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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 A study of climate change-related technology transfer and the legal barriers 
1.1.1 Overview  
Climate change is an unequivocal threat to humankind which is taking place more 
rapidly than many people expected.
1
 To a large extent, the situation as regards the 
climate today is the result of the technological choices we made in the past; similarly, 
the climate in the future will largely be determined by the technology we choose now. 
The changes taking place in technology are particularly important over the long-term 
time scales that are characteristic of climate change.
2
 As the term indicates, climate 
change technologies include climate mitigation technologies aimed at reducing GHG 
emissions and climate adaptation technologies for coping with the impact of climate 
change.
3
 The more rapid and widespread transfer of them requires an inclusive set of 
processes in which equipment, know-how, experience and human resources flow from 




As a positive measure to tackle climate change, technology transfer has both 
economic and environmental benefits. It is expected to improve efficiency in the use 
of energy, introduce less carbon-intensive sources of energy, develop renewable 
energy sources and thus achieve the transition to a low-carbon economy.
5 
From a 
legal perspective, it has been recognized as an avenue for international cooperation in 
relation to the „common concerns of humankind‟,
6
 particularly cooperation between 
developed countries and developing countries. It is certainly true that a collective 
endeavour with regard to climate control and technological advance will benefit all 




Recognizing that technology transfer is an integral part of the international dialogue 
on environment and development, the intergovernmental community has adopted a 
wide variety of provisions in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 
including climate change agreements. Complementing the targets of GHG emission 
reductions, the transfer of technology serves to assist states to fulfil their regulatory 
                                                 
1
 See W. Collins, R. Colman, J. Haywood, M. Manning, and P. Mote, “The Physical Science behind Climate 
Change,” Scientific American, August 2007, pp. 65-70. 
2
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Mitigation of Climate Change, Chapter 2, “Framing Issues.” Decades, or longer time 
scales are typical of the gaps involved between technological innovation and its widespread diffusion, and of the 
capital turnover rates characteristic of long-term energy capital stock and infrastructures. 
3
 For example, climate mitigation technologies mainly include renewable energy technologies (i.e., wind turbines, 
biomass fuels, nuclear energy, and geothermal heat), energy conservation & efficiency technologies (i.e., improved 
building materials, transport processes, advanced recycling technologies, heat recovery technologies, direct 
electrolytic) and others (i.e., carbon capture and storage), while climate adaptation technologies often occur as a 
result of government intervention in the common good and systems such as agriculture, water, biodiversity, ocean 
management and human health (i.e., better agricultural techniques and forest management, drought-resistant plant 
varieties and biogenetic materials, and desalinization plants). More details will be discussed in Chapter 1, “Basic 
concepts and background.”  
4 
IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, Chapter 1.2, “Basic 
Concepts.” 
5 
Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Switzerland, August 2008, pp. 1-8. 
6
 The totality of the global atmosphere can now properly be regarded as the common concern of humankind. See 
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, Chapter 6, “Climate 
Change and Atmospheric Pollution,” Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 339.  
7
 See C. Kemfert, “Climate Coalitions and International Trade: Assessment of Cooperation Incentives by Issue 
Linkage,” Energy Policy, 32(4), 2004, p. 457. 
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commitments under the international climate framework, with developed countries 
taking the lead.
8
 The broad institutional arrangements that consider technology 
transfer to be a crucial tool for achieving specific environmental objectives provide a 
solid foundation for the best possible global result in this interdisciplinary area, with 
varying degrees of success in practice. The increasing importance of technology 
transfer is even more apparent now in the light of the current post-Kyoto agreement 
negotiations.  
 
“Despite the renewed efforts of the international community and the growing 
recognition of the importance of technology, the full potential for the development, 
deployment and transfer of these technologies remains unfulfilled.”
9
 In fact, the 
transfer of technology is not happening fast enough to aid developing countries in 
mitigating and adapting to their climate crisis.
10 
In this respect, both suppliers and 
recipients are actually responsible for this. To a certain extent, they both fail to 
provide a favourable environment for an effective technology transfer in which the 





There are numerous ways of increasing the flow of climate sound technologies and 
improving the quality of the transfer of technologies. However, basically the barriers 
can only be removed by the technology suppliers and recipients themselves. 
According to the IPCC, a barrier is referred to as “any obstacle to reaching a potential 
that can be overcome by policies and measures.”
12
 Policies and measures, whether 
international or national, can be designed well or poorly designed, stringent or loose, 
binding or non-binding, and politically attractive or unattractive.
13
 The obstacles in 
this field are generally regarded to be the result of human factors.
14
 Up to now, 
attention has been devoted to obstacles that hinder the improved access to climate 
mitigation and adaptation technologies in the international climate framework.
15
 
Unfortunately, these barriers have not been addressed in much detail. In general, they 
are centralized in practical areas. Scant weight has been given to legal barriers in rules, 
standards, regimes and institutions, and there is no tailored action because the 
identification, evaluation and prioritization of legal barriers are mostly context-based.  
 
                                                 
8
 Chapter 2, “The Legal Framework of Climate Change-related Technology Transfer.” 
9
 The UN, Climate Change and Technology Development and Technology Transfer, United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs Department, 2008, p. 3. 
10 
The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Technology Diffusions in the Developing World, Development 
Prospects Group Report 42097, Washington DC 2008. 
11 
IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 11.7, “International Spillover Effect”, Chapter 13.3, “International Climate 
Change Agreements and Other Arrangements.” In fact, the IPCC devoted attention in its special 2001 report to the 
barriers which existed. The report contains an extensive overview of the most important barriers in developed, 
developing and transition economies that could impede the transfer of ESTs to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change. The coverage of identified barriers is quite broad, ranging from socio-economic aspects, human capacities 
to legal institutions. 
12 
See idem, Chapter 2.4, “Definition of Barriers, Opportunities and Potentials.” They can be either subjective like 
legal obstacles in codes, standards and procedures, or objective like social infrastructures and resource capacity. 
13
 See idem, Chapter 13.3, “International Climate Change Agreements and Other Arrangements.”  
14
 See idem, Chapter 2.4.3. “Definition of Barriers, Opportunities and Potentials,” which defines a barrier as “any 
obstacle to reaching a potential that can be overcome by policies and measures.” Henceforth “policies” will be 
assumed to include policies, measures, programs and portfolios of policies.  
15 
There are, for example, the IPCC Report 2001, the IPCC Report 2007 and the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer Five Years of Work; the IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Chapter 1.5, “Barriers to the Transfer of 
Environmentally Sound Technologies,” Expert Group on Technology Transfer Five Years of Work, UNFCCC 




China is playing an increasingly important role in climate geopolitics. Being a victim 
of emissions imposed by its industrialised neighbours in the past, China is now seen 
as the new leading emitter linked to global warming.
16
 In the past few decades, the 
mushrooming growth in GDP achieved at the expense of polluting the atmosphere has 
driven China to a historical and moral turning point.
17
 Consequently, the current local 





More recently, the Chinese leadership has become aware of the climate situation, 
which indicates that China will suffer great damage from climate change, while at the 
same time it could itself gain greater net benefits from a good climate policy.
19
 High 
emissions will not only affect domestic concerns such as public health and lead to 
political upheaval, but the shift in the Chinese strategy towards greater collaboration 
and reciprocity in the international world could also be adversely influenced.
20
 The 
Chinese government recognizes this and has begun to take top-down actions for 
climate change, with comprehensive solutions, including technology. 
 
Since early 1980, China has set on a peaceful-rise route by virtue of science and 
knowledge. Technology plays a central role in this, and the need for technology is 
becoming ever more urgent with the forecasts of the impact of climate hazards. 
Outdated technologies still dominate in indigenous industries, and the delayed transfer 
of advanced foreign technologies is leading to a lock-in effect of high emissions for 
decades to come.
21
 Despite the technological changes taking place now, it will take a 
long time for the Chinese domestic energy system to diversify and to ultimately 
achieve clean industries. At the Copenhagen Climate Summit, President Hu Jintao 
declared that China will continue to integrate overcoming climate change in its socio-
economic plan by taking measures: “… to step up efforts to develop green economy, 
low-carbon economy and circular economy, and enhance research, development and 




At the international level, collaborating with other developing countries, China has 
conducted a proactive climate diplomacy, which has led to some tangible changes in 
the climate change lawmaking. As regards technology transfer, it is attempting to 
pursue a practical, problem-solving approach in order to achieve the accessibility, 
affordability, appropriateness and adaptability of technologies required for enhanced 
action on mitigation and adaptation.
23
 To date, China has signed a series of climate 
                                                 
16
 See Jolene Lin, “Climate Governance in China: Using the „Iron Hand‟,” in Benjamin J. Richardson (eds.), Local 
Climate Change Law: Environmental Regulation in Cities and Other Localities, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, 
pp. 3-4. 
17
 See Xun Yan, The Road to a Clean Future, China Economic Publishing House, Beijing, 2009, pp. 41-44. 
18 
China’s National Climate Change Program, Prepared under the Auspices of National Development and Reform 
Commission People‟s Republic of China, 2007, pp. 4-9.  
19
 See Jonathan B. Wiener, “Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China”, 55 UCLA Law Review, 2008, p. 
1813. 
20
 See idem, pp. 1820-1825. 
21
 See Zou Ji, Wang Ke and Fu Sha, “Proposal on Innovative Mechanism for Development and Transfer of 
Environmentally Sound Technologies,” Economic Science Press, 2009, p. 56. 
22
 Chinese President Hu Jintao‟s Speech at the UN Climate Change Summit, 23 September 2009, available at 
http://dk.China-embassy.org/eng/News/t605967.htm. 
23






 Its accession to the WTO spells numerous opportunities for the 
future development and transfer of low carbon technologies. In the meanwhile, China 
has strengthened the relevant legal structures in order to enshrine the national 
commitments in its domestic legal system.
25
 The most recent progress concerns the 




In many respects, this sounds good. Chinese governments have made impressive 
attempts to move towards low carbon development through promoting technology 
innovation and transfer. The practical operation of this, however, gives rise to a 
completely different picture: in general the environment in China is not as hospitable 
for importing and investing in technology as was expected. In this respect, one 
commonly perceived barrier is law related, and there are regulatory, institutional and 
legislative obstacles. On the one hand, the market recognizes the cost of carbon where 
government intervention has a central role is vital to the transfer of climate 
technology.
27
 Legal tools are intended to promote a full, sustainable and meaningful 
technology transfer. On the other hand, the draft legislation in China is rather thin and 
timid. The actual implementation and enforcement are far from ideal, in particular at 
the regional and sectional level, to achieve concrete mitigation and adaptation goals.
28
 
According to the IPCC, robust law must be passed to achieve environmental 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, distribution considerations and institutional 
feasibility.
29
 A substantive discussion on the barriers contained in Chinese legislation 
and practices associated with climate change technology transfer is imperative. 
 
1.1.2 Definition of the problem 
In this context, this thesis will seek to provide answers to the core question: 
 
What are the legal barriers to technology transfer for addressing climate change and 
are there any implications for Chinese legislation and practices? 
 
Four subsidiary questions must be dealt with to answer this central question: 
 
1. What do we mean by technology transfer in a climate change context? What are 
the distinctive features in comparison with regular technology transfer and what 
is the theoretical basis behind this?
30
 
2. What is the legal framework for climate change-related technology transfer? 
What specific principles, rules, institutions and mechanisms have been 
                                                 
24
 There are the 1992 UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2007 Bali Roadmap.    
25 
China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change: the 2009 Progress Report, National Development 
and Reform Commission, November 2009. A series of laws including Energy Conservation Law, Renewable 
Energy Law, Clean Production Promotion Law, Circular Economy Promotion Law, and the formulation and 
implementation of some special or auxiliary regulations, such as the Regulations on Energy Conservation for 
Buildings, Administrative Measures for Electricity Conservation have been put in place as expected. 
26
 China’s Draft Climate Change Law: Setting a Path Toward Emission Reductions, 9 May 2012, available at 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/research/promo/research/1.1859181?&ref=searchlist. 
27
 See David Ockwell, Jim Watson and Gordon MacKerron etc., UK-India Collaboration to Identify the Barriers to 
the Transfer of Low Carbon Energy Technology, Final Report, Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, 2006, p. 40. 
28
 Centre for International Environmental Law (IEL), Climate Change and Technology Transfer: Principles and 
Procedures for Technology Transfer Mechanisms under the UNFCCC, Report of Side Event – UNFCCC Climate 
Change COP, Poznan, Poland, 2 December 2008.  
29
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 13.2.1 “Climate Change and Other Related Policies.” 
30






3. What are the legal barriers in the process of supplying and receiving climate 
sound technologies in general and specifically how do they impact on 
international technology transfer? What kinds of solutions, if any, have been 
proposed to tackle these barriers?
32
 
4. Has climate change-related technology transfer been regulated in China? What 




1.1.3 Methodology  
Technology transfer in response to climate change is a sensitive subject, first, because 
climate-friendly technologies are not automatically transferred to developing 
countries;
34
 secondly, the transfer does not take place as a charity, but on the basis of 
common interests and responsibilities.
35
 Because of the complexity involved, the 
barriers which are present in this process tend to be formidable, multidimensional and 
difficult to detect. For example, different stakeholders involved in technology transfer 
perceive these barriers differently. “Views diverged in particular on the impact of 
different aspects of domestic regulation on technology transfer.”
36
 It is therefore a 
challenge to carry out an in-depth analysis of this interdisciplinary topic in a 
comprehensive, prudent and constructive way.  
 
To deal with this successfully, this PhD thesis applies a combined methodology. We 
reviews the general legislation and literature on the subject. In addition, there is a 
specific review of the literature on the Chinese situation as regards climate mitigation 
and adaptation technology transfer. For more information on what is happening at 
ground level, field research is taking place in China which covers government officers, 
technology enterprises, financial agencies and scholars. Key persons in the field of 
technology transfer and climate change have been interviewed. These all contribute to 
the PhD thesis to a greater or lesser extent. Specifically, the four subsidiary questions 
mentioned above will be dealt with in the following five chapters, after which a 
conclusion will be reached on the core question in the last (sixth) chapter.  
 
The first subsidiary question will be answered in Chapter 1. We will start by outlining 
and describing the basic concepts in general, particularly the key term “technology 
transfer”. What is climate sound technology? In more substantive terms, what are 
climate mitigation and adaptation technologies? How can we distinguish climate 
sound technologies from ordinary technological products? On this basis, the exact 
meaning of climate change-related technology transfer will be presented from both a 
statutory and an operational perspective. we will also demonstrate the necessary link 
between the distinctive characteristics of climate sound technologies and the dynastic 
process of transfer (the theoretical basis). A deeper understanding of the key concepts 
                                                 
31
 Chapter 2 “The Legal Framework of Climate Change-related Technology Transfer.”  
32
 Chapter 3 “Instrumental Barriers to Supplying Climate Sound Technology”; Chapter 4, “Instrumental Barriers to 
Receiving Climate Sound Technology.” 
33
 Chapter 5 “Chinese Legislation and Practice of Climate Sound Technology Transfer.” 
34 
Basically, it is distinct from regular international technology cooperation, which is simply based on knowledge 
gaps and mutual benefits. 
35
 See Hao Min, “The Analysis of the Relationship between Clean Technology Transfer and Chinese Intellectual 
Property Countering the Climate Changes,‟ Dir research series, Working Paper No. 147, 2011, p. 1. 
36
 Technology Transfer in the CDM Projects in China, EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, 2010, p. 15, available 
at http://www.euChina-cdm.org/.  
9 
 
helps to narrow down the scope of the research, prioritise the main points and thus 
guarantee valid answers to research questions.  
 
Chapter 2 will deal with the second question, on the relevance of the legal framework 
for climate change-related technology transfer. A normative analysis is carried out to 
provide an overview of what has been formulated on technology transfer in the 
international climate framework. In the theory-oriented research, the survey of 
normative resources can be of great help to create a system of legal theory, and 
furthermore, to develop and test this appropriately in due course.
37
 Basically, we will 
focus on the key work, the convention, and then describe the groundbreaking efforts 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) related 
to technology transfer, for example, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan and the 
Copenhagen Accord. This chapter will systematically examine the principles, rules, 
standards, institutions and mechanisms. These are assumed to serve as a benchmark 
for assessing whether or not effective technology transfer has been achieved by means 
of domestic legislation and the corresponding implementation. 
 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on the third subsidiary question. Both Chapters address 
the legal barriers on the basis of a review of the literature, but from different 
perspectives. First, Chapter 3 contains a study of the instrumental barriers to the 
process of supplying climate sound technologies. In international practice most 
climate sound technologies originate in northern countries (Annex I countries).
38
 
Some of the common practices resulting from the public policies and institutions of 
these countries will be reviewed in broad terms. In view of the irreplaceable role of 
the private sector, especially multinational enterprises (MNEs), the second part of this 
chapter will take a closer look at their performance, focusing on the legal aspects. 
Secondly, in Chapter 4 we will deal in detail with the legal barriers which exist for 
developing countries (Non-Annex I countries) on the demand side for technology. 
Because the available information is inadequate and there are enormous differences of 
opinion, there cannot be a “one-size-fits-all” approach.
39
 Chapter 4 will mainly follow 
the outline of chapter 3, which concentrates on general practices. However, unlike 
chapter 3, it does not make a clear distinction between the public and private sectors. 
Instead, Chapter 4 gives weight to the barriers themselves. The reason for this is that 
when introducing climate sound technologies, the barriers in the private sector are not 
really legal in nature. To a great extent, they result from real problems such as the 
lack of capacity, and could be resolved with broad governmental policies.  
 
Chapter 5 devotes special attention to the legislation and practices in China. As 
indicated above, climate change-related technology transfer is context based. Present 
day China serves as a significant and clear example of technology transfer used for 
climate mitigation and adaptation. We will therefore start with a picture of the 
background to climate-related technology transfer, for example, the basic policies 
relating to climate change and the endogenous level of technology. This is followed 
by an extensive study of the relevant legalisation. On this basis, a range of regulatory 
                                                 
37
 See Piet Verschuren, Hans Doorewaard, “Design A Research Project,” LEMMA Publishers, Utrecht, 2005, pp. 
33-37.  
38
 See Stephen S., Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects, Chapter 9: “Origin of Technology,” The 
UNFCCC Registration & Issuance Unit CDM/SDM, Montreal, Canada, December 2008, p. 9. 
39
 See Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal Saggi, “Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options, Research Program on Political and Economic Change,” Working Paper 
PEC2004-0003, 2004, p. 17. 
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barriers will be identified, prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the 
international climate framework, as well as the Chinese legislation and its practical 
implementation. The results of field research conducted in China have been 
incorporated in this study. 
 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions, permitting us to define the legal barriers in the transfer 
of technology for addressing climate change and the corresponding implications for 
China. 
 
1.2 Basic concepts 
The term “technology transfer” is used very frequently in the climate change 
negotiations.
40
 A range of definitions has been given to technology transfer with 
potential for climate mitigation and adaptation, but only a few are recognised as a 
standard term by the various stakeholders or at the operational level.
41
 Up to now, the 
climate change agreements themselves have not given a definition of the terms 
“climate sound technology” or “technology transfer”. The interested parties, 
particularly the key players and broad policymakers, have a different perception of 
these concepts. For example, some OECD countries regard the concepts as a form of 
international technology cooperation, while most developing countries insist on the 
expression “technology transfer” which they consider to reflect the essence of the 
obligation of solidarity and assistance.
42
 In practice it is difficult to define technology 
transfer with measurable indicators which could be used to identify, streamline and 




The ongoing discrepancy in the definitions is indicative of some tension in this 
respect.
44
 Therefore it is very important to eliminate the disagreement about the 
concept and to introduce a normative, pragmatic and reliable definition of technology 
transfer in order to promote post-Kyoto climate coordination and cooperation. Up to 
now, the transfer of technology has fallen short of the goals set by the Parties to the 
UNFCCC.
45
 The international community is urgently seeking a new global regime for 
technology transfer.
46
 A clearly defined regime for technology transfer will provide a 
solid basis for effective action. In addition, to deeply explore concepts such as climate 
                                                 
40
 See David Popp, “International Technology Transfer, Climate Change, and the Clean Development Mechanism,” 
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5(1), 2011, pp. 137-139. 
41
 As will be discussed below, there are, for example, the MEA‟s definition, such as the Montreal Protocol, the 
Agenda 21 definition, the IPCC definition, the TNA‟s definition, the CDM project design document definition, the 
WIPO definition, and the GEF definition. In addition, a number of academic definitions have been provided, the 
best known of which are those of Matthew Littleton, 2008; Collins William, 2007; David Haug, 1999; Gaëtan 
Verhoosel, 1998, etc.   
42 
See Chapter 2.2.1, “Technology Transfer Commitments.” Climate sound technologies suppliers in the 
international market prefer the expression “technology cooperation” to “technology transfer”, as the latter 
instinctively emphasizes the solidarity obligation to provide their technologies on favourable terms, with 
concessions, and therefore reduce the net profit they expected from the regular commercialized channels which 
could be achieved by technological cooperation. On the other hand, as far as technology recipients are concerned, 
a solid pattern of technology transfer characterized by the “common but differentiated environmental 
responsibilities of states” and an affordable pricing system are very warmly welcomed. For them this is the only 
way in which they can fully and more effectively participate in the global endeavours to combat climate change. 
43 
These indicators generally include: geographical origin, level of innovation, environmental effectiveness, 
capability building.    
44
 Technology Transfer in Chinese CDM Projects 2010, (no. 36), p. 7. 
45
 Climate Change and Technology Development and Technology Transfer, the United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs Department, 2008, p. 3. 
46
, Expert Group on Technology Transfer Five Years of Work, UNFCCC Climate Change Secretariat, 2007, p. 4. 
More details can be found in Chapter 2.4.3, “Recent developments.” 
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sound technology and technology transfer has an immediate impact: it helps to narrow 
down the scope of research, prioritize the main points and therefore guarantee valid 
answers to research questions. Consequently, the research questions for this chapter 
ask: 
What do we mean by technology transfer in the context of climate 
change? What are the distinctive features in comparison regular 
technology transfer and what is the theoretical basis behind this?  
 
We will start with a general description of basic concepts such as climate sound 
technologies, in particular the key term “technology transfer”. The precise meaning of 
climate change-related technology transfer will be presented on this basis, both from 
the statutory and operational perspective. The thesis will then reveal the link between 
the distinctive features of climate sound technology and the dynastic process of the 
transfer of technology, viz. the theoretical basis. Finally, the remaining part will give 
an overall view of the actual as well as the potential transfer of technology in the 
context climate change. Hopefully a common framework of definitions will be 
established to serve as a basis for an overarching theoretical analysis. 
 
1.2.1Technologies, environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) and climate sound 
technologies 
Technology refers to the application of science and engineering to study problems and 
provide solutions to overcome the physical limitations of human beings.
47
 The 
fundamental role of new technology is to lower costs and achieve society‟s goals by 
reallocating resources.
48
 Whether technology serves us collectively or individually, it 
is greatly dependent on the particular social environment of which it is an integral 
part.
49
 There are rarely technological means without a certain cultural background and 
social values, and similarly the structure of a society in a particular historical period is 
bound to influence our perception of the actual significance of technology.  
 
ESTs 
As we saw above, the history of human consciousness and civilization is a history of 
adaptation, transformation and harmonization with the natural environment
 
in which 
advanced technologies achieve progress through innovation and diffusion, and 
accelerate that progress. However, the interaction between technological change and 
environmental management is not always positive.
50
 The state of the environment 
today is a result of the technological choices we made in the past; history teaches us 
that technology, on its own, is a tool we can put to good use or bad use. Similarly, the 
earth that human beings will inhabit in the future will be largely determined by our 
choices and our use of technology now.
51
 The environmental consequences of 
technological options must be explicitly recognized.
52
 
                                                 
47
 Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies for Sustainable Forest Management, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, United Nations Forum on Forests Secretariat, Framework and Applications, December 2005, p. 
5. 
48
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 2, “Framing Issues,” pp. 148-150. 
49
 WIPO Handbook on Industrial Property Information and Documentation, Part 1, Introduction. 
50
 Technologies typically have a negative impact on the environment. For example, they utilize non-renewable 
resources and generate waste and pollution. See Sustainability Concepts: Environmentally Sound Technologies, 
available at http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/concepts/10-est.html. 
51
 Ontario Centre for Environmental Technology Advancement, Advancing Tomorrow’s Technologies – 2001/02 
Annual Report, 2002.  
52




Environmental concerns have reached a defining moment in history. Due to the 
increasing transboundary environmental problems,
53
 technological solutions have 
necessarily acquired an increasingly international character. The movement of 
technology, typically from developed countries to developing countries, has important 
spillover effects which are considered a critical factor in the assessment of 
environmental policies in global economies.
54
 These technologies, which are 
characterised as being for the public good, are specifically defined as 
 
“… technologies that protect the environment, are less polluting, 
use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of 
their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more 
acceptable manner than the technologies for which they were 
substitutes…. Environmentally sound technologies in the context 
of pollution are „process and product technologies‟ that generate 
low or no waste, for the prevention of pollution. They also cover 





According to Agenda 21, ESTs are intended to solve all sorts of environmental 
problems such as a reduction in pollution, the use of resources, the handling of waste 
and clean production methods where the ideal of sustainable development is a central 
concern.
56
 It is clear that the definition of ESTs has a relative nature. Defining them in 
an absolute sense is difficult, as the environmental soundness of a technology can be 




Climate sound technologies 
The terms “ESTs” and “climate sound technologies” (also referred to as climate- 
related technologies, climate-friendly technologies and climate-responsive 
technologies) are often used interchangeably, for example, in the IPCC reports.
58
 
However, without specifying what constitutes a climate sound technology, the IPCC 
adopts ESTs as a term of general reference.
59
 Accordingly, as their name indicates, 
climate sound technologies are those with the potential to significantly mitigate and 
                                                                                                                                            




 At least in the context of global environmental issues such as ozone depletion and climate change, and the 
MEAs address those issues. There can therefore be no doubt that broad definitions are appropriate. See James 
Shephard, “The Future of Technology Transfer Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements,” 37 ELR, 2007, p. 
10548. 
54
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 11.7.6, “Technology Spillover,” p. 668.   
55
 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Earth Summit 1992, Chapter 34 of Agenda 21. 
56
 As defined in the Brundtland Report in 1987 by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and 
Development, “(…) sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the 
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony 
and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations”. 
57
 United Nations Environment Program Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Phyto-technologies, A 
Technical Approach in Environmental Management, Freshwater Management Series No. 7, available at 
http://www.unep.or.jp/Ietc/Publications/Freshwater/FMS7/2.asp. 
58
 It is worth noting that technologies which address climate change, i.e., which are climate-friendly and climate-
responsive, are not necessarily always environmentally sound.   
59
 IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Chapter 1.2, “Basic Concepts.” 
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adapt to global climate change. It might be fair to say that climate mitigation and 




As an inclusive concept, climate sound technologies comprise two major categories of 
technologies: mitigation technologies and adaptation technologies. Mitigation 
technologies focus on slowing down climate change and mainly include energy 
conservation technologies, renewable energy technologies and clean production 
technologies, while adaptation technologies cope with the effects of climate change in 
key sectors such as agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, ocean management and human 
health.
61
 From the perspective of dynastic technology transfer, mitigation 
technologies are aimed at reducing GHG emissions, in which carbon market plays a 
central role.
62
 However, adaptation technologies occur mainly as a result of 
development objectives and government interventions for the collective good in 
systems.
63
 Furthermore, adaptation technologies usually address site-specific issues 
and the supposed benefits are more locally oriented in comparison with mitigation 




Despite differences regarding some aspects, mitigation technologies and adaptation 
technologies are treated uniformly in the UNFCCC context; otherwise the range of 
issues would become too loose, vague and indeterminate. Mitigation is essential and 
adaptation is inevitable.
65
 The corresponding technologies are closely intertwined as 
two processes in the regulatory framework.
66
 Similarly in this PhD study, we will deal 
with both these technological changes, focusing in particular on mitigation 
technologies, but also highlighting those areas in which the transfer of adaptation 
technologies could be promoted.  
  
According to the international climate framework, the concept of climate sound 
technologies has numerous significant characteristics. First, although a large number 
of climate sound technologies are generated by private innovation, they have 
characteristics of being for the public good because of their potential contribution to 
the atmosphere which has been acknowledged as “public property” and a “common 
concern of mankind.”
67
 Essentially climate mitigation and adaptation technologies are 
aimed at overcoming global environmental externalities.
68
 However, this socio-
environmental function does not always coincide with commercial interests in reality, 
and is likely to be undermined by a highly competitive market that focuses on 
maximizing the economic function of a technological product.
69
 Secondly, climate 
sound technologies are designed to cover the full spectrum of the technological cycle, 
                                                 
60
 Wang Canfa, “The Field Research on Technology Transfer in Addressing Climate Change and its Implication for 
Chinese Legislation and Practices,” PhD Research Program, 2011.  
61
 Idem. Specifically, there are technologies dealing with dykes, sea-walls in coastal management, fertilizers, 
irrigation, reservoirs in agriculture, sanitation systems and health-care infrastructure for heat waves, droughts, 
floods and windstorms, etc.  
62
 Ockwell, Watson and MacKerron 2006, (no. 27), p. 11. 
63
 IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Chapter 1.2, “Basic Concepts.” 
64
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 13.2.2, “Linking National Policies.”  
65
 Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change, Adaptation, Technology and Science Program of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, Climate Change Secretariat of UNFCCC, Bonn, 2006. 
66
 See T. Barker, Representing Global, Climate Change, Adaptation and Mitigation, Global Environmental Change, 
2003, pp. 1-6. 
67
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell 2008, (no. 6), pp. 338-339. 
68
 Zou, Wang and Fu 2009, (no. 21), p. 19. 
69
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 13.1.2, “Criteria for Policy Choice.” 
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and require a system that involves institutional, manageable and prudent coordination, 
rather than a single piece of know-how, equipment, machinery or product such as 
specific and tangible hardware. “Both the development of the hybrid car engine and 
the development of the internet retailing mechanism represent technological 
changes.‟
70
 Finally, the definition of climate sound technologies has an abstract, 
indeterminate and rather unlimited scope. Like ESTs, it is difficult to define climate 
sound technologies in an absolute sense.
71
 What could be a climate sound technology 
now, in one country or region, might not be so somewhere else ten years later. 
Therefore it is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of technologies in a changing 
context.
72
 However, unlike other ESTs (e.g., biomedicines), climate sound 
technologies are highly diverse in character. As mentioned above, it is possible to 
make a distinction between climate mitigation and adaptation technologies.
73
 Even 
within mitigation technologies, the emphasis on the stages of innovation, diffusion 
and assimilation differ. 
 
1.2.2 Technology transfer  
1.2.2.1 Technology transfer in traditional business 
Technology transfer is difficult to define as it happens in many different ways.
74
 In 
the original sense, it refers to “the diffusion and adoption of technology and know-
how between parties, typically private companies, universities, financial institutions, 
governments and non-governmental organizations.”
75
 The traditional model of 
technology transfer which originated in the 1950s was based on large-scale foreign 
investment in developing countries, but did not comprise much domestic capacity 
building and focused almost exclusively on the procurement of hardware and 
machinery, without regard for human resource development.
76 
Traditional technology 
transfer predominantly takes place in the private marketplace in two forms: (1) 
internally between headquarters and subsidiaries of MNEs, and (2) externally between 
foreign and domestic enterprises. Technology transfer is an important factor in 
strategic alliances, based on foreign investment, to maintain a competitive edge in the 





                                                 
70
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Chapter 2, “Framing Issues,” p. 148. Achieving this will add essential value to 
promoting technology transfer in the international climate framework. The extremely broad definition of climate-
related technologies adopted by the second Conference of the Parties (COP2) of UNFCCC in 1996 identified: 
practices and processes such as “soft” technologies, for example, capacity building, information networks, training 
and research, as well as “hard” technologies, for example, equipment to control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) in energy, transport, forestry, agriculture, and industry sectors, to enhance 
removals by sinks, and to facilitate adaptation. 
71
 Environmentally Sound Technologies for Sustainable Development 2003, (no. 52), pp. 16-14. 
72
 International Environmental Technology Centre, UNEP, Technology Transfer: The Seven Cs for the Successful 
Transfer and Uptake of Environmentally Sound Technologies, 22, 2003. However, worldwide they are not yet 
viewed as being acceptable.  
73
 Climate adaptation technologies are closely linked to ethical/human rights: the rights to health, food and shelter. 
74
 See Matthew Littleton, “The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Climate Change-Related Technologies to 
Developing Countries,” DESA Working Paper, No. 71, 2008, p. 2.  
75
 Shephard 2007, (no. 53), p. 10547. 
76 
See Gill Wilkins, “Technology Transfer for Renewable Energy: Overcoming Barriers in Developing Countries,” 
Royal Institute of International Affairs Sustainable Development Programme, Taylor & Francis, Inc., 2002, p.42. 
77
 According to WIPO, General knowledge or IP rights involved in technology transfer are: (1) licensed in the form 
of intellectual property; (2) the subject of formal consulting or training agreements; (3) communicated in the work 
place or research settings; (4) diffused by publication or other means. See Technology Transfer & Licensing, IP 
Strategies and Innovation of WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/strategies/technology.html. 
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To be applied, the spillover of technologies relies on particular political, economic 
and social backgrounds, which means that innovations produced by one country in 
one industry will consciously or unconsciously become standard practice for that 
industry worldwide.
78
 The globalization of technologies is an irreversible trend, 
leaving little opportunity for individual societies to decide whether they wish to 
accept it. Furthermore, they may or may not have the capability to accept it. In 
traditional business, the transferability of technology was originally based on the 
mobility of international elements. As one part of this dynastic process, technology 
was often linked to other elements, such as capital, products and human resources. 
Taking human resources as an example, this not only involves micro-level skills such 
as operation and maintenance, but also the macro-level social capacities to understand, 




So what do we mean by the term “transfer” in the context of MEAs? What is the role 
of climate sound technologies in determining technology transfer and what is the best 
way to transfer mitigation and adaptation technologies using a common, normative 




1.2.2.2 Climate change-related technology transfer 
Technology transfer is an important subject in debates on climate change policy, but 
often proves to be a source of confusion.
81
 On the whole, the endless confusion 
originates from the fact that is there no uniform, workable and comprehensible 
definition of technology transfer related to climate change.
82
 In reality there are 
various viewpoints and interpretations of the concept of technology transfer: some are 
rooted in existing statutes; others have developed from practice in the field.  
 
(1) Statutory definition 
Almost all MEAs and climate change agreements are very cautious with regard to 
describing technology transfer in their provisions. Instead of a direct definition, the 
legal meaning of technology transfer remains concealed, leading to various 
interpretations.
 83
 Two examples can be illustrated in this respect: Agenda 21 and the 
IPCC Report.  
 
The definition in Agenda 21 
At a conceptual level, Agenda 21 plays an irreplaceable role by providing a basis for 
the definition of ESTs and pursuing technology transfer - on a global scale. It 
elaborates the dynastic process of technology transfer on the basis of the definition of 
                                                 
78
 Environmentally Sound Technologies for Sustainable Development 2003, (no. 52), p. 7. 
79 
The reason for this is that the mobile process of technology transfer will temporarily or ultimately come to an 
end in an exogenous context. See Hitoshi Kondo, “International Factor Mobility and Production Technology,” 
Population Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1989, pp. 290-299. 
80 
WIPO, “The Climate of IP and the IP of Climate: An Overview of the Policy Issues Technology Transfer, the IP 
system and climate change: challenges and options,” Side Event, UNCCC COP 14, Poznan, December 2008, p. 12. 
81 
See Taishi Sugiyama, Climate Change, Energy and International Environmental Issues, Cooperative Climate, 
Chapter 1, Cutler J. Cleveland (ed.), November 2008, available at 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Cooperative_Climate:_Chapter_1. 
82
 See Gaëtan Verhoosel, “Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transferring 
Environmentally Sound Technologies”, 11 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 49, 1998, p. 62. 
83
 Many MEAs, including the Montreal Protocol, Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, etc., which contain requirements for the transfer of ESTs, without defining the term “transfer”, for 





 Several important statements are thus contained “to guide interpretation of 
this definition with emphasis on facilitating the accessibility and transfer of 
technology, particularly in developing countries, as well as the essential role of 
capacity building and technology cooperation in promoting sustainable 
development.”
85
 Although it is rather simple, Agenda 21 serves as a clear example for 
understanding technology transfer which addresses environmental problems, and has 





The definition in the IPCC 2001 Report  
Of all the official definitions of technology transfer, the most representative tends to 
be the definition adopted by the IPCC. According to the IPCC 2001 Report, 
technology transfer is defined as: 
 
“A broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, 
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate 
change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, 
private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and 
research/education institutions…The broad and inclusive term 
„transfer‟ encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology 
cooperation across and within countries. It covers the transfer of 
EST processes between developed countries, developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition, amongst developed 
countries, amongst developing countries and amongst countries 
with economies in transition. It comprises the process of learning 
to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including the 
capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions and integrate 




A closer examination indicates that the wording used above refers to three key points 
for an understanding of technology transfer related to climate change. These are: (1) 
highly interdisciplinary: a range of perspectives based on different views of climate 
sound technology transfer: as a technological product originating from the private 
sector, as a public commodity for global climate welfare and as a socio-economic 
process in changing technology;
88
 (2) systematic project: technology transfer is not a 
one-off transaction independent of the recipients, but a fundamental part of 
                                                 
84
 Agenda 21, Chapter 34.1, Chapter 34.3.  
85
 Agenda 21, Chapter 34.3. “…this implies that when discussing transfer of technologies, the human resource 
development and local capacity-building aspects of technology choices, including gender-relevant aspects, should 
also be addressed. Environmentally sound technologies should be compatible with nationally determined socio-
economic, cultural and environmental priorities”. Also see UNDP, Definition of Environmentally Sound 
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compatible with nationally determined socio-economic, cultural and environmental priorities. 
87
 IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Chapter 1.2, “Basic Concepts.” 
88
 See idem, Chapter 2.7.3, “The International Dimension in Technology Development and Deployment: 





 Total technology transfer includes capacity building, which calls for a 
universal effort from both developed and developing countries, public and private 
sectors; (3) relative concept: technology transfer is mostly context-based, the regime 
is drawn up in a bottom-up manner, simply codifying the pledges that countries are 




The IPCC makes an important contribution to standardising the term of technology 
transfer. It has a good understanding of the basics of multifaceted technology transfer 
and could help to achieve the full potential of climate sound technologies.
91
 Because it 
is frequently referred to and widely accepted, this concept serves as guideline for 
scientific literature and climate negotiations. Nevertheless, the success of the IPCC 
definition of technology transfer should not be overstated. According to the definition, 
the technologies under the UNFCCC are much less specific and are in fact unlimited. 
“Only when the technologies to be transferred are very specific and readily 
identifiable will developed countries be able to make concrete commitments and to 
effectively monitor compliance with the resulting obligations.”
92
 There is no all-
encompassing theory which covers such a broad definition of technology transfer, 
though numerous frameworks and models have been put forward in existing climate 
change agreements.
93
 More importantly, although the IPCC definition is 
acknowledged to be a useful guide in a general sense, it turns out to be rather limited 
in practice, because of the lack of operability that is required. The CDM‟s project 
designs document is a prime example.
94
 When registering a project, the CDM 
participants are asked to present a description in their project design documents of 
“how environmentally safe and sound technology and know-how to be used is 
transferred to the host Party.”
95
 According to some technology transfer assessments 
conducted in the CDM projects,
96
 realistic technology transfer happens at a low level 
because market participants‟ perceptions of technology transfer vary.  
 
The IPCC definition has come up against numerous challenges, as well as undergoing 
improvements, during the progress of climate change negotiations. In 2009, the 
UNFCCC published a handbook to launch a technology needs assessment for climate 
change, in which technology transfer was described as “the flow of experience, know-
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how and equipment between and within countries, which would typically combine 
market and non-market based technologies.”
97
 In the handbook, the origin of 
technologies is highlighted for the purpose of a needs assessment. Notably, the 
handbook definition in particular sheds light on non-market based technologies. The 
recent trend in long-term cooperative action on climate change shows that non-market 





(2) Operational definition 
“A workable definition of technology transfer must be functional rather than formal.”
 
99
 Concrete performance indicators are needed to make the term “technology transfer” 
less abstract and closer to daily legal practice. In line with the basic definition laid 
down by the IPCC, there are four elements which account for operational technology 
transfer: origin, innovation, improvement and capacity.  
 
Geographical source 
Either the components of technologies (major or essential equipment) or the rights to 
technologies (patents, licences, copyrights, trademarks) must originate from abroad. 
Actual physical movement is not always necessary, because there is no tangible 
exchange across international borders when rights originate abroad. For example, 
foreign enterprises could give recipients the right to manufacture related equipment in 
host countries, or provide on-site technological assistance to local operators. It is 
argued that importing foreign expertise with experience of technology production, 




Degree of innovation 
The imported technologies should not already be in use in the receiving markets, or in 
any specific regions or industrial sectors as a result of research and development 
(R&D). Nowadays many counties are engaged in R&D at the same time; mitigation 
and adaptation technologies exist in domestic markets, but are not commonly 
commercialized or used.
101
 Therefore, it is important to identify technology options in 
advance. In the portfolios of identified technologies, “new” technologies are 





Compared with alternative technologies, technologies to be transferred are more 
environmentally-sound and in the case of climate change, should contribute to 
reducing the intensity of CO2 in the atmosphere or should adapt to the impact of 
climate change. Basically, technologies that fulfil the requirement of innovation and 
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of foreign origin are climatic sound.
103
 They perform better in many respects, e.g., as 
regards efficiency (when applicable), capacity, lifetime, and the degree of technical 
sophistication required for manufacturing, installation and operation. As predicted, 
these all ensure a good environment potential, which will benefit not only the local 
but also the global climate.
104
 Under some circumstances, transferring these 
technologies also has side effects in the socio-economic domain and therefore also 





In fact, most mitigation and adaptation technologies are highly scientific. However, 
rather than relying on being a “magical bullet”, they depend on human skills.
106
 
Therefore by definition technology transfer is pointless, unless adequate measures are 
taken with regard to the development of human resources.
107
 For the transfer of 
physical technological equipment, it is important that the capability to manufacture, 
operate and maintain it is also transferred. In fact, several key players have expressed 
an interest in capacity building. For example, some European organizations refer to 
capacity building as a “key to success” and a way to “secure more sustainable 
projects.”
108
 Capacity building in relation to technology transfer particularly makes 
sense in the long term. It is only if the “soft element” of technologies is transferred, 





The above four performance indicators – origin, innovation, improvement and 
capacity – were introduced to measure the specific level of technology transfer in 
practice, ranging from “absolutely no technology transfer” to “a higher degree of 
technology transfer.” Representing a new realism in overcoming climate change with 
technological solutions, operational technology transfer improves our understanding, 
interpretation and implementation of the UNFCCC provisions concerned.
110
   
 
To sum up, there are increasing concerns that technology transfer should be better 
defined in the statutory and operational context of addressing climate change. In a 
legal sense, a conceptual limitation would lead to problems regarding the institutional 
                                                 
103
 For example, they are more efficient in GHG reductions, or generate more CERs compared to existing 
technologies. 
104
 Environmental improvements may include the following examples: reductions in or avoiding local air pollution, 
reductions in water pollution, reductions in waste, and reductions in the use of resources.  
105
 For example, they are better for health improvement, an improved quality of life, education and equality; the 
main economic improvements are: the alleviation of poverty, job creation and the quality of employment, the 
improvement of skills and enterprise stimulation. See UNFCCC Handbook for Conducting Technology Needs 
Assessment for Climate Change 2009, (no. 97), p. 30. 
106 
See Andrew Barnett, UNCTAD Secretariat, “Do Environmental Imperatives Present Novel Problems and 
Opportunities for the International Transfer of Technology?” UNCTAD/DST/4, UN Sale, No. E.95, D, New York 
1995, p. 14. 
107
 UN Environmental Program, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technological Advice, Ways and Means to Promote and Facilitate Access, and Transfer and 
Development of Technology, Including Biotechnology; Note by the Secretary, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/2/6,Para. 
32,1996. 
108
 Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China 2010, (no. 36), p. 8. 
109
 Ockwell, Watson and MacKerron 2006, (no. 27), p. 10. The “soft element” of technologies is based on the 
traditional notion of “hardware” (physical equipment) and is often the most important. 
110
 Under the present framework of definitions, there are normally two operational definitions of technology 
transfer: (1) the straightforward application in both the theoretical and practical fields; (2) the twofold application, 





 and would consequently impede specific implementation.
112
 Therefore 
we are attempting to provide a comprehensive, objective and open analysis of the 
relevant concepts, without aiming to provide a definitive answer. In this PhD study 
climate sound technology transfer is defined as the flow of advanced foreign 
technologies (components and rights), from the development of technology-related 
institutions to the final stage of technological self-reliance. 
 
1.3 Background: climate change-related technology transfer 
1.3.1 Technology transfer and climate change  
Like old wine in a new bottle, the recent progress in addressing the environmental and 
climate crisis has revitalised international technology transfer in the business world.
 
113
 “What makes technology transfer more of [an] emerging feature of international 
environmental law is the first world‟s discovery that international technology transfer 
has a selfish application in addition to its obvious altruistic application of cleaning up 
the environment.”
114
 In this respect, the transfer of technology goes beyond the global 
solidarity of sharing technology advocated by the Declaration on the establishment of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) that simply aims to bridge the gap 




When confronting the urgent and prevailing crisis of climate change, technology 
transfer becomes more negotiable. In pragmatic terms, developing countries could 
achieve modern carbon-free economies in a relatively short time with the 
dissemination of global technology; while developed countries could achieve their 
environment targets and at the same time stimulate trade by entering foreign markets 
and exporting more products and services. Technology spillovers over a long period 
are particularly characteristic of climate change.
116
 As the IPCC pointed out, current 
technologies that are already operating or at the pilot stage could nearly double in the 
next hundred years or more.
117
 By applying what we already know on a large scale, it 
would be possible to stabilize GHG concentrations at 500±50 parts per million.
118
 
Therefore it is tempting to pin one‟s hope on the potential of technology with regard 
to possible climate change and the feasibility and cost of climate policies. The 
rationale of technology transfer to address climate change has been well documented 
in the international climate framework. It is a potential stumbling block, but also an 
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opportunity for a breakthrough in the current and future negotiations to reach a 





In short, the recent developments of climate politics reflect the shift from hollow 
rhetoric to an “Environmental Realpolitik” approach characterized by differentiation 
and rationalization.
120
 International technology transfer is entering a new era of global 
climate welfare and a new realism.  
 
1.3.2 The theoretical basis 
Technology transfer targeting climate mitigation and adaptation is essentially 
different from business-as-usual technology transfer. The theoretical basis can be 
examined from three perspectives: the market mechanism, market failure and 
government failure.  
     
(1) The market mechanism 
Combating climate change calls for the universal participation of states which are at 
different stages of technological progress. The fundamental demand for international 
technology transfer arises from knowledge gaps in different places, viz. supply and 
demand.
121
 The degree of tension between supply and demand has a direct impact on 
the scope and speed of technological movement. At the moment, technology transfer 
primarily takes place in response to market forces, such as market size, partnerships, 
capital and competition conditions, etc.    
 
Under the market-led mechanism, the R&D costs of technology transfer are borne by 
the transferee, and in this case developing countries are usually the main 
transferees.
122
 Due to the need for cost-effectiveness, the costs of technology are very 
likely to exceed a socially optimal level, which implies a reduction in the national 




(2) Market failure  
As an innovative product, climate sound technology is expected to increase in value, 
while as a public good, it must be applied on a large scale worldwide in order to 
improve the situation as regards the atmosphere. The legal status of the atmosphere as 
a “common concern of mankind”
124
 means that market mechanism plays only a 
limited role here. Two failures have become apparent: (a) the failure to internalize the 
environmental costs of climate change, thus reducing the incentive for innovation in 
the private sector. Typically, global warming is a negative externality and 
implementing technology transfer will lead to costs and benefits which are not fully 
internalized by those involved.
125
 However, positive spillovers occur only when 
technological information is disseminated in the wider economy and the technology 
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suppliers do not profit from the economic value of the transfer.
126
 (b) The failure to 
hold back and distort the private sector investment in technological advances, 
irrespective of environmental concerns.
127
 Because the global climate is a public good, 
the private sector does not have an adequate incentive to invest in the public sector, 
which makes hardly any profit or a small profit and is universally accompanied by the 
“free ride”‟ phenomenon.
128
 This significantly reduces the incentives for technology 
transfer. 
  
Market failures cannot resolve themselves and appropriate measures must be taken by 
governments to ensure that the objectives of the UNFCCC are achieved. For example, 
governments could push the supply and pull the demand of technology to effectively 
guide the private IPR holders and supervise the climate technology market.
129
 This 
applies to an even greater extent for technologies that are used for climate adaptation; 





(3) Government failure 
Government intervention could overcome the failures of the market mechanism. 
Nevertheless, as the atmosphere is a common concern of mankind, it is perhaps fair to 
say that there is no real global governance by a supranational government. In fact, 
global climate governance has to a large extent been fragmented.
131
 For example, 
there is hardly any uniform management in the global market of climate mitigation 
and adaptation technology.  
 
“The challenge is to achieve the global public good of climate protection – averting a 
tragedy of the global commons – through consensual action by heterogeneous 
national actors.”
132
 At the national level, each state pursues certain political, economic 
and social objectives that are rarely consistent.
133
 Climate sound technologies are 
closely linked to energy security, economic growth and international competitiveness, 
which are all very important to states.
134
 Yet despite this, in the two-tier game of 
climate sound technology transfer, the activities of national officials and interest 
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groups in national politics and intergovernmental politics are insufficient.
135
 Global 
endeavours go beyond the negotiations related to individual interests.
136
 “With no 
global sovereign to adopt coercive regulation, countries must be affirmatively 




In short, framing optimal policies to effectively promote climate sound technology 
transfer is difficult, due to potential market failure as well as government failure. That 
is probably the source of the paradox: combining public climate welfare and private 
commercial interests in one regime.  
 
1.3.3 Practices and trends  
“The complex way in which climate-related technology moves from individual to 
individual and organization to organization raises [a] preconditioned problem in the 
meaningful and effective transfer of technology.”
138
 To stand any chance of success, 
the relevant knowledge, money (investment) and goods (trade) have to be ultimately 
transferred as concepts embedded in people‟s mind 
 
In general, technologies with the potential to address climate change are at the 
different stages of development (see figure 1), ranging from R&D, demonstration, 
deployment, diffusion and transfer.
139
 Different stages imply the marketing and 
market penetration of technology, which impacts the ultimate technology transfer. For 
example, in the earlier stages like R&D and demonstration where the associated 
technologies are at the laboratory stage and will be implemented in a limited number 
of commercial facilities or research institutes in order to collect necessary information 
before entering market, experience has showcased that direct public support is 
generally needed.
140
 At the moment, “many low carbon technologies are currently at 
pre-commercial or supported commercial stages of deployment and may therefore 
require some form of government support in order to facilitate their wider 
adoption.”
141
 Other technologies like carbon capture and storage technologies (CCS), 
they are generally understood and enter the stage of deployment and diffusion that is 
commercially mature and very close to transfer.
142
 The stakeholders involved in this 
and their motivation and the action they take at every stage vary enormously. “With 
the analysis of interests and influences of different stakeholders at each stage, 
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In practice, the climate sound technology market is becoming increasingly globalized 
and states benefit from each other‟s technological advances. Up to now international 
technology transfer has reflected a gradual increase in the importance of the private 
sector.
144
 Nowadays nearly 80% of climate sound technologies reside in the private 
sector, which are – and will be – the most important players in the process of 
technology transfer.
145
 Technologies can be developed in either the public sector or 
the private sector, but successful technologies created in the public sector often have 
spin- offs in the private sector, because the latter is regarded as being better at 
exploiting the market potential of these technologies. Most climate mitigation and 
adaptation technologies are realistically concentrated in MNEs. As key players, 
MNEs are the major producers of GHG emissions, but could probably also be the 
main providers of final technical solutions.
146
 Therefore further attempts must be 
made to promote greater participation and identify potential obstacles in this sector for 
the international climate framework of the future. For example, at the very least, no 
more resources should be wasted on negotiations about who should bear the major 
responsibility for technology transfer: governments or the private sector. The 
negotiations should focus rather on how the public regime can successfully engage the 
private sector in this respect.  
 
1.4 Conclusion  
Technology transfer is seen as a good solution to overcoming long-term climate 
problems. However, it seems impractical – or at least, rather difficult – to formulate a 
catch-all definition of technology transfer at the statutory level. A variety of 
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definitions have been given for technology transfer with the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions and adapt to the impact of climate change. A few are acknowledged in 
practice as a standardized reference by different stakeholders.  
 
Unfortunately, climate change agreements themselves do not provide a definition of 
“climate sound technology” and “transfer”. The lack of a uniform, reliable and 
workable and definition of technology transfer in response to climate change often 
proves to be a source of confusion. A common framework of definitions as a basis for 
a general theoretical analysis is becoming increasingly important. To reach a better 
understanding of technology transfer, the definition of climate sound technology has 
to be clarified first. Without specifying what constitutes a climate sound technology, 
the IPCC refers to the general concept of ESTs formulated in Agenda 21: 
technologies aiming at solving all sorts of environmental problems where the ideal of 
sustainable development is the centre of concern. Accordingly, as their name indicates, 
climate sound technologies refer to the ESTs with the potential to significantly 
mitigate and adapt to global climate change. Therefore there are basically two major 
categories of technologies: mitigation technologies and adaptation technologies.  
  
The definition of climate sound technology has decisive implications for how 
technology transfer is perceived in the context of climate change: as an innovative 
technological product from the private sector, as a public commodity for global 
climate welfare, or as a socio-economic process of learning. The IPCC developed the 
most representative concept of technology transfer on this basis, which is widely 
referred to and accepted. In the light of the IPCC, technology transfer is a highly 
interdisciplinary, context-driven and systemic process. The IPCC definition 
successfully captures the core of multifaceted technology transfer and may help to 
achieve the full potential of climate sound technologies. Nevertheless, although this 
definition is more than a merely formal concept, it lacks the necessary operability to 
direct activities in the real world. Therefore the technologies covered by the UNFCCC 
are not very specific and can even be said to be unlimited. For a functional rather than 
formal definition, there are four concrete performance indicators: geographical origin, 
the requirement of innovation, environmental improvement and capacity building. 
 
The in-depth descriptions of basic concepts led to the second general conclusion of 
this chapter, which is that climate change technology transfer is essentially 
distinguished from the technology transfer occurring in the usual business fields. Like 
old wine in a new bottle, the recent progress in addressing transboundary 
environmental problems has revitalised international technology transfer in the 
business world. Given the urgent nature of climate change and the prevailing crisis in 
this respect, technology transfer has become more negotiable. Breakthroughs in the 
current and future negotiations on technology transfer are needed to reach a consensus 
on complex issues such as how to define and implement “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” in order to achieve global climate welfare.
147
 The global solidarity of 
sharing technology no longer simply aims to bridge the gap between the rich and poor. 
 
Meanwhile, potential distinctions have resulted in a paradox in the two-tier game of 
technology transfer. Climate sound technologies produced by the private sector are 
expected to increase in value, which means the price will be higher than a marginal 
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cost. The transfer of technology thus primarily takes place in response to market 
forces. However, the market mechanism plays only a limited role in relation to the 
atmosphere as “common property”. The environmental costs of climate change are 
not internalised and therefore the incentive for innovation in the private sector is 
reduced, unless governments push the supply and pull the demand to encourage the 
private IPR holders and supervise the climate technology market. Even so, it is 
perhaps fair to say that there is no viable global governance by a supranational 
government. The challenge is to achieve the global public good of climate protection 
by means of the concerted action of heterogeneous national actors who have a stake in 
climate technology transfer related to energy security, economic growth and 
international competitiveness. “With no global sovereign to adopt coercive regulation, 





In practice, the climate sound technology market is becoming increasingly globalized. 
Many low carbon technologies are currently at the pre-commercial or supported 
commercial stages of development and may therefore require some form of 
government support to be more widely adopted. If they are to have any chance of 
success, it is very important to identify the various interests, influences and barriers of 
different stakeholders during each stage of technology process. For example, up to 
now, international technology transfer has gradually increased in importance in the 
private sector. To be successful, technology transfer must effectively engage this key 
sector in the international climate framework, and this will be systematically 





                                                 
148
 Wiener 2008, (no. 19), p. 1805. 
27 
 
Chapter 2 The Legal Framework of Climate Change-related 
Technology Transfer 
 
Climate change is a topic that is as much a political and economic challenge as it is a 
legal one.
1
 The dual purpose of technology transfer to combat the global climate crisis 
and to share technological and financial resources means that it is an important issue 
in today‟s international legal system. Recognizing that technology transfer has 
become an integral part of the international dialogue on environmental and 
developmental policies, intergovernmental society has responded proactively by 
framing legislation to facilitate this process through domestic and international action. 
A broad institutional regime that regards technology transfer as a crucial economic 
tool for achieving specific environmental objectives lays a solid foundation for the 
best global solution in this interdisciplinary area, which has had varying degrees of 
success in practice. 
 
Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 
technology transfer has successfully re-emerged and played an increasingly important 
role in international and national laws and policies. The concept of technology 
transfer has become one of central concepts in the context of climate change. 
Gradually a practical need has arisen to define precisely the function of the legal 
instruments in this process. “Negotiators need to agree on the functions the 
institutions are meant to serve.”
2
 Exploring the role of law – more specifically the 
legal principles, statutory rules and institutions – is primarily based on a systematic 
survey of normative resources which codify technology transfer in the context of 
climate change. This chapter will focus specifically on the following question: 
 
What is the legal framework for climate change-related 
technology transfer? What specific principles, rules, institutions 
and mechanisms have been developed? 
 
In the assessment of MEAs, one of key parameters is to identify whether their 
formulation contributes to the development and transfer of ESTs. Ideally a feasible 
climate change agreement should encourage the transfer of technology; without this it 
may be difficult or impossible to achieve emissions reductions on a significant scale.
3
 
We will begin with the early efforts of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 and 
elaborate on these efforts further, using examples from the field of climate change. 
 
2.1 Background: Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 
2.1.1 An overview 
By and large, climate-related technology transfer is regulated by the UNFCCC 
proceedings which originated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held twenty years ago. In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit succeeded in 
delivering the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC. Since then, the transfer 
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of ESTs has taken on a new urgency in international environmental policies and laws. 
The Rio Declaration adopted explicit language to promote technology transfer.
4
 At the 





Both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 aim to achieve a sustainable society 
characterised by the development of an economy aware of the importance of low 
carbon emissions, in which technology plays a central role. Two principles were put 
forward to achieve this and these have had a far-reaching influence on the process of 
technology transfer.  
 
2.1.2 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
In the first instance, the Rio Declaration sheds light on technology transfer by setting 
out the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Above all, Principle 7 
states: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth‟s ecosystem.”
6
 To maximize the efforts of 
all nations, it is assumed that both the developed and developing world will take steps 
to protect the climate system, which is an integral part of ecosystem.
7
 The principle is 
based on a widespread consensus that the situation as regards the atmosphere today is 
the result of accumulated effects produced by various factors. Historically, developed 
countries are major GHG emitters, emitting most GHG continuously, while 
developing countries have also contributed to adverse global warming, and their share 
of emissions is increasing. Under the common responsibility, developing countries 
agree to be Party to the declaration, to fulfil their obligations in return not only for an 
improved climatic environment, but also for financial and technical support.
8
 
Including every country in the search for solutions to climate change ensures 
universal participation in present and future negotiations and initiatives.
9
 However, it 
is important to remember that common responsibility merely aims to encourage all 
Parties to devote attention to climate change and develop policies, but does not 




Another fundamental aspect of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities inherent in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 is that the principle 
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mandates varying responsibilities, despite its application to all the participants.
11
 The 
term “differentiated” responsibility implies substantive equality,
12
 as it takes into 
account the history and capacity of participants. In response to the need to stabilize 
GHG concentrations, developed countries are requested to adopt domestic measures 
on climate mitigation and adaptation by limiting GHG emissions and by strengthening 
carbon sinks and receivers. Furthermore, in taking the lead, they commit themselves 
to undertake marginally more obligations to assist developing countries to tackle 
climate change through innovation, and the dissemination and utilization of climate 
mitigation and adaptation technologies.
13
 On the one hand, the realistic capabilities of 
developing countries, e.g., at the economic and technological level, are insufficient to 
guarantee effective implementation, but on the other hand, it is important to ensure 
that there is reasonable space for the eradication of poverty as well as social growth in 




For the targets to be achievable and compliance to be viable, the Rio Declaration, 
Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC make the participation of developing countries a 
precondition for cooperative action in the field of technology transfer.
15
 Therefore 
developed countries with the obligation to act with solidarity and provide assistance, 
and with superior capacities, are expected to make their advanced technologies 
available, especially those produced in the public domain, as the whole world will 
benefit from improvements in climate technology.
16
      
 
In conclusion, technology transfer which addresses climate change reflects both the 
aspects of global environmental governance and intra-generational equity. The well-
known principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is enshrined to reduce 
the gap between these, providing a basis for the transboundary flow of good climate 
technology. So far this principle has been widely accepted in international 
environmental law.
17
 At the very least, an equitable balance acceptable to the great 
majority of developed and developing countries has ultimately been achieved on the 
basis of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. However, 
practical terms, the question remains whether the scope of this principle merely 
encompasses states. In fact, the private sector represents a significant proportion of 
the efforts to find a solution. “It will be fair to require [it to also incorporate] the 
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2.1.3 The principle of cooperation 
Another important principle which has an impact on technology transfer is the 
principle of cooperation. As a traditional principle of international environmental law, 
the formulation of cooperation in the Rio Declaration takes various different forms. 
Concrete principles targeting poverty eradication
19
 the internalization of 
environmental costs
20
 and the development of international liability law,
21
 constitute a 
further elaboration of the principle of cooperation. With regard to technology transfer, 
the inclusive principle of cooperation is “no longer simply aimed at the prevention of 
damage in neighbour states, but at sustainable (social and economic) development for 




Agenda 21 also formulates this principle. Not only have more detailed proposals been 
added for the actions of different stakeholders regarding technology transfer, but 
technical cooperation is also required at the grassroots level and regulatory incentives 
are included at the level of government.
23
 This does not see technological and 
financial assistance as charity, but as “a common obligation and responsibility”. On 
the one hand, the chapter 34 of Agenda 21 acknowledges the importance of 
governments in insisting on cooperation in the transfer of technology, which requires 
mutual understanding to be strengthened at high levels. On the other hand, there are 
few indications of how governments should play a practically effective role in the 




Despite its limitations, Agenda 21 is the first example of a true summary of 
international cooperation which is considered to be important for the innovation and 
transfer of ESTs. Several critical aspects affecting the international flow of carbon-
free technologies are underlined, even though they are addressed in a rather general 
manner. These aspects cover a wide range, varying from the special needs of 
developing countries, the potential barriers created by intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) to the specific availability of technological information and the favourable 
portfolio of technological partnerships. In the subsequent Resolution, the United 
Nations General Assembly invited the Commission on Sustainable Development to 
particularly monitor compliance with technology transfer, as provided in Agenda 21.
25
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As international environment and development agreements, the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21 opened up a new era for improved technology transfer, and concurrently 
established appropriate forums like the UNFCCC to draw up general reference points 
for international actions in the field of climate change. 
 
However, as the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 are policy documents, they do not 
have legal force. They have more significance and a greater impact as a record of the 
political bargaining, rather than as hard or soft obligations in themselves.
26
 Serving as 
an open benchmark for proposals and recommendations, they are more likely to 
promote a certain kind of high moral obligation amongst the international community. 
“The extent to which these recommendations have been implemented varies, and the 




2.2 Technology transfer in the UNFCCC 
An initiative involving technology transfer received worldwide attention during the 
negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, which is acknowledged to be the hub of 
international endeavours responding to global warming and supporting climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.
28
 As its name indicates, the UNFCCC is designed 
as a broad framework to comprehensively deal with the climatic crisis with a 
combination of economic, technological, legal and social instruments.
29
 Article 4 was 




2.2.1 Technology transfer commitments  
The UNFCCC distinguishes between three categories of Parties: all participants, and 
the participants from developed countries and developing countries. Each category 
has varying commitments. With regard to individual commitments, Article 4 has the 
following structure: 
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(Article 4.1 (c), 
Article 4.1(g) ) 
 
(2) The exchange 
of technology 
information 
(Article 4.1 (h)) 
 



























2.2.1.1 The commitments of all Parties 
(1) Technology promotion and cooperation  
Technology transfer under the UNFCCC is firmly linked to the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities”. The wording used in Article 4 serves as the basis 
for climate change and technology transfer: Parties to the convention all agree that the 
issue of climate change is a matter of global concern that should not be addressed 
only by action from within national boundaries.
31
 Although the Parties have different 
motivations for technology transfer based on their own interests, they are obliged to 
engage in technological change to support climate mitigation and adaptation.
32
 This is 
known as the general technology transfer commitment. 
 
A. Technology promotion  
The general technology transfer commitment is common to all Parties, which must 
“promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes.”
33
 States must engage in domestic 
action and international cooperation, with the coordination of all the relevant sectors 
from “energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry to waste management.” This 
statement suggests that if climate change-related technology transfer is characterized 
as multiform cooperation, it is likely to take place in an interdisciplinary fashion.
34
 In 
addition, the general technology transfer commitment is necessary to climb up the 
technology ladder.
35
 Sub-article 4.1(g) confirms the compelling need to facilitate 
comprehensive research on climate sound technologies. It is not only the innovations 
in technology, but also the market conditions and legal systems that have been 
identified as subjects for research.  
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The frequent use of the term “promote” in Article 4 is striking. Exactly what does this 
mean? Does it entail a legally binding obligation resulting in robust compliance? In its 
original sense, “promote” means to encourage or urge the development or progress of 
something. As regards climate technology transfer, Parties are requested to take 
proactive action in advance, to place technology transfer on the policy agenda and 
give it appropriate priority. On the basis of the steps already in place, governments‟ 
response to technology transfer should be active, effective and efficient, with a greater 
input of human resources, financial measures and institutional adaptations, amongst 
other things. These actions should be undertaken promptly, with no delay or hesitation.  
 
In the cases of MEAs including the UNFCCC, the term “promote” very often appears 




 to illustrate the same 
behavioural model. They are always used as an alternative in the regulations for the 
transfer of ESTs. However, by its very nature, this sort of expression does not really 
affect the freedom of individual states to act, given that it allows for a lot of leeway. 
To some extent this could lead to the scope of the legal obligations concerned, if 
indeed there is any, to be at the very least, loose, vague and indeterminate.
38
 As some 
commentators stated, the commitment imposed by these provisions is conceived only 
as a “best effort” requirement which is not necessarily binding on Parties, although 




B. Technology cooperation  
In general, Article 4 reflects the principle of cooperation, though there is no actual 
reference to “technology cooperation.” On many occasions technology cooperation 
and technology transfer go hand in hand, e.g., in economic diplomacy and 
international treaties. However, they are essentially different when it comes to climate 
mitigation and adaptation technologies. First, it has been stressed that all the 
cooperating Parties benefit from this cooperation, the most successful process for 
technology cooperation usually involves business-to-business partnerships in a 
commercial setting.
40
 Whereas, technology transfer also underlines the mutual 
                                                 
36
 For example, the 1979 Energy Charter Treaty, Article 19.1 provides: In pursuit of sustainable development and 
taking into account its obligations under those international agreements concerning the environment to which it is 
party, each Contracting Party shall…(h) encourage favourable conditions for the transfer and dissemination of such 
technologies consistent with the adequate and effective protection of Intellectual Property rights. 
37
 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1999, Article 10: Financial mechanism: The 
Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of providing financial and technical co-operation, including 
the transfer of technologies, to Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Protocol…The Multilateral 
Fund shall (ii) facilitate technical co-operation to meet these identified needs. 
38
 See Gaetan Verhoosel, “Beyond the Unsustainable Rhetoric of Sustainable Development: Transferring 
Environmentally Sound Technologies,” International Environmental Law Review, Vol.11, 1999, p. 59.  
39
 See Bosselmann, K., “Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Sustainability through Improved Regimes of 
Technology Transfer,” 1/2 L. Env’t & Dev J., Issue.19, 2006, pp. 22-26. According to Bosselmann, “best effort 
commitment” simply requires parties to make an effort in good faith to achieve the goals at issue, with no clear 
consequences if the goals are not achieved. For this, we partly agrees with the opinion viewing the “promotion” 
statements as an obligation of effort. Compared with the obligation of result that leads to a robust compliance 
system, the force of the best effort obligation appears much weaker, leaving plenty of space for individual states‟ 
discretion. However, it would not result in non-legal consequences. According to the comment, this best effort 
statement does not impose a binding duty on Parties. This is not the case. Binding obligations apply under the term 
“promote” and the states‟ inaction legally violates related clauses. In some extreme cases, non-fulfilment of the 
effort obligation may even lead to punitive measures in substantive and procedural law. In contrast with the result 
obligation, it is rather difficult to identify measure and evaluate this sort of best effort obligation in reality, and this 
has an effect on the legal force of the clause concerned.             
40 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
2002, p. 27. 
34 
 
benefits for all the parties,
41
 but in terms of the reduction in global GHG rather than 
commercial interests.
42
 To ensure this, the special needs of developing countries are 
given particular consideration in the process of technology transfer. 
 
Secondly, technology cooperation is broader in scope, including North-South, North-
North and South-South cooperation. There is a long history of cooperation in the field 
of science and technology and this has taken various forms. In the process as a whole, 
the international flow of technology regularly follows the channel created by the gaps 
in the technology supply chain. However, the technology solution to climate change is 
characterized by international assistance.
43
 Only technology transfers that highlight 




It is important to make a clear-cut distinction between technology cooperation and 
technology transfer. During the negotiations on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, 
there were proposals to replace technology transfer with technology cooperation.
45
 
For example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) claimed that 
“building cooperative partnerships between those who have the technology and those 
who need it is likely to be more effective.”
46
 Whether there is technology cooperation 
or technology transfer, the process certainly needs to be attractive to both parties.
47
 
The key point is which is better to achieve the objectives of the climate change 
agreements. As Parties to the UNFCCC, governments have made decisions on the 
entry into force of these agreements and must fulfil their technology transfer 
commitments. The term “technology transfer” reflects the role of government and the 
public nature of climate technologies which become more or less obscured by the 





(2) The exchange of technology information  
The process of technology transfer is also a process of dissemination of information.
49
 
In general, information on technological climate products should be available on the 
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market for different participants.
50
 If technology transfer participants feel uncertain 
about a piece of ESTs or their contractual partner, because of the lack of basic or 




Article 4.1 has an inclusive content. It formulates the form (how to exchange 
information) and content (what kind of information needs to be exchanged) for the 
information exchange mechanism. It is assumed that all the Parties engaged in the 
UNFCCC will exchange information in a “full, open and prompt” manner. The 
requirements of a full, open and prompt exchange of technology information are 
analysed below.  
 
A. The full exchange of technology information  
To be identified as a “full exchange”, the exchange of technology information must 
cover everything; otherwise it will be incomplete or insufficient. In the practical 
process of the transfer of technology, there are two requirements as regards the 
exchange of multidimensional information, the scope of the information and the 
extent of exchange. First, the coverage of technology information should be 
comprehensive, including the level of sophistication of the technology, the various 
different stakeholders, the stages and pathways in the transfer of technology, and an 
enabling environment and capacity. As far as technology is concerned, the full 
exchange of information covers the entire lifecycle of a product.
52
 Hardware such as 
equipment and devices should also be covered. In addition, full information also 
encompasses knowledge and know-how, as well as the rights to it. Secondly, the 
extent of the exchange of technology information must be feasible, useful and specific, 
rather than trivial, superficial and interfering. The transfer of technology involves the 
exchange of information between those who have it and those who do not. In an 
international context, those who are in a more advantageous position as regards 
technology information do not “fully reveal their knowledge without destroying the 
basis for trade, creating a well known problem of information asymmetry: buyers 




However, does the full exchange of information mean that information can be 
obtained for nothing? In the light of the notion of the public good, information once it 
has been generated will be disseminated free of charge and become publicly available. 
As far as climate change technology is concerned, it is difficult to give a direct answer. 
Some policy-related information spontaneously finds its way into the public domain. 
However, other information, such as trade-related information, is mainly produced in 
the private sector and rarely finds its way into the public domain where it can be 
disseminated free of charge. Furthermore, new information rarely becomes available 
cost-free. As regards technological products, new information complements the 
existing information, resulting in an increase in the total sum of knowledge. In an 
information-based economy, information must be used productively. From this 
perspective, Article 4.1 seems to be too general to serve as a fixed reference. 
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Therefore the cost of information is left to individual states‟ capacity and authority, 




B. The open exchange of technology information  
At the same time, the UNFCCC requires an “open” exchange of technology 
information. The exchange of technology information takes place as the result of an 
increase in a country‟s level of exposure to that information. Therefore governments 
play a crucial role in developing different channels and pathways to ensure that the 
right information will reach those who actually need it.
 55
 Many different aspects have 
to be taken into account, for example, the establishment of institutional structures for 
broad information sharing and the coordination of central and regional authorities 
when climate change-related information is released, guaranteeing both the necessary 
transparency and efficiency,
56
 and encouraging the commitment of the private sector 
to providing efficient channels for access to information to ensure informed decision 
making. In reality, however, there are many barriers in this field. The tight control 
measures (on the supply side) or immature marketing mechanisms (on the demand 
side) result in implosive, repeated and inferior information about technology.
57
 Key 
information has been artificially shielded, which reduces the creditability of 
technology information and the extent to which results can be achieved with it. Most 
of the barriers to information are of a technical nature. This involves scaling up the 
capacity, including the establishment of information infrastructure, as well as 
supporting regulations.  
 
In the private sector, the open exchange of information is reflected in every aspect of 
cooperation in technology transfer, ranging from negotiation, the signing of contracts 
to implementation. Technology information such as the status of patents and the terms 
of licences should be available on affordable terms. The problem is how to define the 
boundary between commercial secrets and a reasonable release of information, in 
order to prevent practices which try to exploit the advantageous status of technology 
information. For governments, it is necessary to promote the establishment of 
stakeholder networks associated with clean technologies at the policy level, in order 
to enable actors to come together on preferential or concessionary terms. 
 
In fact, the extent to which governments and the private sector should publish 
technology information depends on a series of concrete factors, such as national 
conditions, market share and priority arrangements. Up to now, the UNFCCC has not 
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C. The prompt exchange of technology information  
The requirement of prompt information exchange reflects the basic legal principle of 
efficiency. There is no question that the parameter of time must be taken into account 
when a policy is assessed. Technology exchange is characterised by its long-term 
nature, especially when this involves its entire lifecycle and foreign participants. 
Therefore technology transfer participants who gain information are expected to make 
it accessible as soon as possible. As no concrete standards have been agreed to 
measure the extent of the prompt exchange of technology information, it is difficult to 
coordinate the compliance of Parties in practice. Given that some Parties are slack 
about fulfilling their obligations with the excuse of the long-term nature of the process, 
compliance cannot be enforced with immediate legal measures. 
 
Conclusion 
Article 4.1 draws up the technology transfer commitments which are common for all 
Parties. The clause is expressed in a relatively open way and has two aims: (1) to 
draw the attention of states to establishing more domestic institutions to promote 
technology development and transfer for addressing global climate change; (2) to 
pragmatically strengthen international cooperation on climate-related technology 
transfer. The common technology transfer commitments are basically founded in 
fields where there is cooperation related to aspects such as technology promotion and 
information exchange. Article 4.1 actually has profound implications, as it focuses on 
the reciprocal relationships and common ground between Parties It is not only 
concrete measures that are based on Article 4.1(e.g., technology need assessment 
(TNA))
59
, but also advanced, far-reaching changes in organizational structure (e.g., 




As described above, technology transfer as a positive measure facilitating 
participation in the MEAs reflects differentiated standards of responsibility for 
various categories of countries which have been identified. There are different 





2.2.1.2 The commitments of developed country Parties 
“Differential responsibility does result in different legal obligations.”
62
 For this to be 
possible in the instruments, certain arrangements have been made related, for example, 
to periods of grace, delayed implementation, less stringent commitments and 
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international assistance in term of technology transfer and financing support. The first 
three of these arrangements have been frequently applied in the form of enforcement 
measures, while the last is known as a facilitation measure.
63
 For a long time, the 
UNFCCC has been trying to balance enforcement measures and facilitation measures. 
International assistance is introduced as a form of facilitation to improve the target for 
the reduction of GHG emissions.
64
 Article 4.3, Article 4.4 and Article 4.5 contain 
relevant formulations, which will be described in more detail below in order of 
importance: 
 
(3) Obligation of solidarity and assistance in technology transfer  
Article 4.5 is cited as a classic clause which requires technology transfer in response 
to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and has been placed at the heart of the 




Firstly, technology transfer commitment primarily relies on the efforts of developed 
countries. This commitment in essence differs from the general technology transfer 
commitment shared by all Parties.
66
 Article 4.5 highlights the leadership of developed 
countries, requiring them to take “practicable” steps to promote technology transfer to 
developing countries. The term “practicable” has a special significance, because there 
is evidence that previous international practices in technology transfer were based 
largely on ideological considerations. Meanwhile, it is clear that legislators tried to be 
cautious when they drew up the provisions on imposing obligations. Article 4.5 is 
consistent in frequently using the terms “promote” and “facilitate”.  
  
Secondly, the obligation of solidarity and assistance for technology transfer is a 
relative obligation, as indicated by the qualification “as appropriate”. Article 4.5 
provides for developed countries to meet their technology transfer commitments, 
where applicable or relevant. This implies that the commitment is conditional on “the 
state of technology development and the environment in a particular country.”
67
 In a 
legal sense, the concrete technology transfer commitment is subject to national law. 
To some extent, it is somehow dangerous to interpret and implement provisions which 
are formulated in such vague terms. “When an undertaking decides not to license, no 
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Thirdly, the far-reaching technology transfer commitment under the UNFCCC is 
subject to concessions.
69
 Based on the obligation of solidarity and assistance, 
technology transfer must be carried out in a way that prioritizes developing country 
Parties with a weak capacity characterised by backward technologies, immature 
market conditions and incomplete legislation. The concessions which apply for the 
technology transfer commitment are important from the viewpoint of legislation, as 
they combine intergenerational equity with global climate governance. In some way, 
this reflects a constructive but pragmatic legislative ideal for current international 
environmental law. However, political bargaining takes place regarding the conditions 
and extent of the concessions.
70
 In theory, the lower costs of climate technology, 




Fourthly, Article 4.5 confirms the increasingly prominent role played by other entities 
in the process of technology transfer. This has a particularly important impact and is 
likely to lead to a breakthrough in reversing the endless stalemate between North and 
South on the issue concerned here. “Other parties and organizations” is an inclusive 
concept covering all entities except government. In technology transfer, the term 
refers mainly to the private sector, but is not limited to it.
72
 Other individuals and 
organizations concerned, such as donors, research institutions, the media and public 
groups are also included.
73
 By using the word “may” – which is softer than “shall” – 
throughout, Article 4.5 seemingly does not intend to impose an obligation on these 
entities. A high morality of aspiration is indicated, rather than a duty in this respect.
74
 
In fact, there are few precedents in MEAs that supersede national law and directly 
impose obligations on individuals.
75
 The reason that the UNFCCC highlights “other 
parties and organizations” is to achieve a shift in obligation. After all, it is the duty of 
governments to encourage complete commitment to technology transfer through 
public institutions.
76
 Developed countries‟ governments must either directly transfer 





Finally, attention has been devoted to climate adaptation under the technology transfer 
commitment. Historically, international efforts to address climate change have 
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focused on climate mitigation.
78
 Adaptation to climate change is an important 
development objective to reduce the vulnerability to climate change. The worldwide 
transfer of climate-adaptation technologies has occurred not as a result of market 
forces, but as a result of social intervention in which governments play a central 
role.
79
 In practice, climate adaptation is costly, especially for those developing 
countries which are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.”
80
 According to Article 4.4, the incremental cost resulting from adaptation 
measures is expected to be shared equitably among the UNFCCC Parties. 
Unfortunately, the implementation of Article 4.4 has proved to be lax up to now.
81
 In 
the very recent past, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) placed 
climate adaptation on its working agenda and had put forward potential policy 




(4) The obligation of solidarity and assistance in financial support 
The UNFCCC provides “new and additional financial resources” for international 
assistance. A proportion of contributions agreed upon by developed country Parties is 
used to fulfil the commitments under Article 4.3 of the Convention. 
 
In the international climate framework, financial assistance is provided through a 
systematic arrangement involving funding sources, managerial regulation and 
organizational structure. In general, there are two types of funding sources for the 
development and transfer of technology: the traditional model employed by 
governments and the innovative model involving public-private partnership (PPP).
83
 
Government-driven funding operates at a global and regional level, within or outside 
the UNFCCC system, and accounts for the majority of international assistance. The 
best known funding organizations are the Global Environment Facility (GEF),
84
 the 
World Bank Carbon Finance
85
 and the United Nations Environment Program 
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 etc. At the regional level, there are organizations such as Green Financing 
in the Netherlands
87
 and the Carbon Trust in the UK.
88
 With the increasing demand 
for clean technology worldwide, the contributions provided by public funding prove 
insufficient. In contrast, the PPPs which are based on the self-interest and shared 
objectives of enterprises are increasingly viewed as an effective way of promoting 
technology transfer for GHG reductions.
89
 To meet the requirement of “new and 
additional financial resources” in Article 4.3, a combination of incentives for private 
capital is therefore needed to direct funding towards climate sound technologies.  
 
The funding must be managed and distributed. Relevant institutions therefore have to 
be established, either subsidiary to or separate from the UNFCCC. One important 
example of a subsidiary body is the Montreal Protocol, which is aimed at introducing 
substitutes for ozone-destroying substances in order to restore the earth‟s deteriorating 
stratospheric ozone layer.
90
 The Montreal Protocol has established a multilateral fund 
especially for technology transfer and capacity building in developing countries. 
Under the authority and guidance of the Protocol, this fund aims to promote 
technologies for developing countries on fair and most favourable terms. In the 
context of climate change, the GEF, established independently of the UNFCCC, is a 
main player which invests in climate-related technology transfer. Up to now, there 
have been repeated appeals for specialized technology transfer funds which are 
subsidiary to the UNFCCC, under the leadership of developed countries, to which 
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In the financing process, specific funding rules, country-based policies, cultural 
dynamics, and specialized technology considerations must be clearly understood at 
the instrumental level. Up to now, the UNFCCC secretariat has created two 
workshops in collaboration with the EGTT “which generated critical learning and 
common understanding on means of financing technology needs in developing 
countries‟.
92
 In a technology transfer project, it is crucial to develop a well-prepared 
project proposal. In order to improve the access to funding, it is suggested that the 
project proposal focuses on: (1) whether technology transfer has added value for 
stakeholders; (2) whether the project links the climate technology transfer theme to 
other themes to ensure its financial sustainability; (3) quantifying cost-effectiveness as 




In the real world, financial assistance is not only a practical imperative, but also a 
substantive commitment. According to Article 4.3, GHG emission reductions will 
involve an “incremental cost” for developing countries which must be agreed before 
financial support is offered. The agreed minimum incremental cost therefore serves as 
a benchmark for identifying whether financial assistance will be enforced and to what 
extent.
94
 However, in reality it is difficult for North and South to reach a consensus on 
the amount of “incremental cost”, and it is not surprising. Moreover, the final part of 
Article 4.3 adds that consideration should be given to “appropriate burden sharing 
among the developed countries Parties”. Like Article 4.5, this reflects far-reaching 
compromise between the Parties. The strength of the commitment to provide financial 
assistance is weakened to a large extent.  
 
2.2.1.3 The commitments of developing country Parties 
The UNFCCC did not include any compulsory GHG emission reduction targets for 
developing countries, but in the meantime it has introduced international 
technological and financial assistance to achieve substantive equity and legal 
pragmatism.
95
 In this context, the main task of developing country Parties is to focus 
on domestic climate mitigation and adaptation, and to make the best use of external 
assistance.  
 
(5) The commitment contained in the conditionality clause  
The convention does not include any direct statements stipulating differentiated 
obligations for developing country Parties, except in Article 4.7, which is known as a 
conditionality clause. When it was formulated, it met with a great deal of controversy 
and suspicion. Some people consider it to be a remarkable improvement in 
international environmental legislation,
96
 while others think that a conditionality 




From the point of view of legislation, Article 4.7 is unique, because it does not 
attempt to introduce any concrete commitments, but provides conditions to fulfil 
existing commitments. In fact, several MEAs have adopted a conditionality clause in 
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 Essentially relating to the commitments of developing countries, the 
conditionality clause makes their fulfilment conditional on actions taken by developed 
countries. Under the clause, developing country Parties could and would suspend the 
implementation of the convention if developed country Parties did not provide 
financial assistance and technology transfer. Therefore it might be fair to say that the 
conditionality clause makes finance assistance and technology transfer absolutely 
indispensable for the implementation of MEAs.
99
 Consequently a violation of the 
provisions on solidarity and assistance may constitute a material breach and is in 




(6) An enabling environment   
Article 4 contains significant recommendations for developing country Parties which 
are engaged in technology transfer. As recipients, developing countries may not be 
able to control the supply of technology.
101
 Provided they are permitted to make use 
of their domestic capacities, this may facilitate the process. In general, a versatile 
enabling environment is needed in both the host country and the country of origin. For 
the country of origin, an enabling environment not only means smoothing and 
accelerating the flow of technology, but also entails assisting developing countries to 
create the enabling environment. For the host country, they are expected to promote a 
favourable environment for attracting foreign investments, increase the interest of 
investors and security while removing restrictive barriers.
102
 Once technologies have 
been introduced, developing countries could devote attention to increasing their 
domestic capacity for adopting, assimilating, re-innovating and producing 
technology.
103
 Up to now, there has been a growing recognition that technology 
should move from a donor-driven approach to a balanced approach that combines 




At a conceptual level, the term “enabling environment” encompasses government 
policies which focus on creating and maintaining an overall macroeconomic 
environment that brings together suppliers and consumers and leads to cooperation 
between companies.
105
 Various policy tools are available in this respect.
106
 From the 
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legal point of view, special attention should be devoted to four aspects: (1) a 
macroeconomic policy framework. This involves direct and indirect financial support, 
energy tariff policies, trade and foreign investment policies.
107
 A stable, normative 
and favourable macro-economy in the host countries could and would support a 
sustainable market for climate sound technologies; (2) national private legislation and 
regulations on property rights and contracts can either facilitate or hinder the progress 
of technology transfer; (3) codes, standards and certification. Minimum 
environmental performance standards have an impact not only on the operation of 
technical systems, but also on the development of the service/maintenance 
infrastructure;
108
 (4) institutional capacity building. Developing countries are 
generally required to strengthen their administrative and legal processes to ensure 
transparency, and participation in regulatory policy-making. Capacity building has 
been recognized by the G77 group,
109
 as well as the OECD
110
, and is a slow and 
complex project which takes place at every stage of the technology transfer process. 
For every stage, governments of developing countries must ensure that the most 




2.2.2 Assessment  
In sum, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the architecture of the UNFCCC. 
First, the UNFCCC is a legally binding agreement which provides a strong and 
coherent framework for climate-related technology transfer. “It assumes universal 
accession and adherence to a single set of implementing principles and rules.”
112
 It 
obliges both developed and developing country Parties to effectively facilitate 
technology transfer. Secondly, although the UNFCCC is flexible enough to 
accommodate a wide variety of approaches, there are inherent deficiencies when it 
comes to technology transfer, particularly in comparison with the Montreal protocol. 
The most formidable of these are (1) the range of climate change technologies is vast 
and their application covers many sectors; (2) it is in the nature of climate change 
technologies that they are for the public good, and are essentially aimed at solving 
global climate externalities which are not adequately or explicitly codified. Finally, it 
is high time to focus on the implementation of the technology transfer commitments 
under the convention, determine the existence of material breaches and how to deal 
with them at the instrumental level.
113
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Along with the COP conference proceedings, the original convention gradually 
developed to become more pragmatic, specific and stringent. Some new developments, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, greatly improved technology transfer. 
  
2.3 Technology transfer in the Kyoto Protocol 
In many ways the Kyoto Protocol is the milestone that follows the UNFCCC. Based 
on the structure of the UNFCCC, the subsequent Kyoto Protocol defines the climate 
regime in a more concrete, integrated and constructive way, and has a far-reaching 
impact on the international transfer of climate sound technology. Not only has it 
reaffirmed the original commitments to technology transfer under the convention, but 
it has also successfully called on a robust compliance system and market solutions in 




2.3.1 The reaffirmation of the commitment to technology transfer  
Technology transfer is the key to achieving the goals of the convention and the 
protocol. The UNFCCC imposed technology transfer commitments for the 
differentiated Party groups and called for concrete international action, and this was 




Article 10 and Article 11.2 provide an explicit description of the technology transfer 
commitments imposed by the UNFCCC which are legally binding on all the Kyoto 
parties. They reaffirm the content of the UNFCCC, and even its basic tone. We found 
that the terms used in the Protocol “have very flexible meanings and allow for many 
discretions and loopholes on the transfer of ESTs because they do not impose definite 
binding commitments on countries against which compliance can be assessed, and 
they rely on national measures for their implementation, leaving individual countries 
with considerable discretion.”
116
 Despite this, the Kyoto Protocol does not simply 
repeat the UNFCCC, because: (1) It gives weight to a private sector-oriented 
approach. Compared to its parent, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol adopts stronger 
language on the need for an enabling environment for the private sector in the process 
of technology transfer.
117
 “The role for international investment in environmental 
policy was made clear under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.”
118 
(2) It highlights that 
technology transfer for mitigating and adapting to climate change is less likely to 




It is well known that the main aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to set binding targets for 
the reduction of GHG for developed country Parties, amounting to an average of 5%, 
compared to the 1990 levels, for the five-year period from 2008 to 2012.
120
 Although 
there are no rigorous reduction targets for developing country Parties, they do commit 
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themselves to creating a favourable atmosphere for technology transfer to prepare for 
fixed reductions in the future. In fact, some western delegations had proposed the 
creation of an enabling environment by developing countries during the early debates 
of the UNFCCC, though these proposals were not adopted at the time.
121
 The wording 
on technology transfer in the Kyoto Protocol reflects a generalized understanding of 
the ESTs transfer dilemma as a complex issue requiring contributions from all the 
stakeholders who are actually involved.
122
 A changing strategy is emerging aimed at 
the full participation of the private sector and developing countries in order to help the 





2.3.2 Innovative measures to technology transfer 
Among the substantive improvements introduced by the Kyoto Protocol, the most 
remarkable concerns its flexibility mechanisms. “Not only were these viewed by the 
United States and other developed states Parties as essential means of meeting their 
commitments in a cost-effective manner, but some of them also provide a means by 
which developing states Parties may restrain growth in their own emissions.”
124
 As far 
as climate technology transfer is concerned, the flexible Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) establishes a positive link between international assistance and 
certificated emission reductions (CERs). Further, the Kyoto Protocol has taken steps 
to achieve a robust compliance mechanism. Both the CDM and the Compliance 
Mechanism have the potential to increase the flow of climate technologies and to 
improve the quality of technology transfer, as will be shown below.  
 
(1) Clean Development Mechanism 
In the light of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties with a commitment to limit or reduce GHG 
must meet their targets primarily with national measures. However, in reality it is 
difficult for them to rely on domestic measures alone to meet these targets. 
Recognising this, the protocol allows for significant flexibility with three market-
based mechanisms to create what is now known as the “carbon market.”
125
 Of these 
three mechanisms, only the CDM is available to developing countries. Article 12 in 




In theory, the CDM enables Annex I Parties to finance reduction projects in 
developing countries to contribute to their sustainable development. The credits 
received from these activities will be used to meet some of developed countries‟ 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to limit and reduce emissions. It is the first 
global, environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind to provide a 
standardized emission offset instrument – CERs.
127
 Both North and South benefit 
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from the Kyoto Protocol‟s carbon market established by the CDM.
128
 Taking China as 
an example, by the end of October 2008, the Chinese government had approved 1,595 
CDM projects, including 286 which had been successfully registered with the EB, 
amounting to 24% of the total of all CDM projects globally. Chinese CERs from the 
CDM projects are estimated to account for approximately 230 million tonnes of CO2 




Although the CDM does not contain an explicit reference to technology transfer in the 
protocol, it serves as an important practical vehicle for financing emission reduction 
projects that employ clean technologies currently unavailable in host countries.
130
  
With regard to key players in climate-related technology transfer, in particular the 
private sector, “the CDM is intended to help channel private investment towards 
climate-friendly projects.”
131
 Such government-supported Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has great potential to channel many climate sound technologies to developing 
countries.
132
 In turn, the transfer of technology contributes to “promoting CDM 
projects for high quality, high efficiency emission reduction and to safeguarding the 
environmental integrity of CDM.”
133
 In an operational context, the process of 
approving the CDM projects will go smoothly, given it is accompanied by the 
requirements of technology transfer.
134
 Host countries welcome technology transfer, 




On a global scale, the CDM projects are largely driven by carbon market, rather than 
technology transfer. They are dependent on the flow of goods and capital in the global 
economy, which leads to a degree of uncertainty about the volume and price of CERs 
in the carbon credits market.
136
 From a broad policy perspective, the climate policy to 
be adopted will have a great impact on CDM. For example, during the discussions of 
the post-Kyoto agreement, there were requests for the revision or even the abolition of 
the current CDM.
137
 Important questions arise in this regard. Have the CDM projects 
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in developing countries been able to benefit from technology transfer? At the 
instrumental level, is it necessary to impose any mandatory requirement for 





(2) A facilitative approach in the Compliance Mechanism  
Both the convention and the protocol mention compliance.
139 
The Kyoto Protocol 
consolidates the status of the Multilateral Consultative Process (MCP) created by the 
UNFCCC, elaborating substantive and procedural rules to hold accountable those 
Parties which fail to comply.
140  
As Articles 16 and 18 provide, they explicitly 
encourage the improvements put forward for the compliance mechanism.
141
 At the 
subsequent COP 7, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed on the design of the 
compliance mechanism and created the Compliance Committee.
142
 “Through its 
branches, the Committee considers questions of implementation which can be raised 
by expert review teams under Article 8 of the Protocol, any Party with respect to itself, 




The compliance mechanism under the protocol is an integrated, dual and tiered 
system consisting of a Facilitative Branch and an Enforcement Branch.
144
 As their 
names suggest, the objective of the Enforcement Branch is to determine whether 
Parties meet their commitments under the Protocol or not, whilst the Facilitative 
Branch has the authority to increase compliance by providing advice and assistance to 
the Parties.  
 
The Enforcement Branch focuses on emission reduction-related commitments. 
Specifically, it is responsible for deciding whether a Party has failed to comply with 
its emission targets, methodological and reporting requirements for greenhouse gas 
inventories, and other eligibility requirements. Under the Enforcement Branch, each 
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type of non-compliance requires a specific course of action. The Enforcement Branch 
will generally reduce the assigned amount for Parties which fail to comply, require 
compliance action plans or suspend their eligibility to sell permits.
 145
 This procedure 
is characterised by an arbitrary, “traffic light” approach.   
 
No such mandate exists in the Facilitative Branch, the main task of which is to take 
into account the common but differentiated responsibilities of the Parties, including 
technology transfer, financial support and capacity building.
146
 Accordingly, there are 
no sanctions, penalties or even fixed deadlines that can be applied by the Facilitative 
Branch, the core ideal of which is to link implementation to international 
assistance.
147
 It is only when non-compliance is the result of a lack of will, rather than 
a lack of capacity, that a stringent enforcement approach should be applied. “A 
regime aspiring to strict substantive targets is more likely to be accepted if it is 
developed through a facilitative approach.”
148
 Parties can be supported if their 
obligations are attainable, which leads to greater participation in the regime, while it 




In the international climate framework, technology transfer has up to now been 
largely addressed by two instruments, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Afterwards, most of the post-Kyoto endeavours at an international level have also 
shed light on the issue of technology transfer to varying degrees. Some have borne 
fruit, such as the Bali Action Plan. 
 
2.4 Technology transfer in the post-Kyoto proceedings  
2.4.1 The Bali Action Plan 
Ten years after the Kyoto Protocol, governments from around the world – in both 
developed and developing countries – reached agreement in Bali on stepping up their 
efforts to cope with climate change “now” and “up to …”.
150
 A number of forward-
looking decisions have been made, including the adoption of the Bali Action Plan. In 
Bali, there was a consensus among the Parties that the negotiations should address a 
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shared vision for long-term cooperative action.
151
 According to the Bali Action Plan, 
future discussions on improving international/national actions should take the MRV 
criteria into account. In particular, the nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs)
152
, supported and enabled by technology, finance and capacity building, 




The Bali Action Plan strategically elevates technology transfer to a higher level. 
Before Bali, technology transfer was organised by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The Plan calls for “enhanced action on 
technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation and 
adaptation.”
154
 As a result, technology transfer which had been excluded by the key 
climate change negotiations at the beginning was officially incorporated in the 
working agenda of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).
155
 Together with 
mitigation, adaptation and financing, technology transfer is identified as one of the 
four “building blocks” in the future climate negotiations.
156
 For example, immediately 
afterwards during the Bonn climate talks, the SBI and the SBSTA endorsed the aims 
of the EGTT for 2008-2009 to: “(1) increase research and development of 
technologies and technology needs assessments, specifically in Africa, small island 
developing states and least developed countries; (2) develop performance indicators to 




In addition, the Bali Action Plan responds to the need for “cooperative sectoral 
approaches and sector-specific actions”.
158
 Climate sound technologies are very broad 
and differ from sector to sector. As the IPCC stabilization scenarios predicted, a 
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combination of existing and new technologies have proved necessary to achieve the 
desired mitigation levels. Irrespective of the stage they have reached, these 
technologies are prevalent in various sectors such electricity, building, industry and 
transport.
159
 Technology transfer provided by developed countries could and would 





In Bali, a growing consensus was reached on the key technologies needed to achieve 
low-cost mitigation, barriers to information and incentives, the need to stimulate 
international technology cooperation and the existence of a substantial financing 
gap.
161
 However, other issues remain unsolved, for example, how quickly a low 
carbon economy can be achieved with technological solutions or how the MRV 




2.4.2 The Copenhagen Accord 
Since Bali, many Parties have submitted proposals containing a blueprint for 
technology development and transfer scenarios in accordance with their own 
experiences and specific circumstances. For example, in August 2008, the Group of 
77 and China submitted their version, which led to great concern in the international 
community.
163
 This proposal provided details on the specific rationale, guiding 
criteria and institutional arrangements that could be used as a reference for a new 




In 2009, the COP took place at the fifteenth session of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen. 
The conference focused prominently on two targets: (1) to set long-term goals to limit 
any temperature increase to two degrees Celsius (above pre-industrial levels); (2) to 
define in more detail the MRV criteria related to national commitments.
165
 Despite its 
ultimate failure to reach an agreement which was legally binding and acceptable to all 
the Parties, the Copenhagen Summit triggered proactive political responses and 
unprecedented publicity to overcome global climate change. In the end, it established 
an overall plan of action for major emitters in the form of the Copenhagen Accord.  
 
The Copenhagen Accord is essentially a continuation of the struggle regarding 
common but differentiated responsibilities.
166
 It urges Parties to take action that is 
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 G77 & China for A Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC 2007, (no. 91). It includes: the creation of an 
Executive Body on Technology to be supported by a strategic planning committee, technology panels, verification 
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consistent with science on the basis of equity, highlighting the “strong political will to 
urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.
167
 Bearing this in mind, the 
international endeavours to facilitate technology transfer have adopted a more 
problem-solving approach. The critical role of technology transfer, both for adaptation 
and mitigation, is clearly described at the beginning of the Copenhagen Accord: the 
“early and rapid reduction in emissions, and the urgent need to adapt to the adverse 
impact of climate change, requires large-scale diffusion and transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies.”
168
Two mechanisms in particular, the 
technology and the finance mechanism, are stipulated for technology transfer.  
 
The finance mechanism 
Technology transfer is at the heart of most climate change projects and is therefore a 
central issue in most finance mechanisms.
169
 For a long time, many Parties have 
expressed their frustration at the slow progress of the finance mechanism.
170
 The 
Copenhagen Accord therefore appeals for scaled-up, new and additional, predictable 
and adequate funding for further action on climate mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries, including technology transfer and capacity building.
171
 The 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) – an operating entity for the financial mechanism of the 
Convention – was created in this context. According to the Copenhagen Accord, a 
fast-track funding with a collective pledge of USD 30 billion for the period 2010–
2012 would be put in place.
172
 In the long term, the GCF‟s goal is to raise USD 100 
billion per year by 2020.
173
 With regard to technology transfer, the GCF initiative is 
intended for projects, programmes, policies and activities aimed at transferring 
technology to developing countries. However, the pledged funds of the Copenhagen 
Accord are not only for technology transfer, but also in total for climate mitigation 
and adaptation. Till now, the portion related to technology transfer is not specified yet. 
Besides, because of the many uncertainties resulting from procedural, practical or 
even conceptual difficulties, the details of the design and operation of the GCF have 
been left for later.  
 
The technology mechanism 
In response to numerous proposals submitted by Parties, the COP 15 decided to 
establish an institutional framework or “Technology Mechanism‟ to promote 
technology development and transfer which support action for climate mitigation and 
adaptation.
174
 The proposed mechanism is to consist of the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre/Network (CTCN). As agreed, 
the TEC will be set up to replace the EGTT to facilitate further access to affordable 
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 See idem, Para. 11. 
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and appropriate technologies required by developing country Parties.
175
 However, this 
is a far more challenging task than the simple decision to create it. The exact 
composition and authority of such a Committee is yet to be defined, for example, 




“Substantial amounts of financial and technological support for both mitigation and 
adaptation will be an integral part of any agreement.”
177
 In seeking to link the 
Technology Mechanism and the Finance Mechanism, the Copenhagen Accord has led 
to a positive result in this regard. Nevertheless, it has many shortcomings: (1) the 
Accord is characterised as not being legally binding and not having a consensus;
178
 (2) 
some important issues, such as IPRs as well as the MRV criteria, remain unresolved. 
By way of example, the final Copenhagen Accord includes few references to the IPRs 
of climate sound technologies.
179
 To some extent, the Copenhagen Summit mirrors 
the continuing significant disagreement between Parties and the lack of adequate 
empirical evidence for achieving a better understanding of the issues concerned. In 
this context, the COP 15 decided to extend the mandate of the Ad-Hoc Working 





2.4.3 Recent developments  
Since Copenhagen, the UNFCCC has continued to make progress on the openings left 
by the Copenhagen Accord to kickstart the Technology Mechanism. In COP 16, the 
negotiators at the Cancun talks finalized and formalized the UNFCCC decisions to 
create a Technology Mechanism.
181
 The main task that was left was to specify the 
details required by an on-the-ground organization, including the finance, mandate and 
structure of the TEC and the CTCN. Fortunately, Cancun achieved some progress in 
the relevant negotiations by agreeing on the preliminary framework for the 
Technology Mechanism.
182
 It considered that the TEC serves as an advisory and 
administrative agency. It consists of 20 experts from both developing and developed 
country Parties which will identify technology priorities, coordinate international 
efforts, and make recommendations for improvement.
183
 Meanwhile, the CTCN has 
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an operative role in technology transfer at both the international and regional level. It 
has a small central office and a large network responsible for carrying out the TEC 
directives, and facilitating and improving the implementation of existing initiatives.
184
 
As regards technology transfer, the CTCN is supposed to encourage stakeholders to 
carry out needs assessments and help with the process of transfer. The Cancun 
package on technology transfer reflects the negotiators‟ intention to create a 
mechanism that is flexible, based on existing initiatives, and better coordinated.
185
 
However, some of the basic details regarding the structure and operation of the centre 
and the network have to be defined more fully in the follow-up proceedings. More 
importantly, there are no indications of any interaction between the TEC and the 
CTNC, or even between the network and the central office within the CTNC.
186
 The 
Durban climate talks continued the work achieved at Cancun with the aim of making 
the Technology Mechanism fully operational. Agreement was reached on several 
issues, including the modalities and procedures of the TEC, and the administrative 




In addition, three other critical aspects closely related to technology transfer were 
addressed to some extent during the UNFCCC proceedings after Copenhagen. One of 
these was the relationship between the Technology Mechanism and the Finance 
Mechanism. The Cancun Agreement largely failed to achieve a breakthrough as 
regards the correspondence between these two mechanisms at the institutional level. 
Durban achieved more, outlining their potential connections, though “not to the 
satisfaction of the developing countries negotiating under the umbrellas of the Group 
of 77 and China and the LDCs.”
188
 At the very beginning of the Durban talks, the 
UNFCCC announced the launch of the GCF. During the negotiations, the Parties 
compromised on the wording, which does not really amount to much, though it 
appears to broaden the sources for the funding of the CTCN.
189
 The current rate of 
negotiations shows how difficult reaching consensus on the matter of finance is. 
 
The second aspect concerns the MRV criteria. Both Cancun and Durban focused on 
transparency and the related MRV criteria. To build trust between Parties, the COP17 
provided a much-needed procedure to help countries report on their mitigation efforts 
frequently and in detail. Developed countries are therefore required to submit biennial 
reports starting in 2014, which include the provision of financial, technological, and 
other support to developing countries. Despite this, it is still too early to conclude that 
the UNFCCC has achieved real progress in the MRV related to technology transfer. 
The clarification provisions for non-Annex I Parties, as well as the common 
accounting rules, were not addressed in sufficient detail in Durban, which limits the 
possibility of comparing and adding up the implementation by Parties.
190
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The final aspect concerns the IPRs of climate sound technology. The contentious 
issue of IPRs was deliberately omitted during the UNFCCC negotiations, as Parties 
continued to disagree about how openly technologies should be shared.
191
 Developed 
country Parties strongly insisted on restrictive IP protection, while developing country 
Parties were frustrated by the conflicting conditions imposed at Cancun, which 
required them to skip over the usage of fossil fuels but failed to provide them with 
access to the necessary technologies. During the Durban climate talks, IPRs were 
initially proposed as a new set of functions for the TEC, which were unfortunately 
excluded from the final text presented to be adopted by the COP.
192
 Once again, the 
issue of IPRs ended in a stalemate. On the one hand, the disagreements on this issue 
were not expected to hold up the process of creating the Technology Mechanism; on 
the other hand, the complex role played by IPRs in technology development and 





In short, the issues mentioned above remained unresolved and will have to be 
addressed in future meetings of the UNFCCC. Therefore there is reason to believe 
that a great deal of attention will continue to be devoted to climate change-related 
technology transfer within and even outside the UNFCCC. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Technology transfer has been around for a long time in international relations and 
successfully re-emerged twenty years ago in the international dialogue on 
environmental and developmental policies. The international community established a 
broad institutional arrangement for technology transfer as a crucial tool to achieve 
specific environmental objectives, creating a solid foundation for achieving the best 
global situation in this interdisciplinary area. 
 
Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration heralded a new era for technology transfer with 
the introduction of two fundamental principles: the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and the principle of international cooperation. The well-
known principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in particular takes due 
account of the historical and current factors, which make it possible to achieve an 
equitable balance acceptable to the great majority of developed and developing 
countries. However, the policy documents of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration 
indicate only the moral duties of countries, which serve as an open benchmark for 
international action on technology transfer in the subsequent process.  
 
In the context of climate change, technology transfer is predominantly regulated by 
the UNFCCC process. Designed as a broad framework to deal comprehensively with 
the climate crisis, including solutions involving technology, the UNFCCC has drawn 
up technology transfer commitments for three categories of Parties: all participants, 
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developed country and developing country participants. The commitment to promote 
general technology transfer and exchange technology information is imposed on all 
Parties. In this respect, it is assumed that developed countries will undertake 
obligations of solidarity and assistance both in technology and in finance. On the one 
hand, developing country Parties are allowed to suspend their implementation of the 
convention under the conditionality clause, while on the other hand, they commit 
themselves to ensuring an enabling environment for the improved participation in 
technology transfer.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol was the first milestone after the UNFCCC. The initial framework 
for technology transfer was developed to become more pragmatic, specific and 
stringent. A range of innovative approaches characterised as market solutions was 
formulated. The CDM, one of the typical flexible mechanisms, forms a constructive 
link between international assistance and CERs. Although it does not have an explicit 
technology transfer mandate, it serves as an important practical vehicle to finance 
emission reduction projects that employ clean technologies currently unavailable in 
host countries. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol called for the improvement of the MCP, 
and directly promoted the creation of a robust compliance mechanism in the 
subsequent COP 7. The Facilitative Branch, entrusted with the task of ensuring that 
the common but differentiated responsibilities of the Parties are fulfilled, was 
responsible in the case of the violation of “positive measures” such as technology 
transfer. 
 
The international negotiations on climate-related technology transfer are making slow 
progress. Ten years after the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan strategically 
elevated technology transfer to a higher level by incorporating it in the working 
agenda of the SBI. Together with mitigation, adaptation and financing, technology 
transfer was described as one of the four “building blocks” in the follow-up 
negotiations. In general, the developing country Parties were the winners in Bali. By 
way of compromise, their NAMAs enabled by technology, financing and capacity 
building will be assessed by international society with the MRV criteria. Immediately 
afterwards, many Parties forwarded proposals containing blueprints of Technology 
Mechanism scenarios on the basis of their experiences and specific circumstances.  
 
Finally, the Copenhagen Summit established a Technology Mechanism to change 
ideals into down-to-earth regulations. At the same time, the Copenhagen Summit 
created the GCF, the operating entity for the financial mechanism of the Convention. 
Developed countries were obliged to donate the fast-track funding needed for the 
GCF to fulfil their commitments as regards solidarity by providing financial support. 
However, Copenhagen ultimately failed to achieve any legally binding agreement. 
The UNFCCC has therefore continued to try and make progress with regard to 
kickstarting the Technology Mechanism. The recent Cancun and Durban Climate 
Talks endeavoured to make the TEC and the CTCN under the Technology 
Mechanism fully operational in practice, and on this basis link the Technology 
Mechanism to the Finance Mechanism in institutional terms.
194
 In addition, both 
Cancun and Durban have shed some light on the MRV issue and the IPRs, though it is 
still too early to conclude that they have achieved any significant progress. 
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To summarise, the UNFCCC proceedings have developed a legal framework for 
climate-related technology transfer. This is undeniably a remarkable achievement, 
particularly from the long-term historical point of view. Technology transfer has 
gradually re-entered the international arena and is now at the centre of the relevant 
legislation.
195
 Nevertheless, it would be foolish to exaggerate the progress made by 
the UNFCCC. “Nowhere in the realm of the climate is change debate the need for 
alternative thinking more critical than in the development and transfer of clean 
technology.”
196
 It is also worth noting that the areas where the current progress 
reflects consensus are also the ones where consensus is relatively easy to find. 
Technology negotiations have not yet resulted in any new rules on technology transfer 
under the UNFCCC.
197
 Instead, they are seriously hampered by two obstacles: (1) the 
IPRs of climate technologies in the private domain; (2) the financial measures in the 
public domain. In fact, there have been inherent deficiencies from the very beginning. 
First, global climate governance was fragmented by its very nature. In an 
economically volatile situation such as climate change, national leaders tend to 
“commit based on an appeal to moral obligation unrelated to or insensitive to national 
interest and international competitiveness.”
198
 Therefore the likelihood of strong 
compliance is not initially high, though the UNFCCC progress on the whole has been 
positive. Secondly, although the UNFCCC is flexible enough to accommodate a wide 
variety of approaches, it cannot deal with the vast range of climate sound technologies, 
the applications of which span many sectors. Finally, climate change-related 
technology transfer is aimed addressing global environmental externalities, and the 
current legal framework mainly fails to reflect, confirm or guarantee this. As the 
following chapters will show, the lengthy negotiations, and the progress achieved in 
formulating appropriate regulations are confronted by many compromises, tensions 
and obstacles.  
 
 
                                                 
195
 Haug1992, (no. 41), pp. 219-221. Regulations on technology transfer had already been drawn up in the 
Declaration on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the late 1970s. 
196
 See Yvo De Boer, “Beijing High-Level Conference on Climate Change: Technology Development and 
Technology Transfer,” 2009, available at 
www.unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/pdf/081107_speech_beijing.pdf. 
197
 Marcellino and Gerstetter 2010, (no. 178), p. 10.  
198




Chapter 3 Instrumental Barriers to Supplying Climate 
Sound Technology  
 
The climate regime resulting from the UNFCCC proceedings has a framework in 
which the burden is shared and global climate governance is to be achieved by 
observing intergenerational equity. Developed country Parties, major contributors of 
GHG, are obliged to set targets for the reduction of emissions. To facilitate 
compliance on a large scale, they take a marginal commitment to provide technology 
and finance internationally, viz. to provide solidarity and assistance.  
 
As regards technology, there is no single paradigm for the flow of technology.
1
 In the 
context of the UNFCCC, technology most often flows North-South. The owners of 
climate technology offer their advanced technologies on the international market to 
make it available to recipients worldwide. Up to now it has been generally recognised 
that technology transfers from developed countries to developing countries are and 
continue to be important in many industries which can make significant contributions 
to tackling global warming.
2
 However, these transfers are not occurring at a sufficient 
rate to assist these countries to mitigate and adapt to the impact of climate change, 
because of a number of potential barriers. 
 
According to the IPCC, barriers are “any obstacle to reaching a potential that can be 
overcome by policies and measures.”
3
 They can be either subjective, such as obstacles 
in codes, standards and procedures, or objective like obstacles in social infrastructure 
and resources capacity. Barriers at the legal level are generally seen as the main 
obstacles caused by human factors.
4
 In fact, they are context-specific and vary 
depending on the stakeholders concerned. When it comes to climate technology 





The identification, evaluation and removal of legal barriers is an integral part of 
creating an enabling environment for technology transfer in the international climate 
framework. In fact, as early as 2001, the IPCC devoted attention to the existing 
barriers and provided an extensive summary of the barriers in developed and 
developing countries which hinder the transfer of climate sound technologies.
6
 A wide 
range of barriers was prioritized, ranging from socio-economic aspects to human 
capacities and legal institutions. It was concluded that there are no pre-set answers for 
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overcoming these barriers, but that appropriate action should be taken to tackle “the 
specific barriers, interests and influences of different stakeholders in order to develop 
effective policy tools.”
7
 In this context, this chapter will attempt to conduct an in-
depth analysis of concrete barriers that arise on the technology supplier side from a 
legal point of view. The research question for this chapter is therefore: 
What are the legal barriers in the process of supplying climate 
sound technology and specifically how do they impact on 
international technology transfer? What kinds of solutions, if any, 
have been proposed to tackle these barriers? 
To answer the above questions, we will first review the normative sources of climate 
change-related technology transfer and on this basis take a closer look at the specific 
legal barriers which exist in international law. Subsequently some of the common 
practices in the public policies and institutions of countries supplying technology will 
be examined.
8
 Considering the increasingly important role of the private sector in 
providing technology solutions in response to climate change, the final part of this 
chapter will focus on technology transfers carried out by the private sector by 
particular multinational enterprises.  
 
3.1 The legal barriers confronting the public sector in supplying technology 
In this chapter the term “public sector” has specific implications. It refers to state 
governments which make and enforce climate change-related technology transfer 
policies and laws.
9
 Representing the will of their states, governments are involved in 
international affairs and are acknowledged to have rights and obligations in the 
system of international law. Theoretically, they make a choice to become parties to 
the UNFCCC and are therefore responsible for implementing it domestically.
10
 In the 
light of the UNFCCC, governments in developed countries have a responsibility to 
transfer climate good technologies to developing countries, although this is not 
happening fast enough.
11
 The failure to do so is based on the complexities of national 
and international law. 
 
3.1.1The barriers emerging in international law 
In the field of international law, legal barriers which impede the supply of climate 
sound technologies can be attributed to two principal factors: (1) the lack of an 
explicit, strict and enforceable legal basis for technology transfer in the international 
climate framework; (2) conflicts and constraints within the existing legal system, 
particularly the WTO regime.  
 




 See Morag Goodwin and Han Somsen, “Regulating for Climate Change in Developing Countries: Appropriate 
Regulatory Strategies in the Context of Technology Transfer,” Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 2 (2010) 
nr. 1, p. 111.  
9
 In general, the public sector refers to the state sector as the part of the state that deals with the production, 
delivery and allocation of goods and services by and for the government or its citizens, whether this is at the 
national, regional or local/municipal level. 
10
 See Zou Ji, Pang Jun and Wang Haiqin, Technology Transfer under the UNFCCC Framework, In Yasuko 
Kameyama, Agus P. Sari, Moekti H. Soejahmoen and Norichika Kanie (eds.), Climate Change in Asia: 
Perspectives on the Future Climate Regime, United Nations University Press, 2008, p. 189. 
11
 World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects: Technology Diffusions in the Developing World,” Development 
Prospects Group Report 42097, Washington DC, 2008. 
60 
 
3.1.1.1 Governmental obligations to supply climate sound technology  
The international law on climate sound technology originates from the UNFCCC, but 





(1) The compliance system 
Although many states have actually ratified the climate change agreements, the mere 
act of ratification is not sufficient to ensure strong compliance. The lack of strong 
compliance is due to the fact that there is no basic enforcer in international law as 
there is in domestic law.
13
 The attempts to balance different interests in combating 
climate change are faced with many political difficulties which destroyed efforts 
made in the past, even though the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are to some 







 adopted in the Articles indicates a stronger sense of duty than the 
mere moral aspirations put forward in the Declaration on the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in the late 1970s.
16
 Under the UNFCCC, developing 
countries may suspend some obligations if developed countries do not transfer 
technology to them or provide financial support.
17
 Therefore it could be argued that 
the violation of technology transfer provisions would constitute a material breach of 
the convention in that it hinders the accomplishment of the objectives of the 
convention.
18
 To determine when violations occur, the UNFCCC must specify the 
minimum amount of assistance to be provided in order to comply with the convention. 
There is no international consensus on this as yet. In legal terms, the extent to which 
the commitment on technology transfer is legally binding remains problematic.  
 
In addition to this, there is an inherent deficiency in the implementation and 
enforcement of climate change-related technology transfer commitments, particularly 
compared to the Montreal Protocol. The scope of climate-related technologies is vast 
and their applications span many sectors. “Only when the technologies to be 
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transferred are very specific and readily identifiable will developed countries be able 





The procedural level 
Compliance with international climate laws is generally considered to be weak. Only 
an elaborate, effective compliance mechanism can ensure that climate technology 
transfer will move from rhetoric to down-to-earth legal reality.
20
 The 1992 UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol are seen as only partially fulfilling this requirement.
21
 The 
“multiple consultative process” (MCP) was formulated, but by its very nature (non-
judicial, non-confrontational) this is a soft measure which is used to avoid and resolve 
disputes related to implementation.
22
 No penalties or sanctions are imposed on non-
compliant parties under the MCP, although it does have the power to recommend 
measures to facilitate cooperation and promote understanding of conventions.
23
 At the 
subsequent COP7 in Marrakesh, a new compliance mechanism was introduced to 
determine that there would be consequences for non-compliance.
24
 Considering the 
common but differentiated responsibilities of the Parties and the circumstances 
pertaining to this, including technology transfer, a specialized Facilitative Branch was 
established under the Compliance Committee.
25
 However, the Facilitative Branch will 
not impose any sanctions or penalties either.
26
 It does not have the power to decide 
upon or apply outcomes of non-compliance, and it may not make any binding 
decision regarding whether or not a Party is in non-compliance.
27
 In fact, the appeals 
for a stringent compliance mechanism were not really welcomed by some Parties. For 




Generally, clean technology transfer disputes involve not only environmental treaties, 
but also trade treaties. There is a realistic need to coordinate the powers of the MEAs 
and the WTO.
29
 It is not clear whether the Facilitative Branch in the UNFCCC has 
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equal weight to its counterpart in the WTO, for example how to define their 
jurisdictions concrete cases if a conflicts of jurisdictions, how to coordinate. Overlap 
could become an issue when a panel has to react on a determination already made by 
the non-compliance mechanism under the UNFCCC, because “trade measures for 
non-compliance would in most cases ensues as a consequence of a determination of 
non-compliance and a WTO panel would only be called to do adjudicate upon the 




In conclusion, it is highly likely that technology transfer commitments will have only 
a superficial influence due to their limited substantive and procedural stringency. In 
this respect it is difficult to determine whether governments fulfil their international 
assistance obligations, and to what extent they do so,
31
 because assessment involving 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) depends on a solid legal basis, and 
this does not exist in the case of climate technology transfer.  
  
(2) The MRV criteria of technology transfer  
The MRV criteria aim to “enhance compliance with a future international climate 
agreement and thus also affect the agreement‟s effectiveness in terms of mitigating 
and adapting to climate change.”
32
 The MRV requirement initially applies to the field 
of GHG emissions and then extends to non-target mitigation actions such as 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs).
33
 At required, the NAMAs in 
Annex I Parties supported by international finance and technology transfer are to meet 
MRV criteria.
34
 But what do MRV criteria mean for technology transfer? 
 
An overview of MRV related to technology transfer  
MRV refers to three closely linked concepts: measurement, reporting and verification. 
Each of these is concerned with a distinct set of issues.  
 
A. Measurement 
Law can be measured. In the climate regime, the requirement of measurement 
facilitates technology transfer with the collection of indicators which are used to 
establish baselines and identify the potential for mitigation, as well as adaptation.
35
 In 
general, indicators related to technology transfer can be quantified in terms of the 
dollars spent and technologies transferred. In this respect, the EGTT has compiled a 
short list of performance indicators for the SBI to evaluate whether the obligations of 
solidarity are satisfactorily met.
36
 Forty possible indicators have been identified for 
the purpose of collecting the available data and exploring gaps in the data.
37
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Reporting is a continuous commitment in the climate regime, requiring Parties to 
provide information about their performance with regard to mitigating and adapting to 
climate change, so that others can assess what a state is doing in absolute/relative 
terms.
38
 The requirement of reporting is generally accepted because of the modest 
effort entailed.
39
 Under the UNFCCC, Parties can establish modalities in respect of 
their differentiated commitments and capacities.
40
 Broader and more stringent 
requirements for National Reports (NRs) apply for developed country Parties, so that 
their compliance can be determined, while developing country Parties are permitted to 
report and deliver National Communications (NCs) on a less regular basis on both 
their actions and emission levels.
41
 In this process, the governments of both 
developing and developed country Parties must report on technology transfer 
undertaken in their public and private sectors domestically.
42
 The financial resources 
provided by the GEF (Global Environment Facility) or other channels are also 
covered in the report, as “a good first step to provide measurable and comparable data 
in assessing technology transfer.”
43
 Precise and reliable information must be 
presented in a transparent, standardized way in a successful report to allow for 
comparison and verification.
44
To achieve this, the IPCC introduced specific 
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guidelines for the national reporting requirement in 2004, illustrating the format, 





Verification is a process undertaken independently to test the accuracy and reliability 
of reported information, or the procedures used to generate information. Although the 
major task of verification is not to “offer a legal judgment as to whether a state 
complies with its obligations,” it “plays a preliminary role by providing the factual 
predicate for later legal determinations in agreements with compliance procedures.”
46
 
Up to now only a few MEAs have introduced a regular and unconditional process for 
verification.
47
 In the climate regime, verification is often associated with a “review” 
and at the moment only a few areas are being reviewed.
48
 There is a requirement for 
carrying out an international review to verify those GHG mitigation actions that are 
undertaken with technological and financial assistance.
49
 However, it is important to 





Barriers arising in technology transfer related to MRV 
Technology transfer with MRV is a new area. Current measurement, reporting and 
verification provisions under the UNFCCC are well defined and work well in the field 




There are significant shortcomings with regard to assessing the implementation of 
technology transfer commitments with MRV, which include problematic technology 
transfer commitments, limited performance indicators and the inadequate capacity to 
carry out MRV. (1) Technology transfer commitments are somehow problematic.
52
 
First, they are not sufficiently specific. Verification is only possible if commitments 
have been measured.
53
 However, the standard reference of quantitative measurement 
of technology transfer is based on the UNFCCC, particularly on how many 
obligations have been determined for developed country Parties to transfer their 
climate sound technologies. The vague character of the provisions makes consistent 
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measurement difficult and results in unverifiable data.
54
 To a large extent, the 
elaborate verification guidelines of the Montreal Protocol benefit from its detailed 
commitments.
55
 Second, the determination of compliance will immediately become 
complicated, if it comes to ranking the importance of multiple commitments within 
the current climate change framework in which commitments with different goals are 
allocated in an inclusive way.
56
 The MRV criteria for technology transfer are 
commitments made in addition to the primary commitments of emission reductions. 
“It is unclear where technology commitments rank on the scale of all commitments in 
the climate change agreement – and the preferred ranking may differ between 
countries.”
57
 (2) The performance indicators are limited in practical terms. It is 
difficult to distinguish regular technology flows from technology transfer required by 
the UNFCCC. What needs to be measured in relation to technology is broader than 
technology transfer, if that means the movement of technology with a higher cost than 
the commercial standard practice, and also resulting in lower emissions.
58
 While, the 
performance indicators developed by the EGTT “are often too detailed, and, while 
they can be useful for monitoring the implementation of the themes of the technology 
transfer framework, they present challenges when being used to derive meaningful 
insights into the effectiveness of the implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 1(c) and 
5, of the Convention.”
59
 In addition, existing MRV used to quantify technology 
transfer is centralized in straightforward, descriptive elements, in contrast with those 
that are not financed but are commonplace.
60
 There are fewer instruments, there is 
less experience of assessing the less tangible forms of implementation such as human 
resources, local institutional capacity-building to apply technology and preferential 
access so on.
61
 (3) The capacity to carry out MRV is inadequate. Assessing 
implementation is a resource-intensive process. To fully exercise MRV may be 
technically feasible but unaffordable in practice.
62
 The cost of collecting information 
and the period required for capacity building are two factors which have an impact on 
the effectiveness of MRV.
63
 Developed country Parties do not always have sufficient 
capacity to fulfil the MRV criteria, not to mention developing country Parties which 
have even less capital and personnel, and fewer techniques. For example, information 
collation by utilizing the performance indicators will incur significant cost especially 
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3.1.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) 
3.1.1.2.1 Background: IPRs and climate change 
Following the Declaration of NIEO and the Havana Charter, IPRs re-entered the 
domain of public policies with a focus on bioethics, public health and sustainable 
development.
65
 The empirical analysis of the economic value of innovation and the 
utilitarian rationale for IPRs is now confronted with challenges raised by climate 
sound technologies.
66
 Is this just another IPR and technology transfer debate? Or do 
climate change mitigation and adaptation present distinctive challenges for IP law, 
policy and administration? 
 
In the technology transfer negotiations, the North and South hold rather different 
opinions on the obligations of governments to transfer technology and on the costs of 
technologies.
67
 Their diverging views reflect the very nature of climate change-related 
technologies: because they are for the public good, governments responsible for 
overcoming the global climate crisis must make them publicly available; as the fruit 
of innovation most climate technologies are actually generated in the private sector by 
independent commercial entities with legitimate cost/benefit requirements.
68
 These 
technologies are characterized by interrelated interests – the technology suppliers 
commit to providing advanced technologies and have an interest in their widespread 
dissemination.  
 
In practice, there are striking differences regarding the role and application of IPRs. 
The developing countries regard IPRs as a formidable barrier which impedes access to 
affordable climate technologies. As discussed below, they proactively appeal for a 
reform of the international IPR regime and have put forward several solutions, while 
the developed countries do not devote as much attention to IPRs in climate 
technology as the developing countries.
69
 IPRs are generally favoured in these 
countries‟ public policy because they are likely to reward innovation and create a 
predictable investment climate.
70
 So far, different positions seem to be hardening. The 
US Congress issued a directive stating that no new climate treaty can limit the scope 
or application of American IP rights.
71
 Meanwhile, developing countries strongly 
insist on compulsory licensing or even excluding ESTs from being patented.
72
 
Because of these divisive views, the 2009 Copenhagen Summit failed to arrive at any 
uniform agreement on the subject of IPRs and technology transfer.
73
 Instead, the 
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difference of opinion resulted in two options presented in the Draft Decision on 
Enhancing Actions on Technology Development and Transfer. No reference was 
made to IPRs in option 1, while Option 2 confirmed the technology needs of 




3.1.1.2.2 Assessing the role of IPRs in climate-related technology transfer  
The successor to the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to be successful unless the IPRs for 
climate-related technologies are dealt with in an appropriate, pragmatic and 
constructive way. Below, we will attempt to explore the information related to IPR 
law needed by climate change policymakers by answering two key questions: what is 
going on and what does it amount to? 
 
(1) Climate sound technologies, IPRs and TRIPS 
The relationship between climate sound technologies, patents and IPRs is complex. 
There is no single view that accurately captures this relationship. A patent amounts to 
the deliberate use of exclusive rights and are intrinsically associated with the 
generation, dissemination and publication of new technologies.
75
 As an exclusive 
right, a patent can be applied in various fields, particularly in technology partnerships 
and to create broader for technology transfer arrangements.
76
 IPR is an umbrella term 
that refers to “an array of legal rights that provide some sort of protection for certain 
kinds of intangible property.”
77
 Technologies which are aimed at climate mitigation 
and adaptation can be patented, but do not limit in that. There is a wide range of IPR 




The correct use of IPR is important for ensuring technology transfer, especially in 
high-tech industries. The IPRs related to climate technology transfer are confronted 
by a potential paradox: balancing exclusivity and openness and harnessing private 
interests against the benefits of innovation for the public. Two forums, the WIPO and 
the WTO, are particularly involved in this issue. 
 
A. The WIPO  
At the organizational level, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a 
specialized UN agency responsible for setting international norms for IPRs. Despite 
its traditional focus on strengthening innovation, the WIPO is also obliged to 
“facilitate the transfer of technology related to industrial property to developing 
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 Unfortunately, it has struggled to fulfil this mandate. To improve 
performance, the WIPO developed a series of development-friendly strategies.
80
 Since 
then, the WIPO has endeavoured to amend the IPR laws and services for developing 
countries by providing information on options for a domestic IP regime.
81
 In response 
to the Copenhagen Summit, the WIPO presented a proposal identifying potential 
measures for mitigation such as an international forum, patent mapping, support for 




B. The WTO and TRIPS 
In relation to trade, IPRs were framed in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
83
 As the first and most comprehensive 
international agreement on IPRs, TRIPS sets out minimum standards for various 
forms of IP which apply for the WTO Members.
84
 To date, it has been modified 
several times, resulting in the Doha Declaration.
85
 The Doha Declaration adopted a set 
of references to technology transfer, which directly led to the creation of the Working 
Group on Trade and Technology Transfer (WGTTT) that is responsible in particular 
for negotiations on technology transfer.
86
 As regards the TRIPS recently developed in 
Doha, formulations influence the transfer of climate sound technology can be 
basically found in the preamble, principles and specific provisions. 
 
The preamble and principles 
TRIPS presents its concern with the public interest
87
 and the special needs of least 
developed countries (LDCs)
88
 at the very beginning, setting the basic tone for the 
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development and management of IPRs. Three technology transfer-related principles 
are stipulated in response to this preamble, respectively in Article 6, Article 7 and 
Article 8.  
 
Article 6 deals with the exhaustion principle in intellectual property rights with the 
aim of finding a balance between free trade and public interest. By its very nature, the 
exhaustion clause refers to that exclusive right exhausts after first willing sale of 
brand marked good and owner cannot intervene to the circulation of this good.
89
 In 
terms of the targeted markets, it includes both regional exhaustion and universal 
exhaustion. Under universal exhaustion, the owner of technology cannot limit its 
distribution once it has been sold domestically, thus allowing parallel imports. With 
regard to global climate technology transfer, universal exhaustion would be in the best 
interests of public climate protection and importers from developing countries,
90
 
because it promotes competition and liberates international trade leading to lower 
prices and making technologies more accessible in developing countries.
91
 Article 7 
deals specifically with technology transfer.
92
 In this Article, the TRIPS highlights the 
significance of technology transfer, consolidating it as a guideline in the Declaration 
on TRIPS & Public Health. As a principle, Article 7 aims to play a role in reading and 
interpreting TRIPS clauses. To prevent the abuse of IPRs, Article 8 generally entitles 
Members to protect the public interest. Notably, in the 1994 TRIPS, the public interest 
principle was accompanied by the condition that it should be consistent with other 
provisions. However, the Doha Declaration eliminated these subordinating constraints 




Technology transfer provisions  
The WIPO Secretariat enumerated the ESTs transfer-related provisions in the TRIPS 
agreement, including Article 29.1 (disclosure requirement), Articles 30 and 31 
(exceptions and limitations), Article 8 and Article 40 (anti-competitive practices in 
contractual licenses).  
 
By defining the scope of patents and exceptions that have been granted, TRIPS 
imposes mandatory obligations on the standardized IPR protection for its Members. 
According to TRIPS, patent protection applies broadly to all inventions, both products 
and processes.
94
 In this regard, the scope of inventions protected by patents is 
seemingly very broad. As regards climate change, whether this broad scope benefits 
technology transfer or not depends on how the non-discrimination clause will be 
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interpreted in a concrete way.
95
 This applies specifically for second generation bio-
fuels produced by future biotechnologies. These could incorporate specific enzymes 
or new micro-organisms that will be patented.
96
 Once an invention is patented, its 
disclosure must be carried out in a sufficiently clear and complete manner by an 
expert. For many reasons, the requirement of disclosure is difficult to be met in the 
international transfer of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies.   
 
Environmental and climatic sound technologies are considered to be exempt from 
general patentability because they are exceptions on the grounds of protecting the 
“public order” or “morality” and to avoiding “prejudice to the environment”.
97
 On this 
basis, TRIPS allows several exceptions for unauthorised use: the exception for the 
legitimate interests of third parties, the security exception and the public health 
exception. In the first case the patent that was granted is not allowed if it prejudices 
the legitimate interest of third parties in an unreasonable way.
98
 In the case of climate 
technology, it is only if the interests of third parties in mitigating and adapting climate 
change are given enormous weight, that the third party exception can be made. 
However, it may come up against practical difficulties in the judicial or administrative 
process.
99
 Similarly, it is not very likely that patenting climate technologies would 
constitute a material threat to maintaining international security and peace.
100
 Last but 
not least, the public health exception introduced by Article 31 leaves the door open 
for an exception that could be made for climate change-related technology transfer. 
There are three preconditions for this: there is an emergency, the use is non-
commercial use and the domestic market requirement must to be met for the public 
health exception to be exercised.
101
 Members of the TRIPS are allowed to determine 
the specific terms of the public health exception clause,
102
 which raises the most 
controversial issue in this respect – the compulsory licensing of climate sound 
technologies.  
 
Article 31 is commonly referred to as the compulsory licensing clause. In general, 
compulsory licensing is authorised in emergencies. Once a situation has been 
determined as an emergency, best effort licensee must immediately inform the IPR 
holder of the exception allowing unauthorized use. As this license is statutorily-
created, Article 31 has primarily been applied in national law. There are a number of 
specific environmental laws allowing licences for technological applications which 
meet public health needs, such as 42 USC, Section 7608. In this case, the US 
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government issued compulsory licences for inventions that prevent air pollution under 




It is well known that compulsory licensing can be used in the public pharmaceutical 
field, although its application has led to a great deal of controversy. According to the 
domestic market requirement, members must have sufficient manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector to make effective use of licensed medicines. It causes 
problems with regard to compulsory licensing.
104
 For this reason, the General Council 
of the WTO amended Article 31 in 2005.
105
 This amendment definitively waived the 
domestic market requirement for certain pharmaceuticals in its first tier waiver. Since 
then, the WTO opens up regional markets for pharmaceutical products, authorizing 
them for Regional Trade Agreements (RTA, namely the second tier waiver), 
particularly for developing countries and LDC Members.
106
 With the second tier 
waiver, RTA Parties can re-export products to those who seek compulsory licensing 
in importing pharmaceuticals. To some extent, the new amendment of the domestic 
market requirement increases the flexibility for granting compulsory licensing in this 
case. 
 
Despite the similarity with public pharmaceuticals, it remains unclear whether 
compulsory licensing can be extended to climate mitigation and adaptation 
technologies. In this respect, there is a big difference of opinion between developing 
and developed country Parties. The group of 77 developing countries led by China, 
India and Brazil propose compulsorily licensing for patented technologies in the 
private domain.
107
 In their view, the rationale of the public health exception which 
applies for pharmaceuticals protected by patents is also appropriate for addressing the 
global climate crisis. On the other hand, compulsory licensing meets strong resistance 




To increase the likelihood of success, patent holders must be compensated with 
reasonable payment. This process is subject to a domestic judicial review. For 
example, the US court established a clear set of criteria for determining “reasonable 
payment.”
109
 The EU however has less experience of granting compulsory licences 
than the US. In cases where the compulsory license was granted to export 
pharmaceuticals to countries with public health problems, the EU provided for 4% of 
remuneration for patent licences given by the importing countries.  
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“Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”
110
 These grounds cover 
many aspects in national law.
111
 The relevant standards used to measure and assess 
the suitability of these grounds are established on a case-by-case basis. Apart from the 
public interest exception, compulsory licences can be also granted in the case of anti-
competitive IPRs. Once are anti-competitive practices identified, the patent will be 
subject to compulsory licensing until the relevant practices are terminated.
112
 The 
transfer of ESTs is likely to benefit from this exception made for anti-competitive 
IPRs practices which yield a result of reducing RBPs.
113
 However, in practice it is 
indeterminate yet whether the exception for anti-competitive practices is temporary or 
indefinite. There are also no implications for the consequence of exercising such a 
compulsory licensing. 
 
In addition to Article 31, Article 8 and Article 40 also deal with anti-competitive 
practices, but they focus on illegitimate monopolies with a contractual licence.
114 
Article 8 provides for the broad principle that TRIPS will address any restrictions on 
technology transfer and take “appropriate” action. In this context, Article 40 entitles 
members to determine the types of practices they consider may have an adverse 
impact on the transfer of technology. Countries which own IPRs therefore have 
sufficient discretion to influence the exercise of Article 40 with domestic legislation. 
Under this rationale, it is hard to imagine that recipients in developing countries 
would be in the political, economic or legal position to freely choose the best 
suppliers, as members are given great leeway for controlling technology transfer in 




Article 40 contains various pro-competition remedies: exclusive grant back conditions, 
conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing. A review 
of these remedies shows that they basically underline “post-grant” inventions and fail 
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to address abuses of IPRs which occur before they were granted or while they are 
granted.
116
 As far as climate technology transfer is concerned, Article 40 has a 
particular limited effect because it is only transaction-oriented (joint ventures, 
subcontracting, assigning patents to other parties are not covered) and there is no 





To summarise, Article 8 and Article 40 establish “a link between the adverse effects 
an agreement may have on technology transfer and its restrictive effects on 
competition.”
118
 Nevertheless, it is arguable that provisions are formulated to 
overcome the downsides of IPRs in the TRIPS that are primarily aimed at 
incentivising IPRs.
119
 Irrespective of these provisions, there are inherent difficulties in 
making exceptions for anti-competitive practices. In the first place, the relevant 
clauses are too general. Secondly, the requirement of consistency is a precondition.
120
 
This requirement can be interpreted in such broad terms that Article 8(2) and Article 
40 prove to be virtually meaningless.
121
 As Littleton comments: “Seeking a source for 
technology transfer, most developing countries cannot afford to be selective and may 




(2)  Assessing the TRIPS in the light of the UNFCCC framework 
Bearing this theoretical review in mind, it is time to evaluate the impact of IPRs on 
climate-related technology transfer. The impact of IPRs, not only on the spread of 
technology in developing countries at the moment, but also on future innovations in 
technology should be appropriately assessed. Before this assessment, it is necessary to 
take some empirical data and important facts into account. 
 
An overview 
In 2009, Chatham House and Cambridge IP released one of the most comprehensive 
assessments, based on an elaborate analysis of almost 57,000 patents for six key 
technology sectors covering a span of over thirty years.
123
 The key findings are, 
amongst other things, that: (1) due to the time lag taken for patented technology to 
become widely used in subsequent inventions, business-as-usual practices will not 
bring those much-needed climate technologies to market fast enough.
124
 Policy 
interventions are needed to create market demand in order to ensure that the 
technologies are fully provided; (2) the innovation and diffusion of climate sound 
technologies are centralized in OECD countries. Companies and institutes from the 
US, Germany and Japan are clear leaders in technology innovation and determine the 
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rate at which the most advanced technologies will spread in the next decade. Large 
companies in these countries in particular control 80% of the patents for all targeted 
technologies. This suggests that “the most successful strategy for developing 
countries wishing to enter these areas may initially be driven by large companies and 
be pursued through acquisition of foreign technologies rather than internal growth.”
125
 
(3) Patent ownership implies some recognition of the commercial value of an 
innovation. Although the concentration of patent ownership cannot be simply 
assumed to be synonymous with monopoly or the lack of competition, it does slow 




The SBI of the UNFCCC recently conducted a systematic review and assessment of 
the effectiveness of the implementation of Article 4.5 of the Convention, and issued 
an official report. As far as the IPRs for climate technology are concerned, two points 
should be underlined. First, the report surveyed the legal endeavours of developed 
countries to increase the development and transfer of technologies to developing 
countries. In the light of this report, “the past and current support provided was and 
still is inadequate given the needs identified by developing countries.”
127
 Secondly, 
the report referred to the increasing importance of the private sector from 2002 and 
identified the technology transfer initiatives reported by Parties in partnership with the 
private sector. The role played by IPRs in this process deservedly attracted attention. 
“Enhancing the business environment through better use of IPRs will be important for 




                                          
Highlighting these data and facts is significant both from the theoretical and realistic 
point of view. It reveals the important background of climate technology transfer 
internationally at the moment, leading to a better understanding of different 
viewpoints and the essence of problems.   
 
Different viewpoints on the IPRs of climate-related technologies 
As indicated above, continuing differences persist in the IPRs of climate-related 
technologies. The TRIPS will have to be reformed in this respect or they will become 
a source of considerable international dispute.
129
 By way of clarification, an attempt 
will be made below to summarise some of the important arguments frequently 
presented by the stakeholders in technology transfer. 
 
[Option 1] No reference to IPRs in the international climate framework 
This strategy is favoured by most technology exporting countries, led by the US. The 
US has attempted to exclude IPRs from any agreements related to the post-Kyoto 
negotiations for a long time. In this respect, they are supported by Austria, Japan and 
other developed countries to some extent.
130
 The main arguments for their position are: 
(1) The IPR is necessary to reward innovation and stimulate competition, in order to 
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guarantee a long-term supply of technology to the market.
131
 (2) The current regime 
for IPRs and its amendments are sufficient for the Parties seeking international 
technology transfer. First, some climate sound technologies have long been off-
patented and even those patented technologies are small-scales.
132
 Secondly, there is a 
distinction between climate technologies and pharmaceuticals.
133 
It is inappropriate to 
simply apply the public health exception to climate mitigation and adaptation 
technologies.
134
 Thirdly, numerous substitutes for climate technologies can be found 
on the market and domestic competition is enough to bring prices down.
135 
Fourthly, 
TRIPS allows for flexibility and exceptions to patentability in a way that is adequate 
to address most of the obvious obstacles to technology transfer. The key problem is 
how to understand them better and enforce them more effectively at the domestic 
level. (3) Modifying the existing regime of IPRs would be very expensive. There are 
risks and uncertainties involved in redesigning protection standards and procedures. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of implementation cannot be guaranteed in a new 
context. (4) The real barriers to the transfer of climate sound technology to developing 
countries are a low capacity for adaptation and an unfavourable environment for trade 
and investment on the demand side, rather than the protection of IPRs on the supply 
side. (5) There are even some arguments for shifting the attention internationally to 
more important terms on the agenda such as the verification of GHG reduction, in 




[Option 2] Amendment to IPRs in accordance with climate change agreements 
The BRIC countries,
137
 G77 and small island states are against this and suggest 
adjusting IPRs in accordance with climate sound technology, including patent pooling, 
a global pool of IPRs, public licensing, etc.
138
 Leaving these solutions aside, we 
intends to explore the reasons behind them. Unlike option 1, the arguments in favour 
of amendment to IPRs are certainly scattered, and have been addressed in little 
details.
139
 It is therefore important to identify them systematically. (1) The most 
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vigorous argument concerns the common response to global climate change and the 
nature of relevant technologies as a public good. The UNFCCC confirms this from the 
legal point of view and provides obligations for individual governments. In theory, it 
is undeniable that developed country Parties with technology transfer commitments 
should take action to facilitate this process. (2) Normal business practices are 
inadequate to increase the transfer of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies 
to developing countries as required by the UNFCCC. On the whole, TRIPS focuses 
more on whether developing countries could provide an appropriate environment for 
technology transfer, than on whether the developed countries could actively promote 
technology transfer.
140
 First, the target of promoting innovation must be reconciled 
with the public interest. Otherwise it would constitute an abuse of private rights. At 
present, concern about public health reveals the compelling need to control exclusive 
rights properly so that the public requirement of adapting and mitigating to climate 
change with innovation and the application of improved technology can be met.
141
 
Secondly, the TRIPS minimum standards for IPRs protection are unduly rigorous and 
tend towards a sort of protectionism.
142
 Climate sound technologies represent the 
balance between commercial interests and public objectives and an undue protection 
of IPRs will result in high costs, delayed access and reduced competition for them.
143
 
According to current standards, if nothing is done at all, compulsory licensing will 
become more difficult.
144
 (3) Although TRIPS allow for a certain degree of flexibility 
and exceptions for Members to place IPRs in the context of public policy priorities, 
there is no convincing evidence to show that their potential contribution could allow 
and support the rapid and widespread transfer of technologies needed for the 
reduction of GHG emissions. By contrast, the enforcement of this flexibility has been 
challenged by various RBPs which occur in the real world and by failed cases which 
take place in parallel fields.
145
 Therefore it would seem premature to conclude that the 
benefits of the TRIPS exceed the potential obstacles to climate-related technology 
transfer. (4) For those who had high hopes of the latest TRIPS amendments, the key 
problem was that developing countries might not be able to take full advantage of 
them.
146
 For example, recipients in developing countries, particularly LDCs, might 
not be able to afford to compensate holders of IPRs.
147
 Most of the relevant provisions 
leave great leeway for members to control technology transfer in accordance with 
their competitive merits.
148
 Fierce competition from a more sophisticated foreign 
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competitor could drive climate technology licensees out of business.
149
 (5) TRIPS is 
legally prescriptive in nature. When developed countries need guidance from 
developed countries with greater expertise of IPR legislation, they could encounter 
pressure to strengthen the laws on IPRs even beyond TRIPS. This “TRIP-plus 
requirement”
150
 is no longer new for the trade negotiators and politicians in the 
developed countries, and this certainly undermines the legitimate interests of 
developing countries under the TRIPS.
151
 (6) Can the WTO‟s DSM really resolve this? 
In the case of climate technology transfer, possible disputes involve both climate 
change and trade treaties. The powers of the UNFCCC and the WTO must be 
coordinated in more detail.
152 
Moreover, the DSM requires large financial expenditure 
and human resources; it is hard to imagine that developing countries could meet these 
requirements in practice.  
 
In short, the current international dialogue on the IPRs for climate sound technology 
transfer is too heated to achieve the agreement required by the successor of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Each side is eager to justify its position, rather than devote any real attention 
to any other position. Both North and South seem to lack solid evidence to convince 
each other, or are basically reluctant to be persuaded. However, whatever the 
arguments, the global climate crisis is an undeniable truth. Another equally 
undeniable truth concerns the need for developing countries to have better access to 
public climate technologies in order to overcome the climate crisis which is mainly 
caused by their industrialised neighbours. In theory, the regulatory tools for IPRs can 
both facilitate and hinder the progress of technology transfer. To ensure a positive 
result, it is necessary to deliver the required benefits in the required way. 
 
3.1.1.2.3 Options for dealing with TRIPS  
The UNFCCC technology transfer commitment is a relative obligation. It operates 
within a certain legal context in which conflicts and constraints generally exist. 
Regulatory intervention is thus needed to harmonize all the formulations about IPRs. 
This implies exploring the potential contribution of IPRs while removing the barriers 
within or outside the TRIPS framework.  
 
(1) Under the TRIPS 
Solving problems within the TRIPS could be easier and more acceptable than 
amending or abandoning this regime.
153
 Above all, the development target could be 
developed in a new context by exploiting the formulations of the TRIPS in favour of 
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climate technology transfer to developing country Parties.
154
 Members are expected to 
make full use of the present flexibility and exceptions in the light of sustainable 
development, so that advanced climate technologies could be exempt from 
patentability. For example, previous exemptions for pharmaceuticals were made in 
some countries, serving as an example of the exception made for reasons of public 
health, and related to duration and compensation. Furthermore, technology transfer 
stakeholders could take advantage of pro-competition provisions, if they were 
enforced more uniformly by the agreement.
155
 At the organizational level, the WTO 
has the potential to assist the UNFCCC in enforcing technology transfer provisions. In 
the prospective Technology Mechanism, for example, the WTO is expected to play a 





Despite this, “the room available within the TRIPS Agreement to foster technology 
transfer to developing nations is quite small.”
157
 As the studies of the European Patent 
Office revealed, there was an increasing number and scope of patent claims in wind 
energy and biofuel technologies.
158
 “The problems of access to technology seem 
today more fundamental than those relating to the conditions under which the actual 
transfer may take place.”
159
   
 
If the attempts to work with the TRIPS fail, amending it appropriately is essential. In 
2007 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which stated that an ambitious 
post-Kyoto agreement would require “corresponding adjustments” to be made to other 
international agreements, including new agreements on IPRs.
160
 The current TRIPS 
undeniably have limitations as regards promoting technology transfer. For instance, 
although Article 66.2 is a classic example of treating technology transfer as part of the 
larger development project, it has achieved minimal progress.
161
 Few developed 
country members even submitted reports to the TRIPS Council on the application of 
this article for transferring technologies to LDCs.
162
 Moreover, the key Article 31 has 
a fatal limitation. According to it, compulsory licensing primarily aims to serve the 
domestic market and export can be only an incidental use under the WTO Decision of 
public health. However, the duration and coverage of public health exception are 
limited, because the WTO Decision is basically applicable for single member country 
export. In this aspect, the patent holder does not really suffer from this disadvantage, 
but is free to serve more than one market, take advantage of the license, and this acts 
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 In addition, if a piece of technology cannot be used as 
information in a patent, which is known as tacit technology, no obligation will be 
imposed to patent holders to transfer their technology,
164
 and are there any legal 
grounds for granting compulsory licensing for exporting the technology in this regard?  
 
There is room for improvement as regards flexibility and the exceptions to provide 
new incentives for patent-holders to license their climate sound technologies on this 
basis.
165
 If necessary, extending the exemption for compulsory licensing or adopting a 
broader interpretation of the climate crisis would exempt relevant technologies from 
patentability. In the meantime, initiatives should be taken to make compulsory 
licensing more feasible for stakeholders. A modest remuneration for international 
patent licensers would be helpful; if possible, their application fee for IPRs could also 
be exempt.
166
 Those who resist compulsory licensing being granted are expected to 
provide proof for this rejection.
167
 To protect the legitimate interests of patent 
licensers even further, the duration of compulsory licensing could be limited to what 
is necessary for the purposes of public health.
168
 “If full licenses are unrealistic, 
temporary licenses could be granted.”
169
 In addition to compulsory licensing, the pro-
competitive measures in TRIPS could be strengthened for the development test, and 
they could be integrated with other technology transfer provisions. The TRIP-plus 
requirements must be firmly eliminated in the negotiations. Last but not least, when 
greater flexibility and exceptions are enforced domestically, developing countries 
could play a leading role and should be given further discretion to tailor the laws on 




As has been pointed out, the TRIPS adopt strong standards for the protection of 
IPRs.
171
 “Attempts to harmonize IPR laws have resulted in coerced conformity with 
the strictest IPR regulations of industrialized countries.”
172
 To some extent this is 
likely to narrow the options of technology and increase the costs of imitation. “It is 
fair to say that stronger IPRs reduce the scope for informal technology transfer via 
imitation, which was an important form of learning and technical change in such 
economies as Japan and the Republic of Korea (not to mention the United States).”
173
 
                                                 
163




 Littleton 2008, (no. 5), p. 15. 
166
 See John H. Barton and Keith E. Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on A Multilateral Agreement on Open 
Access to Basic Science and Technology,”  In  J. Simon and Bernard M. Hoekman (eds.), “Economic Development 
and Multilateral Trade Cooperation,” World Bank and Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. Also see Littleton 2008, (no. 5), 
p. 383. 
167
 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,” Duke Law Journal Issue 57, 
2008, pp.1699-1701. 
168 
Compulsory licenses should be liable to termination when the circumstances that justified their creation no 
longer apply. See Antony Taubman and Jayashree Watal, “The WTO TRIPS Agreement - A Practical Overview for 
Climate Change Policymaker,” Intellectual Property Division of the WTO Secretariat, 2009, p. 8. 
169
 In reality, the limited period may come to an end when the process of technology transfer has been completed. 




 These are: the twenty-year term of protection from the patent filing date; patents must be provided without 
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“To the extent that minimum levels of patent protection make technologies 
prohibitively expensive (and for which developed countries do not pay with 
development assistance or the GEF) or fail to attract FDI, it is probably the case that 
TRIPS is an impediment to technology transfer.”
174
 Any benefits of strong standards 
are “overwhelmingly outweighed by the high cost of importing patented technologies 
from developed countries, putting developing countries at a disadvantage and 
exacerbating the risks of bio-piracy.”
175
 In a word, the present standards are not a 
good bargain for all states.
176
 Therefore an amendment to the TRIPS offers a chance 
to reset, or at least assess the standards for IPRs on technology transfer-friendly terms. 
 
Similarly, attention should be devoted to making the present procedures less 
cumbersome, time-consuming and expensive. One suggestion is to establish a 
straightforward process with specially simplified, separate procedures, in order to 





(2) Outside the TRIPS 
There is the option of situating IPRs in the framework of climate change agreement. 
This would have at least three aims: (1) to provide the necessary assurances to allow 
the Parties to move beyond the issue of IPRs;
178
 (2) to maintain incentives for private 
funded innovation with this proposed approach; (3) to overcome IPR-related barriers. 
Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach which meets the needs of all the 
UNFCCC Parties, the corresponding arrangements should do more than merely avoid 
the IPRs and TRIPS.  
 
To achieve the first aim, a strategy of global IPRs management could be drawn up for 
public and private climate-technology innovators. Specifically, the UNFCCC is 
expected to redefine the ownership of IPRs and control them at every step of the value 
chain.
179
 To clarify responsibilities in this process, the UNFCCC could assist with the 
establishment of the roles and relationships of multi-players.
180
 In addition, it would 
be productive to match the specific needs of developing countries with innovators in 
developed countries.
181
 The price of clean technologies is likely to decline for 
recipients with this needs-based matching; while uncertainties can also be reduced for 
foreign innovators. Finally, rather than focusing on the TRIPS amendments, a 
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Climate technology transfer is not driven by environmental benefits alone. Fiscal 
incentives like subsidies and tax relief facilitate access to climate sound technology, 
and serve as the most straightforward means of funding.
183
 However, in reality the 
financial capacity of individual governments varies and is susceptible to free rides on 
a global scale.
184
 To avoid free rides at an international level, multilateral funds must 
be well established for early stage R&D and patent acquisition.
185
 In the light of 
existing financial mechanisms (such as the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund and 
the GEF), little attention has been devoted to the management of IPRs.
186 
A great deal 
can be accomplished in this respect, including “conditions for managing existing and 
developed IP; when and whether IP generated pursuant with fund resources should be 
subject to patent or dedicated to the public domain; whether the fund will insist on 
retaining exclusive licensing rights or ownership of IP, royalties, pricing to least 




IPR-related barriers can have a legal or technical nature. First, due to the 
interoperability required by climate technology transfer, IPR information must be 
accessed in an accurate, timely and authoritative way.
188
 However, “increasing 
privatization of basic data by entities in the developed countries threatens to retard the 
diffusion of such knowledge into science and competition in developing countries.”
189
 
A web-based system, the Technology Transfer Clearing House, was created at the 
institutional level to increase the availability of information in general.
190
 Meanwhile, 
appeals have been made at the international level for a multilateral agreement on 
access to information about ESTs to be drawn up in the WTO.
191
 The proposed 
agreement was to “provide a re-balancing of benefits under TRIPS in favor of 
technology users… and serve as a complementary and supporting mechanism for 
market-mediated technology transfers, rather than a substitute for them.”
192
 Secondly, 
the abuse of IPRs is another formidable barrier which takes place in technology 
transfer. The current legal support for pro-competition is inadequate to ensure a 
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competitive marketplace, not to mention the climate technology market.
193
 In the 
context of the UNFCCC, the monopolistic powers of the patent system have been 
broadly recognized.
194 
“Competition law may prove quite important in the context of 
transfer of technology for alternative energy resources and climate mitigation 
technologies.”
195
 Continued attempts could be made to draw up provisions to deal 
with IPRs, outlawing those measures that are universally considered to be wrong, 
such as price fixing, bid rigging and boycotts.
196
 From a procedural perspective, 
judicial and administrative norms should be made available to carry out prosecutions 
in cases where domestic technology enterprises engage in abusive practices abroad, 
for example, on the finality of decision, the type and enforcement of awards.
197
 It is 
commonly known that the anti-monopoly measures tend to be context driven and 
historically, developing countries have been less active than OECD countries in 
making and using competition law.
198
 The combat of climate change with technology 
solution provides them a chance to better harness competition law for achieving not 
only development but also environment objectives.  
 
3.1.2 The barriers emerging in national law 
According to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health, the successful 
enforcement of the provisions on ESTs transfer is dependent on national legislation.
199
 
Key developed country players are not highly motivated with regard to making their 
advanced technology available.
200
 For example, the US and the EU have made 
specific announcements related to targets for the reduction of emissions and financial 
support, but have not made any similar announcements about the transfer of 
technology.
201
 It is not surprising that they are passive with regard to creating a 
favourable legal environment, particularly for climate technology transfer.  
 
The remaining contents of this chapter will examine the potential legal barriers which 
exist in countries supplying technology. It is not possible to draw standard 
conclusions, because the identification, analysis and evaluation of barriers are country 
based.
202
 Only common practices will be considered. “There is sufficient 
commonality nonetheless in the types of problems they face to make a generalized 





3.1.2.1 Inappropriate protection measures 
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Climate change is a global issue, as is the transfer of climate change technology. 
Transferring the technology to developing countries under the UNFCCC is not a 
question of charity, requiring adequate political will. Because of the economic 
interests of the developed countries in climate change, this technology transfer is 
easier said than done. 204 There are therefore inappropriate protective measures in 
foreign trade policies, as well as environmental standards and macro-economic 
legislation, which hinder the global exchange of technologies used for reducing the 
intensity of GHG in the atmosphere and adapting to the impact of climate change. 
 
Due to the economic potential of climate change technologies, they are at the heart of 
a state‟s competitiveness and their transfer abroad would be fundamentally 
discouraged.
205
 A technology assessment conducted to examine the impact of export 
controls on key existing or emerging technologies subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the US, 
specifically examined the potential effects of export controls on commodities, 
software, and technology that either are or can be used to create products that 
contribute to clean energy, energy efficiency and other environmental initiatives.
206
 
According to it, relevant technologies were viewed as a sensitive matter and thus 
subject to dual use export controls which require an export license for certain 
destinations.
207
 By doing so, the BIS ultimately succeeded in facilitating secure trade 
in this important area.
208
 “These technologies deal with energy efficiencies, and the 
harvesting of energy can have dual use applications involving military 
technologies.”
209
 To date, nevertheless, “there is also a widely held notion in the 
international business community that clean energy does not implicate the same levels 
of national security concerns as do tightly held industries such as defence or 




Actually, what the US was doing was not unique. Climate change technology issues 
are a focus of international attention because this is a new industry with a rapidly 
growing market and MNEs want a stake in it.
211
 Developed countries worry about the 
transfer of technology affecting their monopoly.
212
 Instead of transferring know-how, 
major technology supplying countries such as Japan and Germany
213
 tend to offer 
                                                 
204
 See Hao Min, “The Analysis of the Relationship between Clean Technology Transfer and Chinese Intellectual 
Property Countering the Climate Changes,” Dir. Research series, Working Paper No. 147, 2011, p. 11. 
205 
One example is: Proposed Rule Revisions and Clarification of Export and Re-export Controls for the People’s 
Republic of China; New Authorization Validated End-User, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), US, 6 July 
2006. 
206
 “Critical Technology Assessment: Impact of U.S. Export Controls on Green Technology Items,” Office of 
Technology Evaluation Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of Commerce, August 2010. 
207
 These technologies include renewable energy technologies: wind power, hydropower, solar power, alternative 
fuel vehicles, and geothermal energy; energy efficiency technologies: energy efficient industrial, office, and 
household products and carbon sequestration; and others like recycling, waste management, rainwater recycling 
systems, water purification, and sewage treatment. 
208
 Idem. The report highlights the limited range of such products that pose a threat to national security (5.8% of 
total export value in 2008), and acts as a pre-emptive measure towards manufacturers of green technology who are 
concerned with export controls.  
209
 “Green-Tech Export Controls,” 21 August 2010, available at http://www.newmarketresponse.com/?p=194. 
210
 See Julian L. Wong, The Challenge of China’s Green Technology Policy and Ohio’s Response, Centre for 




 Hao 2011, (no. 204), p. 11. 
213 
See Seres, S., “Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects,” Prepared for the UNFCCC Registration & 
Issuance Unit CDM/SDM, Montreal, Canada, 2008, pp. 9. 
84 
 
finished technological products in order to maintain their monopolistic advantages in 
the clean technology market.  
 
The tight control over technology means that the conditions for transfer are not ideal. 
It tends to trigger information asymmetry and deficiencies in accountability, which 
adds the risk and uncertainty in the process of importing technology. Furthermore, the 
process is bound to be cumbersome and time-consuming when it is under tight control, 
weakening the motivation of domestic climate technology holders who are basically 
reluctant to provide their advanced technologies at lower costs.
214
 The natural 
spillover of technologies is highly likely to be reduced. More importantly, export 
controls and licensing restrictions would slow down the mobilization of private 




A number of practices described as “regulatory chill” somehow reflect a 
counterproductive attitude to regulatory standards.
216
 In many cases, international 
technology suppliers such as Germany, England and the US have adopted high 
environmental standards for technological products. As a result, too many domestic 
environmentally sound technologies were being exported. To prevent the overspill of 
even more technologies, these countries have in turn frozen the relevant regulatory 
standards.
217
 The practices of “regulatory chill” indicate a sense of protectionism in 
the clean energy and technology market.  
  
Barriers also arise when there is inadequate legal support for an open, orderly trade or 
investment system. Contractual and regulatory risks are the most common in this 
respect.
218
 First, “contract risk refers to the likelihood and costs of enforcing legal 
obligations with suppliers, partners, distributors, managers, labor forces, construction 
organizations or licensors.”
219
 Technology suppliers such as the US continue to 
emphasize the importance of contractual trade relations, leaving the parties free to 
negotiate the terms of the technology transfer agreement.
220
 However, in reality 
enterprises on the supply side mainly tend to draw up one-sided transfer agreements. 
And in a contractual context, these restrictive business practices cannot be effectively 
prohibited by national law.
221
 Secondly, regulatory risk is an inclusive concept arising 
from the behaviour of public administration. Improper requirements imposed on trade, 
technology transfer agreements, currency and investment regulations often block the 
flows of clean technology aiming to developing countries.
222
 Most often, they result in 
delayed access, cumbersome negotiations, inconsistent funds and excessive costs. 
 
3.1.2.2 Inadequate domestic incentives 
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Under the UNFCCC, governments who have technology transfer commitment are 
expected to introduce incentives for stakeholders domestically. 223 In comparison 
with protective measures, incentives are more negotiable and are therefore acceptable. 
Programme-based assistance, as well as instrumental arrangements, has an important 
role in this respect.  
 
(1) Instrumental arrangements  
“Developed countries should not only lift existing export restrictions on ESTs, but 
they should also actively encourage such exports.”
224
 In general, instruments such as 
export credit, tax relief and other subsidies are widely used as an incentive or 
disincentive in environmental policies.
225
 In this case, substantive tax relief, 
reductions or rebates on incomes or sales taxes of enterprises can be granted for 
revenues from the exports of environmentally sound technological products to 
developing countries.
226
 Unfortunately, “there is an indication that the past and 
current support provided was and still is inadequate given the needs identified by 
developing countries.” 
227
 It is not surprising to find that there is a continuing lack of 
broad, appropriate tax benefits, subsidies and public procurement to support this 
process.
228
 MNEs are less motivated to improve their traditional profit-oriented 
transfer of technology to become more climate friendly, and continue to engage in 
transactions involving inferior technology and environmentally damaging projects.
229
 
Governments in these countries must explore how to assist trade in order to avoid a 
bias against ESTs and discourage the transfer of obsolete technologies.  
 
(2) Development assistance 
Programme-based development assistance which is characteristic of government 
involvement is another channel to incentivise technology transfer. In practice, 
development assistance takes various forms, such as Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), Research & Development (R&D) and Public Private Partnerships (PPP). 
 
Taking ODA by way of example, this represents only a small percentage of 
developmental resources, but plays an irreplaceable role in certain sectors in 
developing countries which attract fewer private funds, such as agriculture, forestry, 
human health and coastal management. Nevertheless, current projects supported by 
ODA are experiencing an overall decline both in absolute terms and as a percentage, 
particularly those with a significant impact on technology transfer to developing 
counties.
230 
“The UN target of ODA at 0.7% of donors‟ gross national income has 
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been achieved by only Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.”
231
 “As a share of donor countries‟ GNP, ODA has levelled off in 





R&D which involves direct government funding and investment is another important 
channel for the transfer of technology. There has been a substantial decline in climate- 
relevant R&D projects supported by developed countries.
233
 The principal reason for 
the lack of incentives is that they are costly and therefore their implementation would 
increase public expenditure in those countries, at least in the short term. However, the 
positive outcomes of these incentives, such as environmental effectiveness, 
distributional equity and instrumental feasibility become apparent in the long run.
234
 
“To promote the development of ESTs that lack short-term commercial viability, 
government funding and public R&D programs are vital, and appropriate, reflecting 




Recent practices show that new public-private partnerships (PPP) are emerging in 
development assistance.
236
 In the context of less assertive and well-endowed national 
states which are reluctant to transfer powers to international bodies, PPP has the merit 
of involving various stakeholders from intergovernmental agencies, private 
enterprises and non-governmental organizations.
237
 To date, several UNFCCC Parties 
have identified specific projects to promote PPP for the diffusion of energy efficiency 
and renewable energy technologies.
238
 Nevertheless, the scope of these covers only 
small-scale projects. Key issues like government powers, financing responsibilities, 
monitoring and evaluation remain unclear in PPP.
239
 Further efforts are therefore 
needed to explore the theoretical basis and practical implementation of PPP to upscale 
climate mitigation and adaptation technologies.  
 
3.2 The legal barriers confronting the private sector in supplying technology 
Climate-related technologies can be developed either in the public sector or in the 
private sector, but viable technologies created in the public sector often have spin-offs 
in the private sector to exploit the potential in the technology market.
240
 Most of these 
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technologies are held by MNEs in reality, which control 80% of the patents for all the 
relevant technologies.
241
 This suggests that the most successful strategy for 
developing countries wishing to enter these areas may initially be driven by large 
companies and be pursued through the acquisition of foreign technologies rather than 
by internal growth.
242
 However, can the private sector effectively promote climate 
change-related technology transfer? If not, what kinds of potential obstacles confront 
this from a legal viewpoint? 
 
3.2.1 Market-based barriers to technology transfer  
In practice, the private sector enters the climate technology market with the trade in 




3.2.1.1 Restrictive business practices in technology trade 
The private sector (particularly leading technology MNEs) has a tendency to become 
trapped by the commercial aspects of climate-related technologies.244 In the transfer 
of technology, their focus is on expected profits, acceptable risks and the achievable 
protection of IPRs. Given the need for profit maximization and their inadequate 
social-environmental responsibilities, MNEs often employ restrictive business 





There is evidence that RBPs have an impact on climate sound technology transfer. An 
investigation carried out in Korean companies importing from Japan showed that of 
the 523 technologies introduced in 1994, restrictive conditions were imposed in 
23.3%. In some cases, even public institutions refused to license technologies which 




The RBPs employed by MNEs differ depending on the stage that has been reached in 
the technology transfer process. The countermeasures also vary. During the initial 
stages of innovation when there are not yet many other competitors with viable 
technologies on the international market, technology holders usually refuse to license 
their technologies or provide access to them. To respond to this restriction, it would 
be possible to issue compulsory licensing for specific climate technologies in the light 
of public health exceptions.
247
 At the market development stage, MNEs employ their 
exclusive rights to block the development of similar or identical technologies, or to 
impose restrictive conditions on transfer agreements. They aim to establish conditions 
that will allow them to manipulate the market in a manner that suits their global 
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strategies. In this aspect, pro-competitive measures to prevent this IPR abuse would 
be beneficial to remedy these RBPs. Once a practice has been judged to be anti-





RBPs are gradually creating a seller‟s market for climate sound technology, further 
exacerbating the imbalance between supply and demand.
249 
Although RBPs can be 
seen as conventional strategies for exploiting IPRs in the area of innovation, they 
breach the principles of both trade liberalization and sustainable development when 
they are employed in technologies for mitigating and adapting to climate change. 
Since, they have limited public interest and normal competition in the transfer of 
climate good technology. Moreover, the situation is deteriorating to some extent. 
Major changes in competition rules that have had a heavy impact on patent licenses 
mean that some practices considered to be RBPs will no longer be supervised.
250
 Even 
when recipients are economically capable to get access to technologies, they may be 
excluded from the “turnkey package”, which includes core knowledge, maintenance 





3.2.1.2 Other deficiencies in technology investment 
Foreign investment in technology is another pathway for developed countries and 
their MNEs to globalize climate sound technologies in the form of foreign direct 




As a vital source of finance and a powerful vector of innovation and technology 
transfer, FDI takes place between the headquarters and subsidiaries of MNEs through 
direct product or process transfer, training or information sharing.
253
 As FDI is based 
on technological superiority in this case, most MNEs are reluctant to see the overspill 
of their advanced technologies.
254
 They usually maintain the ownership or the control 
of technology flows to its fully owned subsidiaries, so that the local market can 
readily be controlled by the headquarters. Most subsidiaries are in a subordinate 
position, and serve only to make a profit for headquarters. However, the spillover of 
technology will eventually have an effect at the local level. It is therefore more likely 
for developing country recipients to benefit from greater competition, e.g., in the 
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context of joint ventures.
255
 Compared to fully owned subsidiaries, joint ventures are 
confronted with relatively liberal local policies.
256
 “Such a policy stance may be an 
attempt to protect incumbent firms from competing with MNEs, or may reflect a 
desire to maximize technology transfer to local agents.”
257
 In this course, it is 
important for governments to encourage green investment without leading to green 
protectionism. Finally, there are also barriers to other technology investments based 
on licensing agreements and management contracts. For example, signing and 
carrying out a management contract involves property distribution. It is difficult to 




3.2.2 Corporate Social-environmental Responsibility (CSR) 
3.2.2.1 Overview  
Nowadays there is cumulative pressure from governments, industries and publicity on 
enterprises‟ overseas activities. Under this pressure, MNEs may seriously consider 
integrating environmental aspects into their international strategies in order to ensure 
worldwide sustainable development.
259
 As external pressures only work when there is 
an awareness of their importance, their contribution to reducing GHG emissions 
depends on self-regulation, viz. corporate social-environmental responsibility (CSR). 
As the EU said, “companies act voluntarily and beyond the law to achieve social and 




Climate change leads to transformations, and even the configuration of enterprises 
responsibility.
261
 Up to the last century, the activities of MNEs had been increasingly 
directed at developing countries.
262
 A company that makes an effort to assist in the 
sustainable development of the third world, even if a profit is likely to result from the 
investment, will be able to gain recognition as a green company, something that many 
consumers are starting to take into consideration.
263
 “In the last decade, there has been 
a growing body of evidence that pioneering companies that actively manage their 
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3.2.2.2 The legal framework of corporate social responsibility  
To improve CSR, enterprises not only need to develop a strategic insight, but they 
also need a supportive legal system.
265 
Four documents have been drawn upon to 
indicate MNEs‟ social responsibilities for the environment.
266
 They state that MNEs 
should (1) adopt precautionary measures; (2) take action to become more responsible; 
(3) promote innovation and transfer clean technologies. The scope of responsibilities 
has clearly expanded from the traditional interests of shareholders to broader socio-
public concerns. These documents were compiled with global partnerships in 
international customary law to serve as a voluntary standard for MNEs. With regard 
to the UNFCCC, it states that “other Parties and organizations in a position to do so 
may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.”
267
 Does this 
requirement of assistance amount to CSR? We believe it does. Instead of imposing 
stringent, legally binding obligations, the convention is intended to achieve voluntary 
cooperation and support from enterprises in the process of technology transfer. The 
formulation in the convention appears to be a “best effort” clause which is left open to 





The above-mentioned voluntary industry standards basically focus on how to manage 
corporations for better economic development and trade liberalization, rather than on 
how to fully engage them in achieving public health and climate welfare. Hence, their 
potential contribution to the diligence obligations of MNEs in climate technology 
transfer proves to be limited. In this context, it is unfortunate that existing MEAs fail 
to prescribe explicit responsibilities for enterprises to provide their advanced 
technologies. As a result, these responsibilities are shifted to the governments of 
developed countries which are committed to creating an enabling environment for 
climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. The governments must either directly 
transfer publicly held climate-related technologies or finance the licensing of privately 
held climate-related technologies.
269
 Private enterprises should be guided to take 
facilitative actions on technology transfer, rather than hinder it. However, due to the 
intertwined interest in reality, they are unwilling to increase the control of enterprises‟ 
overseas activities.
270
 In this context, it is difficult to imagine that MNEs will actively 
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adopt CSR outside their mother countries. According to a survey investigating some 
private codes for environmental conduct adopted in the US and other developed 




In short, engaging the private sector, particularly large MNEs, in mitigating and 
adapting to climate change requires “a much more serious commitment to capturing 
the opportunities – by researching bottom-of-the-pyramid markets, by advancing 
standards of sustainability and public trust and by thinking creatively about linking 
with other businesses locally or abroad for mutual benefit.”
272
 To achieve this, local 
governments may provide a pragmatic solution by improving current private codes of 
environmental/climate conduct, and international society could assist them.
273
 It has 
been suggested that the proposed codes could take technology transfer into account. 
The UNFCCC could play a constructive role in mobilizing the political will of 
countries and in providing technical assistance. The test of success must lie in 
subsequent developments, in particular the post-Kyoto agreement.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
There are no national boundaries for climate change or technology transfer. 
Enterprises and institutions from Northern industrialized countries such as the US, 
Germany and Japan are clear leaders in climate change-related technology innovation 
and will determine the rate at which the most advanced technologies spread in the 
next ten years. Therefore, their good faith, cooperation and necessary actions play a 
fundamental role in the success of the entire process of technology transfer.  
 
From a legal viewpoint, the UNFCCC is a burden-sharing framework. It is widely 
recognized that excessive GHG emissions were ignored during the industrial 
development of Northern countries and therefore it is felt that they should reduce the 
costs of technology innovation.
274
 Intergenerational equity has been encoded in this 
way, with priority for removing the legal obstacles to supplying technology.  
 
Up to now, there have been no explicit, definite and stringent commitments for 
technology transfer in the international climate framework, while within a broader 
context, deeply rooted constraints and conflicts are in existence, e.g., IP protection. 
The IP related to TRIPS under the WTO has a complicated impact on technology 
transfer, and there has been no consensus on this among the key stakeholders. 
Northern industrialized countries have been reluctant even to negotiate on amending 
the TRIPS, or introducing controls on the external activities of their MNEs. As the 
prolonged negotiations for technology transfer revealed, the IP issues are very 
important and the most challenging barriers to market-led technology transfer in the 
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private domain. To make progress on this is still politically important in the current 
situation. 
 
At the level of national law, key developed players such as the US and the EU have 
made specific announcements about emission reduction targets and financial support, 
although there has been no similar announcement presented in the field of technology 
transfer. It is not surprising that they are not actively creating a favourable legal 
environment particularly for climate sound technology transfer, and are not removing 
the potential legal barriers concerned. Very often, the tight control of climate change 
technologies slows down the natural spillovers of international technology transfer to 
a large extent. Because of their lack of will and weak supervision, governments in 
these countries are less motivated to adopt substantial incentives, although incentives 
can be more easily negotiated by their very nature and are therefore more acceptable 
in comparison with protective measures. 
 
To strengthen the support for technology transfer under the convention, at least three 
points must be emphasised: (1) defining the scope of climate change technology 
transfer and the details of the MRV criteria on this basis in the actual implementation 
of technology transfer provisions; (2) improving the compliance mechanism to 
reinforce legislation, particularly the improved and additional functions of the 
Facilitative Branch in the Compliance Committee; (3) re-evaluating the existing 
international legal regime and exploring its potential contribution, while removing the 
existing barriers within or outside the UNFCCC framework.  
 
Climate change has a transforming effect on all stakeholders. There is an urgent need 
to engage the private sector more as they are proving to be increasingly important for 
achieving meaningful and effective technology transfer. However, given the strategy 
of profit maximization and the inadequate awareness of corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities, the private sector, especially MNEs, often adopt 
restrictive business practices when transferring low carbon technologies to developing 
countries. It is perhaps fair to say that if they are performed in a contractual context 
where business-as-usual practices dominate, these RBPs are unlikely to be completely 
prohibited by national law.
275
 Indeed, while developed countries insist on economic 
interests, the international transfer of climate change-related technologies becomes 
somehow problematic.   
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Chapter 4   Instrumental Barriers to Receiving Climate 
Sound Technology 
 
Participatory development has been widely recognized as a way of achieving effective 
technology transfer at every level of development.
1 
To achieve this, the UNFCCC 
established a broad basis for multilateral actions related to an enabling environment 
for technology transfer. This includes the efforts of both developed and developing 
countries, and the public and private sectors. Although a favourable environment for 
the international transfer of climate sound technology depends mainly on suppliers,
2
 it 
is difficult for technology assistance take place in the desired way in the absence of 
appropriate indigenous environments.   
 
Two main reasons account for this: (1) it is felt that the entire life cycle of technology 
should be reflected. The complete process of technology transfer will not terminate 
unless advanced technologies are successfully adapted to local circumstances; (2) 
international efforts for the implementation of technology transfer provisions are 
shifting from a push-oriented to a push and pull approach.
3
 Climate technology 
transfer driven by the donor-push approach is unlikely to succeed without a 
corresponding pull from the recipient concerned.
4
 Similarly, the legal barriers which 




4.1 Background  
4.1.1 Summary of developing countries’ needs 
Historically, developing countries have been the victims of the global climate crisis 
which is principally caused by their neighbours, the industrialized countries.
6
 They 
are now confronted with the challenges of promoting a fast-growing economy with 
fewer mature capital markets and inferior technologies. This results in development 
which favours fossil-fuelled energy generation.
7
 To achieve sustainable development, 
developing countries must transform this conventional development model which is 
characterised by high GHG emissions. And, a serious engagement of them in the 
common responsibility for climate governance needs to explicitly address the 
fundamental need.
8
 Massive technologies are required to deal with the core concern of 
developing countries for continuing economic growth, without an accompanying 
degradation of the climate. “If advanced climate technology is not applied in time, the 
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The required benefits must be delivered in the required ways. Therefore solidarity 
assistance is provided internationally to developing countries in terms of technology 
transfer. In practice, technology transfer results in a significant win-win situation.
10
 
One immediate benefit is the improvement in the climate due to reduced GHG 
emissions. It allows developing countries to take steps that will help prepare for 
possible future mandatory emission reductions.
11
 As regards developed countries, 
technology transfer tracks the progress in achieving country-specific and collective 





Although there are big differences between developing countries nowadays, such as 
the stage of development they have reached, their technology endowments and 
political-legal basis, their basic position with respect to climate-related technology 
transfer remains unchanged. They urge for a full, effective and sustainable technology 
transfer so that both public and private technology flows can be increased.
13
 At the 
same time, developing countries have in common a commitment to enable 
environment for the implementation of technology transfer provisions.
14
 As a starting 
point, specific action must be taken to identify and evaluate the existing barriers. 
 
4.1.2 The approach  
Recipients of technology are affected by a wide range of barriers of different types. In 
1990, the UN had already reviewed the key barriers facing developing countries with 
regard to technology transfer and it produced a brief report on this basis.
15
 
Subsequently, many developing country Parties compiled their national TNAs with a 
brief outline of the barriers to technology transfer used for climate mitigation and 
adaptation.
16
 One of the common barriers is policy-related, and includes regulatory, 
institutional and legislative obstacles. Unfortunately, limited information is available 




In this chapter, we will attempt to provide a summary of the legal barriers that impede 
the introduction of climate mitigation and adaptation technology. The research 
question is therefore as follows:  
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What are the legal barriers in the process of receiving climate 
sound technology and specifically how do they impact on 
international technology transfer? What kinds of solutions, if any, 
have been proposed to tackle these barriers? 
Because of the inadequate information available and the enormous differences in 
specific circumstances, there is no “one-size-fits-all approach.”
18
 The remaining 
content will mainly focus on general practices and conventional circumstances related 
to technology recipients, as in Chapter 3. The previous chapter throws some light on 
the legal barriers that exist in the counterpart to the developing countries, i.e., the 
developed countries. However, while chapter 3 analyses this making a clear division 
between the public and private sectors, this chapter will focus on the barriers 
themselves. This is because the barriers which stop the private sector from receiving 
climate sound technologies are not really legal in nature. To a great extent, they are 
the result of specific weaknesses, such as a lack of capacity. As illustrated below, the 
major legal barriers confronting technology recipients are reflected in the negotiations 
and concern the local capacity as well as the regulatory framework.  
 
4.2 Weak bargaining power in the climate technology transfer negotiations 
4.2.1 Developing countries in climate change negotiations 
Climate change negotiations reflect the overall power (or bargaining power) of a Party. 
In practice, the bargaining powers of Parties differ enormously. “The current balance 
of power is unequally distributed in favour of developed countries, which control 
most of (the) global capital, military power, natural resources and knowledge 
resources.”
19
 Unsurprisingly, they have a great influence on the process of designing 
rules and the international negotiation procedures. As major emitters of GHG 
historically, developed countries are continuing to produce emissions, though the rate 
is declining.
20 
The burden of the impact of emissions is greater for poorer nations. 
Asymmetrical bargaining powers and heavier burden mean that an equitable solution 




Although the UNFCCC introduced the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the concern for an equitable process is constantly voiced in the 
negotiation proceedings.
22
 “Developing country concerns which had always been 
marginal to the thrust of the UNFCCC, have become even more marginalized in 
recent conferences of parties (COPs) as energy has had to be diverted to get reluctant 
northern countries (those listed in Annex 1) to accede to the Kyoto Protocol.”
23
 The 
situation may have improved slightly, but it remains fundamentally unchanged.
24
 In 
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order to collaborate global negotiators to arrive at a widely acceptable arrangement in 
future, the UNFCCC must seriously consider the special concerns of developing 
countries, understand their efforts at mitigation and adaptation to climate change as 




4.2.2 Climate change-related technology transfer negotiations  
One of the imperative items on the agenda of climate change negotiations is to 
achieve a global optimum level to combat climate change through the transfer of 
technology.
26
 “Mandating GHG reductions will be more politically feasible if 




There is a general recognition that most advanced technological properties and 
standards are controlled by developed countries and they have substantial voting 
rights in the process of determining the provisions for technology transfer.
28
 By 
comparison, the unfavourable bargaining positions of developing countries have led 
to “myriad apprehensions about the procedural and consequential equity in the 
negotiations.”
29
 As a result, the technology transfer provisions of the UNFCCC, for 
example, have turned out to be too general with no specific formula or schedule for 
the flow of technology transfer. “The adequacy of the flows provided has been a 





Climate-related technology transfer negotiation involves international trade law, in 
particular the TRIPS, where developed countries have sufficient expertise. Given that 
developing countries may want some guidance regarding their IPR legislation, “(…) 
there is a strong possibility of foreign pressure on developing countries to strengthen 
IPR laws beyond the TRIPS requirements.”
31
 Their desperate attitude toward 
technology transfer particularly tends to lead them to identify themselves as victims of 
a sort of technological colonialism.
32
 In this respect, the environmental effectiveness 
of technology transfer is highly likely to be distorted. For example, the International 
Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) 
33
 carried out a strategy of technology 
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transfer with the aim of taking over the international hydrogen market, rather than 
searching for environmental spillovers.
34
 “The current emphasis on technology as a 
tool for international competitiveness makes it increasingly difficult for most 




In short, the technological and legal dominance of developed countries is self-evident. 
Equity must be expanded to a broad technology transfer context beyond the emission 
entitlements on which current post-Kyoto negotiations focus.
36
 Developing countries 
are expected to take lead in achieving this change, as they are the principal 
recipients.
37
 They now have a new opportunity to improve the current regime of 
climate-related  technology transfer – a regime which can be characterized as “a 
market-based mechanism with only limited potential to channel private investment 
toward large-scale climate-friendly endeavours and provides no assurance of 




 4.3 The lack of capacity for climate technology transfer 
Technology transfer is not an isolated transaction, but a systematic change supported 
by an enabling environment, both at the macro and micro levels.
39
 It is the “generation 
of general knowledge, experience, and capacity – which provide the necessary 
foundation for policy mainstreaming, project implementation, and the eventual 




4.3.1 The lack of capacity at the macro level 
The IPCC sees governments as the major actors in creating an enabling environment 
for climate-related technology transfer; a series of developments must take place in 
tandem with government actions.
41
 Four formidable barriers can be identified here: (1) 
a poor technology innovation system, (2) an information barrier, (3) an unsound 
market and (4) a low capacity to adapt.  
 
4.3.1.1 Poor technology innovation system  
Although many developing countries have started to develop climate related 
technologies and have achieved results very quickly, the fact that their overall 
technology levels lag behind those of developed countries has not changed.
42
 
Technology innovation is of particular concern. “The priority area relating to 
strengthening national systems of innovation and technology innovation centres is of 
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importance, as this may be the first time that the concept of „innovation‟ has been 




In practice, national and/or regional innovation systems have been established to some 
extent in developing countries.
44
 However, the perceived weaknesses in the systems 
vary from country to country. For example, India has historically suffered from a lack 
of liberalism in industry and the fragmentation of certain key sectors, such as the steel 
sector, to overcome the lock-in effect of carbon-intensive technologies.
45
 In China, the 
poor links between research institutes and equipment manufacturers is a major 
obstacle to progress and innovation.
46
 At the institutional level, a number of 
technology innovation centres focusing on mitigation and adaptation technology have 
been established in the last few decades, although they have not been operating very 
effectively.
47
 The implementation capacity of these centres is expected to increase, in 
particular their financial self-sufficiency and international collaboration.
48
 
“Developing countries‟ R&D efforts are often adaptive, following externally 





4.3.1.2 The barrier of information management  
There is a general mismatch between new technologies and replacement technologies 
in developing countries.
50
 Most recipients are unaware of the full range of alternatives 
for climate technologies. It is thus common for importers to “dump” outdated 
technologies even at low costs.
51
 The failure to identify technology needs is largely 
due to decisions based on imperfect information.
52
 Latin America now faces key 
challenges in collecting and organizing information on the economic, environmental 
and social performances of specific technology and in using industry associations and 
central info-pools to disseminate these experiences widely.
53
 In some extreme cases 
such as Nigeria, there are not even any comprehensive statistical data on the condition 
of the atmosphere.
54
 It is pointless to try to acquire perfect information if there is no 
source of information to begin with.
55
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These technical barriers to the acquisition of information involve scaling up capacity 
building, basically including the establishment of an information infrastructure, as 
well as supporting regulations. It is essential for the climate observation systems and 
information management in these countries to be improved, to avoid importing 
improved technologies from developed countries which do not suit the local needs.
56
 
To achieve the exchange of technology information and assist developing countries to 
overcome information barriers, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) 
recently created the Technology Mechanism TM,
57
 which basically serves two major 
purposes: technology needs assessment and capacity building.
 58
 Developing countries 
now are tasked with facilitating communication between networks of national, 




4.3.1.3 Unsound market for climate technology   
Very often, an inhospitable environment results from both market and government 
failures. 
 
（1） Market failure 
Fundamentally, the clean technology market which has recently emerged in 
developing countries can be characterized as immature for the purposes of 
international trade.
60
 This is due to several deficiencies in terms of resources.
61
 First, 
locally inadequate capital has an adverse impact on imports of technology. There are 
limited capital resources in developing countries for specific and fixed investments.
62
 
Secondly, in many developing countries the clean technology industries are at the 
initial stage. “Markets in developing countries are often not sufficiently developed to 
support high-scale production.”
63
 This leads to problems in commercializing low 
carbon technologies, as does the underlying technology dependence on the supplying 
countries. Thirdly, the human resources must be available for technology 
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development and transfer to be a valuable component of projects, which is not the 
case in these countries.
64
 It is difficult to carry out a smooth transfer of labour 
between sectors and countries in the situation which currently exists in most 
developing countries.  
 
From a policy perspective, a sound market must be transportable, stable and orderly. 
Market transparency is necessary to allow participants to structure contracts that 
correspond best with their specific circumstances.
65
 Foreign investors must be assured 
that they are entering a market “where all requirements are presented up front and 
openly with no types of bribes or other forms of corruption necessary to operate.”
66
 
However, the traditional political and economic weaknesses of developing countries 
lead to poor market transparency at the local level. As regards the reductions in GHG 
emissions, the information of CERs is not completely disclosed to the commodity 
markets.
67
 The lack of stability is another major barrier to importing foreign climate 
technologies.
68
 No clear market signals are provided to foreign technology holders on 
a permanent basis. In addition, a fair market is of great importance for clean 
technology. This prevents unfair competition and imperfect business practices.
69
 
Many countries receiving technology are trying to create such a market, but the results 




（2） Government failure to create a sound market 
Governments are expected to prepare a hospitable environment where all the 
stakeholders are appropriately incentivized with healthy financing tools.
71
 In case that 
there is unbalance of size, expenditures, and responsibilities, governmental 




For many reasons, host markets are not structured in a very dynamic way for the 
introduction of low carbon technologies. In India for example, “a large part of the 
economy is dominated by state enterprises and the remainder is heavily regulated, 
leading to diminished or non-existent incentives to use energy efficiently.”
73
 Due to 
monopoly-dominated marketplaces and price distorting subsidies, many foreign 
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investments have been frustrated by unfair competition.
74
 The situation is much better 
now as a result of a series of reforms. The far-reaching but incomplete structural and 
economic transitions currently taking place in developing countries, especially in 
some advanced developing countries, have an immense impact on the flow of 




The market recognizes the cost of carbon, where the government plays a central role, 
is the key to the transfer of low carbon technology.
76
 Not only developing countries, 
but the world as a whole, are now confronted with the difficulties of creating and 
sustaining such a market. “One of the reasons that many low carbon technologies are 
uneconomic is that the externality they are designed to address, i.e., climate change, is 
not priced; whilst the inclusion of the environmental and social cost for carbon 
emissions will not be enough to finance all low carbon technologies.”
77
 Therefore a 
completely market-based technology transfer is not socially acceptable. The Ukraine 
shows that there must be financial facilities for softer financing, as well as 
mechanisms encouraging investment at every level.
 78
 Nevertheless, in practice, the 
climate change project is characterised by “high development costs, high transaction 
costs, and a large number of soft components.”
79
 It is difficult to secure finance for 
these. Other non-project technology transfer activities tend to be on a small scale, 
involving high costs and long repayment periods. It is technically difficult for them to 
employ financing tools that are principally aimed at projects.
80
 Up to now, many 
developing countries have not participated in the growth in financing the renewable 
and energy efficiency for various reasons, such as low investment levels in energy 
capacity, scarce CDM project development, and lack of specific policies to foster the 




In addition, the green finance system is generally less developed in developing 
countries due to excessive regulations and inadequate supervision.
82
 By way of 
example, the financial regulations for wind farms in China at the moment in practice 
make it more difficult for foreign-owned wind farms to borrow money or to sell 
carbon credits than it is for domestic-owned wind farms.
83
 Financial sectors are just 
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unwilling or unable to provide initial investments for the utilization and extended use 
of transferred technologies (i.e., uncertain inflation and interest rates, risk aversion of 
banks).
84
When providing loans and guarantees, few banks seriously take 
environmental needs into account, or make technology transfer a condition of 
approving the loan. And the approval process is poor in transparency. Furthermore, 
uncertainties will increase when international financial channels are involved, which 
requires the domestic finance system being reconciled with international funding to 




4.3.1.4 Low indigenous adaptive capacity 
Even when some developing countries are able to successfully attract foreign 
technology investors, they cannot take full advantage of new technology.
86
 The 
process of adapting technologies is not only costly, but also significantly uncertain. 
Recipients are not willing to engage in technology adaptation unless there is a positive 
return. In this process, the risky experiment of adopting new technology generates 
positive spillovers for others in the form of an opportunity to watch and learn.
87
 This 
information externality reduces the risks of adapting technologies but is not very 
functional at the state level, as the “developing country context can differ between 
countries in terms of technical, financial, natural and even cultural circumstances in 
which the technologies will operate.”
88
 The process of accumulating adaptive capacity 
is particularly country-driven. 
 
Within a country, new technologies are operated in such a way that any given user‟s 
equipment interacts with the equipment of other users so as to create network 
externalities.
89
 For example, the real attraction of vehicles which use alternative fuels 
depends on the available fuelling facilities. Whether to establish these fuelling 
facilities is, in turn, based on the future demands of vehicles. To accommodate 
imported technologies, a package of physical infrastructure to function as network 
externalities must be considered in advance and incorporated into the national 
development plans.
 90
 However, most developing countries do not go that far in the 
introduction of technologies at the ground level. For example, India‟s strategy to 
introduce biomass technologies nationwide was impossible in a large number of rural 




4.3.2 The lack of capacity at the micro level 
Micro enterprises are major producers of GHG and can probably be the final solution-
provider with, for example, technological improvements. To a large extent, the 
barriers they encounter for the introduction of climate sound technologies are related 
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to the nature of technologies such as unlimited and incomplete prices.
 92
 In addition, 
the poor capacity of them is another barrier. 
 
（1） Motivation 
In the international technology transfer, it is not always needs exist but barriers occur 
to transfer them. This is particularly true in the case of enterprise. Despite the great 
demand for low carbon technology on a national scale, the motivation of private 
recipients to invest in this technology is not always very strong. For example, in 
China the majority of enterprises involved in the transfer of ESTs are state-owned and 
therefore subject to government control. Instead of proactively accessing EST markets, 
they usually wait for national plans, orders and direct government investment.
93
 As far 
as climate sound technologies concerned, they are new and there are additional highly 
uncertain costs associated with their acquisition, operation and maintenance.
94
 As a 
result, these technologies are less attractive to private recipients in practice. In 
particular, there are often no industry standards for these new technologies (e.g., for 
the latest technology involving timber-based construction materials). This is thus a 




In project-based CDMs, the motivation to invest in clean technologies is even lower. 
Project developers cannot take technology transfer very far, especially during the 
project design, negotiation and implementation stages.
96
 This is because that 
uncertainty will increase with regard to measuring CERs, when taking technology 
importation into account.
97
 Meanwhile, key participants involved in technology 
transfer are motivated in a variety of ways and they do not always agree.
98
 Potential 
conflict in relation to motivation also reduces the demand for technology transfer and 
therefore forms indirect barriers. 
 
（2） Information  
Many enterprises in countries receiving technology find it difficult to access effective 
information about foreign climate technologies.
99
 Suffering from imperfect 
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information and the strong demand for technologies, they are prone to accepting 
agreements with additional conditions related to the technology transfer, such as the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of manufacturing plants, or technology 
packages which often include outdated technologies or technologies irrelevant to local 
needs.
100
 To a greater or lesser extent, recipients have to rely on certain technology 
suppliers for their support needs.  
 
Two main reasons account for this information deficiency: (1) information about the 
cost, use and origin of the technology has not been fully provided to the market.
101
 
For instance, some technology suppliers are reluctant to share information because of 
IPR concerns or the concern to maintain an international competitive edge.
102
 (2) 
There are no effective channels for recipients to obtain knowledge about available 
technologies.  
 
（3） Purchasing power 
The lack of purchasing power is a basic barrier to receiving technology in practice. 
Wherever there are price differences, enterprises in recipient countries tend to invest 
in cheaper substitute technologies.
103
 In China, for example, although local CDMs 
provide adequate incentives for investing in hydropower, the cost advantage of 
domestic hydropower equipment leaves little room for technology transfer.
104
 This 
often applies, especially when the long-term costs and benefits of new technologies 
(i.e., energy inputs, maintenance and other potentially hidden costs) are not properly 




In many cases there are the finance-related barriers in pre-commercial technology 
such as LED light.
106
 This is because of the high costs of the initial investment for 
large-scale production in order to achieve a cost-effective product. In the absence of 
external funding, an enterprise that is receiving technology is constrained by the scale 
of its operations and its original capital. Small/middle-scale recipients generally 
appear to have a cash flow problem. They are just economically incapable of 
affording what they really need and are offered unnecessary, inferior technologies as 
part of a technology package.
107
 For local banks, it is basically not attractive to make 




（4） Organizational capacity 
Organizational capacity is used at many levels. In the case of micro enterprises, it 
refers to a support system within which enterprises can successfully engage in 
international trade. However, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the 
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organizational capacity of enterprises in countries receiving technology is 
considerably circumscribed.  
 
First, most enterprises are less aware of the risks, as they have little experience of 
taking risks in the carbon market and relevant technologies. Secondly, they lack the 
necessary resources such as assets, a knowledge base and personnel that would enable 
them to bargain more effectively on technology transfer agreements.
109
 For example, 
prices are influenced by and change with the entry of clean technologies into local 
markets. There is “no sufficient diversity in resource endowment to permit alteration 
of production sectors in response to changes in relative prices.”
110
 Whenever is a 
dispute, it is difficult to imagine these enterprises in developing countries being able 
to account on the proceedings of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) under the 
WTO which has required significant investment and human resources.
111
 Finally, 
climate change-related technology transfer is different from the business-as-usual 
practice of which local recipients have experience, in terms of planning, managing 
and coordinating. In climate technology transfer, (1) post-transaction activities, like 
the operation and maintenance of transferred technology, are an imperative part of the 
transfer process for the sake of environmental effectiveness;
112
 (2) There is a strong 
need for a higher degree of integration involved.
113
 At present, few enterprises adjust 
their organizational arrangements particularly to accommodate climate change-related 
technology transfer.  
 
（5） Absorptive capacity 
In theory, the supporting infrastructure in enterprises receiving technology must be 
generally adapted to those of the enterprises supplying the technology, if the receiving 
enterprises “want to be in a position to absorb and take full advantage of transferred 
technology.”
114
 However, this is hardly ever the case in practice. Absorptive capacity 
is based on knowledge. The knowledge base of receiving enterprises is limited 
because of poor national innovation systems.
115
 In order to change the learning 
approach from imitation to innovation, managers must adopt a strategy which fully 
integrates the re-innovation of transferred technologies.
116
 This involves collaboration 
with international technology suppliers whenever there is tension. Measures to 
increase absorptive capacity could lead technology suppliers to be concerned that the 
technology transfer might eventually lead to the creation of new lower-cost 
competitors.
117
 “This, in turn, can lead to reluctance to engage in deeper knowledge 
transfer and a predisposition to engage in capital equipment transfer augmented by 
some training and management co-operation.”
118
  
                                                 
109
 See Cynthia Cannady, “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries, A Practical Strategy,” 
ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue paper nr. 25, 2009, pp. 14-18. 
110
 Blakeney 1988, (no. 64), pp. 700-701. 
111
 Littleton 2008, (no. 31), p. 14. 
112
 Ockwell, Watson and MacKerron 2006, (no. 76), p. 40. To ensure this, it is necessary to organize specialized 
personnel training in or outside the enterprises. As the key to achieving meaningful and effective technology 
transfer, this kind of training is also expected to be offered in technology transfers to assist recipients of developing 
countries with capacity building. 
113
 See Idem, p. 11. 
114
 Haug 1992, (no. 32), p. 223. 
115
 IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Ch. 4.3, “National Systems of Innovation and Technology Infrastructure.” 
116
 See L. Kim, “Crisis Construction and Organizational Learning: Capability Building in Catching up at Hyundai 
Motors,” Organization Science 9, 1998, pp. 506-521. 
117
 Watson 2002, (no. 46), p. 1. 
118




4.4 Poor regulatory framework and enforcement  
Another basic challenge for host developing countries is to comprehensively improve 
the regulatory framework, and the implementation and enforcement of climate 
change-related technology transfer. Five aspects are underlined in this respect: (1) an 
overall technology plan; (2) legislative supports; (3) technology transfer policies; (4) 
incentives; (5) implementation and enforcement.  
 
4.4.1 The lack of an overall plan for climate technology transfer 
 
“Many of (the) technology decisions that we make today, whether in energy 
production, energy efficiency in buildings, transport, industry, or agriculture/forestry, 
will be in use for the rest of the current and even the next generation.”
119
 It is 
important for policy-makers in developing countries to realize that successful 
technology transfer takes time. The lessons learned from implementing the Montreal 
Protocol showed that “an impatient emphasis on quick results during planning may, at 
best, lead to disappointing results and, at worst, may lead to a failure to build strong 




One of the common problems in developing countries is the lack of a strategic, 
coherent and predictable plan for technology development and transfer in the new 
context of climate change.
121
 Although most developing countries have promulgated 
policies and regulations both for climate change and technology during the last 
decades, these issues are tackled separately.
122
 In fact, “the biggest driver of 
technological adoption and change will be the mitigation policy, which determines the 
demand for those technologies.”
123
 Nevertheless, few developing countries have 
combined mitigation policies and technology measures appropriately. Exiting 
technology development and transfer plans in these countries appear to be either 
short-term, isolated from mitigation policies or, rather functionless as pure technology 
measures.
124
 LDCs in particular, have a difficult time in trading on their human 
capital for any program of development.
125
 Innovation strategies must be tailored to 
their special needs and capacities.  
 
Preparing a comprehensive plan for the development and transfer of climate sound 
technology can encounter real difficulties in developing countries.
126
 However, one 
pragmatic technique to achieve this is by using TNAs.
127
 Most developing countries 
are encouraged to make TNAs available in their National Communications (NCs). 
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Since the first report on TNAs completed by developing countries was released in 
April 2006, the number has more than tripled.
128
 “This significant increase in the 
number of TNAs provides a platform for a more detailed and comprehensive review 
of technology needs identified at the regional level.”
129
 In 2010, the UNDP and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat jointly released a new TNA Handbook to support the 
preparations of developing countries for stimulating a wide range of technology 




4.4.2 The lack of supporting legislation  
For many reasons, there is the lack of solid legal foundation in many developing 
countries, e.g., India.
131
 To achieve meaningful and effective technology transfer, 





There is a general recognition that the environmental legislation is lagging behind in 
developing countries. It is not easy for them to integrate environmental objectives in 
the development agenda.
133
 Many countries have developed initiatives for sustainable 
development, but it is questionable whether these initiatives contribute to technology 
transfer. In fact, sustainable development initiatives are likely to reduce the time to 
market for sustainable products. If there is a reasonable certainty about future support, 
this will increase the likelihood of successful technology transfer.
134
 There is even 
evidence that although there have been recent legal steps to achieve environmental 
goals in some developing countries; climate change is rarely one of these because the 
effects are not obvious in the short term.
135
 In the small number of special climate 
change initiatives that do exist, it is found that technology transfer has not been 
clearly defined and fully covered.
136
 Sometimes policies or regulations designed 





In combating climate change, regulators may adopt product standards, process 
standards, emission standards, or ambient quality standards.  In the first place, it is 
important for these standards to be formulated in accordance with the general local 
technological level, economic development, administrative capacity and even 
regulatory weakness. “Consideration should ideally be given in least developed 
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countries to the preference for technology that is high labour/ low capital, not only for 
the direct contribution such technology is likely to make towards development goals, 
but also for the indirect contribution of spillover effects from the transferred 
technology, which are more likely to occur where the technology concerned is 
appropriate to the general level of economic development.”
138
 Secondly, the 
environmental norms and standards in most developing countries are scant, vague and 
incoherent. For example, in the Philippine, there is an inability to enforce 
environmental regulations due to the lack of standard to validate the claims of 
technology suppliers.
139
 Under the vague language of standards, a great deal of 
discretionary power is given to the administrative authority. In general, the standard-
based system is more likely to work successfully in an administrative authority that is 
“active, capable, honest, and sufficiently authoritative to be able to rein in powerful 
industrial interests.” However, in most developing countries where administrative 
weakness and corruption are prevalent, this does not appear to be the case.
140
 
Furthermore, the absence of clear and harmonized standards in developing countries 
leads to an increase in transaction costs and risks as every buyer must ascertain the 
quality and functionality of potential technologies individually.  
 
In practice, developing countries generally find it difficult to transfer technology 
through the more traditional mechanisms. Globalization of technology requires 
“sensitive policies that seek to engage the major economic base of the nation or region 
with both indigenous and foreign technological capabilities.”
141
 Typically, the IP 
protection in developing countries is criticized for not being as strong as that of 
supplying countries. MNE‟s faith needs to be strengthened when they invest in 
developing countries.
142
 On the one hand, developing countries, as technology 
demanders, worry that “stronger IPRs reduce the scope for informal technology 
transfer via imitation, which was an important form of learning and technical change 
in such economies as Japan and the Republic of Korea (not to mention the United 
States).”
143
 On the other hand, some of their IP measures are inevitably seen as 
favouring local enterprises over foreign investors. This is not a novel in history. “Less 
developed economies often seek to advantage themselves by protecting national 
champions while taking the fruits of others‟ inventiveness. The US was a latecomer to 
international intellectual property accords and was accused by Europeans of 
disrespect for their rights.”
144
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In a contractual relationship, some developing countries, dissatisfied with the 
conditions of technology transfer agreement between MNEs and recipient enterprises, 
have begun to supervise and regulate technology transfer with contract legislation. For 
example, they have established registration systems for all technology importation 
agreements, which mean that the government can examine contracts and determine 
whether they correspond with the interest of developing industry.
146
 However, for 
foreign technology holders there would be greater uncertainty in this respect. 
Furthermore, they have been historically confronted with property risks. This is 
because in these countries, private property is traditionally deemed to be an integral 




4.4.3 Appropriate policies for FDI and technology licensing  
Both FDI and technology licensing are used as a way to enter the market for climate 
sound technologies. Appropriate policies for climate sound technology transfer should 
address critical stakeholder needs. In the normal course of events, the choice of an 
enterprise between FDI and technology licensing is not a random choice, but depends 
on many real factors such as the prevailing market structure and the indigenous 
absorptive capacity. For instance, “a monopolistic market would be preferred in the 
case of FDI because here a defaulting licensee could cause a lot of harm.”
148
 In 
contrast, technology licensing is a better option than FDI in the case of a competitive 
market and strong capacity to absorb technologies. In addition, the choice between 
FDI and technology licensing should follow the technology ladder.
149
 At different 
stages of development technologies have an impact on pricing, as well as knowledge 
spillovers.
 
Technology licensees have to pay monopoly prices for intermediate 
technological products, while FDI end-product prices are relatively lower and could 




In general, LDCs with limited innovative capacity and economic conditions need 
straightforward FDI more than technology licensing, because FDI is more realistic for 
them. As regards technology licensing, LDCs are more likely to benefit from 
technological end products in trade. Therefore it is important to exempt these 
countries from strong IPR protection to reduce the monopoly prices of climate sound 
technologies.
151
 Middle-income developing countries like China, Brazil and India are 
generally at the stage of imitating by duplicating. Policymakers in those countries 
could incorporate FDI in the domestic technology development, which would help 
them to move from pure duplication to creative imitation.
152
 As regards technology 
licensing, existing alternative technologies in middle-income countries could, on the 
one hand, bring licensing prices down to some extent, due to local competitive 
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150
 See Michael Grubb, “Technology Innovation and Climate Change Policy: An Overview of Issues and Options,” 
Keio Journal of Economics, 2004, p. 8.  
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markets. On the other hand, they could develop higher value-added strategies at a 
lower cost.
153
 Foreign policies associated with climate technology transfer are 





4.4.4 Incentives  
In the legislative practice of environmental laws, command-and-control regulations 
and incentives go hand in hand, as the proverbial “stick” and “carrot”.
155
 In a climate 
change context, regulatory measures like technology-based limitations are adopted as 
a priority.
156
 Domestic incentive mechanisms are offered at the same time to increase 
financial support for technological change. “Technological change must come 
primarily from the business sector, and is primarily a product of economic 
incentives.”
157
 However, developing countries could be challenged to find ways to 
implement a more integrated approach between government regulations and market 
incentives.  
 
Very often, technology transfer related to climate change is poorly financed in 
developing countries.
158
 The market pull plays a key role in boosting climate 
mitigation and adaptation technologies. As described above, both the carbon and 
technology markets are generally underdeveloped in developing countries, with no 
demand-driven, profit-based incentives mechanism to create a win-win situation by 
attracting the voluntary participation of industries.
159
 Profit-seeking enterprises are 
less motivated to invest effort in importing new, expensive, climate-friendly 
technologies with commercial payoffs which may be too uncertain and long-term.
160
 
From a broad perspective, the continuing lack of clarity regarding the definition of the 
terms “climate  change” “technology transfer” makes it unclear in practice exactly 
what incentives must be provided, and how.  
 
There should be a broad mixture of direct incentives such as subsidies, taxes, tariffs 
and grants, as well as indirect incentives such as risk management and preferential 
procedures. To a certain extent, for example, recipient enterprises stay away from 
climate technology transfer because the process is potentially risky and 
cumbersome.
161
 No breakthroughs have yet been achieved in relation to the 
theoretical basis and institutional arrangement concerned.
162
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Appropriate and adequate incentives correspond to the technology ladder. They must 
be diversified to cover the full life cycle of climate sound technology, ranging from 
the demand for technology, to achievable access and full application. In particular, the 
incentives must contribute to the technology capacity ultimately.
163
 There is already 
evidence that targeted fiscal incentives can stimulate the effective use of ESTs in 
developing countries.
164
 The relevant incentives involve recognizing, managing and 
rewarding the adoption of foreign technologies. “In the presence of informational 
externalities, it may be optimal for a host country to subsidize the adoption of foreign 
technologies or else no one firm may be willing to bear the cost of technology 
adoption for fear of not making a positive return on its investment.”
165
 Meanwhile, 
domestic incentives will not work horizontally without the cooperation of 
international society and developed countries. For example, Honduras introduced an 
incentive for renewable energy to discourage investments in fossil fuels. This policy 
would have a marginal effect unless developed countries encouraged their MNEs to 




4.4.5 Poor implementation and enforcement 
The inappropriate implementation and enforcement of laws can have a 
counterproductive effect. Although there are significant differences, it is common to 
encounter corruption, the miscarriage of justice, local protectionism and poor sectoral 
coordination in developing countries when carrying out technology transfer 
provisions.
167
 Potential barriers become more formidable at the subnational level, 
because of weak capacities and interrelated interests. In Africa, for example, there is 
an urgent need to improve the national regulatory environment in relation to regional 
approaches.
168
 Meanwhile, some of the barriers which occur, such as those related to 
political stability and cultural acceptability, are actually beyond the scope of law.
169
 
As early as 1992, the US funded an initiative to evaluate how farmers in Burkina Faso 
could use climate forecasts to improve food security and agricultural sustainability. 
When this initiative was carried out, a series of barriers emerged as a result of village 
politics and ethnic identity.
170
Another example concerns the Philippines where low 
carbon technologies are commonly perceived as a greater risk by the public because 
they have not yet been proven.
171
 There is no chance that this sort of perception of 
technology will not hamper outdated carbon-intensive technologies from being 
phased out, if the recipients are reluctant to keep up with current performance 
standards.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Prof. Wang established the first Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims in China. 
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It is extremely difficult to obtain conclusive evidence, and reach an overall vision of 
this consequential barrier. Developing country Parties require a more tailored 
response to facilitate the implementation and enforcement of relevant provisions. 
Considering the scope of this PhD study, we will not go any further than necessary to 
prevent repetition, endless verbosity and an excessive research load. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
As a result of the immature global carbon market and the young international climate 
legislation framework, the transfer of climate sound technology is confronted by 
many barriers at the institutional level. The situation is getting worse in the less 
advanced environments of developing countries, which hope to acquire, assimilate 
and utilize up-to-date technologies from developed countries to overcome the “lock-in” 
effects of coal-intensive technologies domestically. Where necessary, developing 
country Parties have committed themselves to creating relevant policies and legal 
environments by exploring and removing barriers. This allows them to take steps that 
will help prepare for potentially mandatory emission reductions in the future. 
 
 
It is certainly not possible to draw any general conclusion about the legal barriers 
which exist in developing countries because the information available is inadequate 
and there are enormous differences. However, “what remains common to all cases is 
the desirability of a supportive regulatory framework, and enabling environment more 
generally, together with the circulation of knowledge and capabilities among 
individuals and institutions in host countries.”
172
 A wide range of well-recognized, 
generally known constraints have been revealed in these aspects, as have their 
potential impact on technology transfer and to relevance to any proposed solutions. 
 
In general, the bargaining powers in the climate technology transfer negotiations are 
currently distributed in favour of developed countries which have self-evident 
technological and legal dominance. As illustrated by the UNFCCC, developed 
countries have substantive voting rights in deciding on technology transfer provisions, 
which to some extent turn out to be too generalised, indeterminate and timid. 
Therefore developing countries have voiced concerns about fairness in relation to 
procedures and consequences in the climate negotiations. For example, understand 
their efforts at mitigation and adaptation to climate change as part of countries‟ wider 
development agenda. As the main technology recipients, the developing countries are 
now expected to take the lead in increasing equity in the broad context of technology 
transfer and beyond the emission entitlements on which current post-Kyoto 
negotiations center. 
 
There is a continuing lack of capacity for the effective transfer of climate sound 
technologies, both at the level of government and at the level of enterprises. 
Governments of developing countries are the major actors in creating an enabling 
environment, while micro enterprises are the major cause of problems with GHG, but 
probably also the major provider of the final technological solution. Fundamentally, 
the barriers related to capacity which exist are the result of technical and financial 
shortcomings and a lack of information and personnel. There is usually causality in 
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the barriers which exist for these two principal stakeholders. For example, a poor 
national innovation system often leads to enterprises having a weak knowledge base 
which cannot fully absorb the transferred technologies.
173
 Therefore “help(ing) 
developing countries establish a mechanism of technological innovation is also an 
important part of technology transfer.”
174
 In the light of the literature that has been 
reviewed, solutions have been proposed for all these aspects to overcome the barriers, 
and the UNFCCC has draw attention to these. For example, it established the CTCN 
under the TM to assist developing countries to reduce information barriers.
175
 This 
international assistance is necessary, as the solutions put forward at the domestic level 
are highly likely to be challenged in the broad context in which foreign participants 
act. For example, measures to increase absorptive capacity arouse significant concern 
amongst international technology suppliers that technology transfer might eventually 
lead to the creation of new lower-cost competitors.  
 
Another basic challenge for host developing countries is to comprehensively improve 
the regulatory framework. The framework is governed by an overall technology plan. 
The shortage of a strategic, coherent and predictable plan for technology transfer in 
the new context of climate change is a common problem in developing countries. 
Existing technology plans appear to be either short-term based on isolated mitigation 
policies or less effective as pure technology measures. Furthermore, the specific 
existing environmental/climate legislation does not tend to support technology 
transfer adequately and efficiently. Up to now, the transfer of climate sound 
technology has been largely left to market forces and economic legislation. However, 
in general developing countries have difficulties with the transfer of technology 
through the more traditional mechanisms. This is primarily because traditional 
mechanisms such as FDI and technology licensing are too sensitive to be structured; 
they are either heavily regulated or inadequately supervised. It is thus important for 
the government in these countries to encourage green investments without leading to 
green protectionism. Incentives are introduced to attract the voluntary participation of 
industries and to complement command-and-control legislation. Nevertheless, in 
practice technology transfer for climate mitigation and adaptation is poorly financed 
in developing countries. So far, these countries have possibly been less able to find 
ways to implement a more integrated approach between government regulations and 
market incentives.  
 
To summarise, above all there are significant barriers to acquiring climate friendly 
technologies, and the corresponding solutions. It is clear that not all these barriers are 
legal ones. In fact, some are based on practical problems, such as an imbalance of 
information and the inadequacy of capacity, and these could be resolved with broader 
government policies. The barriers are outlined here, as they not only determine 
enterprises‟ choice of technology, but also have a profound effect on the 
implementation and enforcement of technology transfer provisions. In addition, 
barriers to receiving technology are largely related to the nature of climate sound 
technologies and their unlimited scope and incomplete price.
 176
 For example, because 
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of the high risks involved in climate sound technologies, the relevant projects are 
often less attractive to finance agencies for providing loans, which in turn reduces the 
motivation of enterprises which does not always appears to be very strong in the first 
place. Finally, as major advocator of international technology transfer, developing 
countries have a particular interest in identifying the legal barriers. As one observer 
said, a “dominant regulatory approach at the global level to tackling climate change 
seems to be the wrong one; to be properly inclusive and relatively effective, it needs 
to be designed to take account of the regulatory weakness of developing countries and 




On a related point, the implementation and enforcement of laws can have a 
counterproductive effect. This is a consequential barrier, and it is difficult to obtain 
conclusive evidence and therefore reach a general conclusion. A tailored response is 
required for a greater likelihood of effective technology transfer. As a developing 
country and recipient of climate sound technology, China serves as a good example. 
In the next chapter, we will attempt to discuss Chinese legislation and practices. 
Chapter 5.3 will specially examine the legal barriers which have arisen for the 
introduction of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies in China in a detailed, 
systematic and constructive manner. The instrumental barriers identified here can be 
tested in the Chinese context.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
which international society and developing countries play a role. For example, the carbon market, which is critical 
for climate-related technologies, is mainly driven by government intervention. However, the international climate 
framework has so far been less robust, which causes a high degree of uncertainty for these technologies. As far as 
developed countries are concerned, acquiring and adopting technology is a process of integration, requiring good 
faith and diligent cooperation from either governments or the private sector. Therefore, the barriers faced by 
recipients take place not as isolated phenomena but in a comprehensive way.  
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Chapter 5 Chinese Legislation and Practices in Climate 
Sound Technology Transfer 
 
Addressing climate change with possible technological solutions is country driven. In 
line with the global trend, Chinese governments have taken top-down measures to 
reduce the high domestic GHG emissions. Its technological needs to respond to 
climate change have expanded enormously as a result. As a basic technology recipient 
open to the world, China is active in framing legislation to create a favourable host 
environment for the introduction of climate sound technology. Nevertheless, the 
relevant legal framework is far from ideal and there are various barriers at the 
institutional level. On the basis of the analysis in the previous chapter, it is now time 
to focus on specific conditions in which international technology transfer operates to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change nationally. Therefore this chapter focuses on 
Chinese legislation and practices, and tries to answer the questions below: 
Has climate change-related technology transfer been regulated in 
China? What legal barriers exist specifically in Chinese 
legislation and practices? 
In the first place, this chapter will describe the background against which technology 
transfer currently takes place. It presents a general picture of Chinese climate change 
and clean technology policies. The second section attempts to explore rules, 
mechanisms and measures in the Chinese legal framework associated with the 
international transfer of climate sound technology. Based on this, the final section will 
identify related legal barriers, which are evaluated in a systematic, prudent and 
constructive manner.  
 
5.1 Background 
5.1.1 The Chinese perspective on climate change  
In general, the trend in climate change in China is consistent with global climate 
change.
1
 There is evidence to show that greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere 
globally, and their accumulation imposes a wide range of potentially serious threats to 
China.  The rise in air temperature nationally has been at a dramatically higher rate 
than any historical rise in the annual average global temperature.
2
 As global warming 
disrupts the balance of nature, extreme weather events known as “Northern drought, 
Southern flood” have recently had a disastrous effect on China and have become more 
frequent and intensive.
3
 In particular, the climate crisis has led to a rise in the sea level, 
4
 and a retreat of glaciers
5
 in China, aggravating the vulnerability of local areas where 
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 China’s National Climate Change Program, Prepared under the Auspices of National Development and Reform 
Commission People‟s Republic of China, 2007, p. 4. 
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 See Idem, pp. 4-6. The annual average air temperature has increased by 0.5-0.8 °C during the past hundred years, 
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 As a result of worldwide climate change, this trend is accelerating, 





This section aims to present the broad context in which the legislation for climate 
sound technology transfer was developed.  
 
5.1.1.1 Climate change and China  
China is the largest developing country in the world. At present, it is widely 
recognized that there is rapid economic growth and progressive urbanization, 





High GHG emissions 
Contemporary China has reportedly surpassed the US as the world‟s largest GHG 
emitter.
9
 Its annual CO2 emissions grew by around 4 billion tonnes between 1992 and 
2007, and more than 70% of this increase occurred in the last five years as a result of 
massive investment in infrastructure.
10
 As China tries to eradicate poverty and raise 
national incomes, its emissions are expected to increase. However, for a complete 
picture of climate change responsibility and the opportunity for mitigation, other 
factors, such as historical contributions and per capita emissions, should also be 
considered. As a “world factory”, China has accounted for –and is still accounting for 
– the carbon emissions of other countries for a long time, and this has contributed to 
national emissions in an essential way. “It is estimated that between 7 to 14 % of 
carbon emissions in China are actually from producing products for American 
consumers.”
11
 Furthermore, despite its high GHG emissions in absolute terms as an 
individual country, China‟s per capita emissions are much lower.
12
 In fact, China‟s 
                                                                                                                                            
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Beijing, October 2004, p. 8. With regard to the impact 
on coastal zones, “(…) it can be seen that there is an increasing trend of sea level rise along China‟s coast since the 
1950s and this trend has become significantly more obvious in the past few years. The sea level currently has a rate 
of rise of 1.4-2.6 mm per year. Chinese scientists have used a sea level rise model to project that the relative sea 
level rise over five typical coastal zones would range from 31cm to 65cm by 2100, which would aggravate the 
coastal erosion. The intrusion of seawater into the river mouth would be enhanced, and it would degrade the fresh 
water quality and adversely affect the fresh water supply along the river mouth.”  
5
See Idem, p. 18. Since climate warming has occurred in the 20th century, the mountain glaciers in China have 
been shrinking. The glacier area in west China has reduced by 21% over this period. The melting glaciers may 
mitigate the reduction of mountain runoff to some extent in the near future, but they also threaten the future 
exploitation of the glacier as water resources. 
6
 The other impacts of climate change on China will be discussed in more detail in the section on Chinese actions 
on climate adaptation.  
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 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no.1. ), p. 5. 
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 See Fei Teng, Alun Gu, “Climate Change: National and Local Policy Opportunities in China, Climate Change 
Modeling and Policy,” Nota di Lavoro 74, 2007, p. 2, available at 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm. 
9
 “World Energy Outlook 2006,” International Energy Agency, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/business/worldbusiness/07pollute.html?_r=1. 
10
 China Initial National Communication on Climate Change 2004, (no. 4), pp. 5-7. According to the Initial 
National Communication on Climate Change released in 2004, the Chinese annual average growth rate of GHG 
emissions for the previous ten years is approximately 4%, and the share of CO2 in the total GHG emissions 
increased from 76% to 83%. 
11
 It is estimated that between seven to fourteen per cent of carbon emissions in China is actually from producing 
products for American consumers. In the rest of the world we buy almost every cheap article – clothes, shoes, 
appliances, computers, etc. – from China. See Jiajun Wen, Climate Change & China: Technology, Market and 
Beyond, A Report for Focus on the Global South, Occasional Paper, 2009, p. 15. 
12 See J.G. Olivie and J. Janssens etc., “Long-term Trend in Global CO2 Emissions,” PBL Netherlands 
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per capita emissions are even below the world average of 7 tonnes.
13
 More 
importantly, because of the aggressive mitigation policies being undertaken, as will be 
discussed below, the intensity of Chinese emissions has fallen by more than two-
thirds in recent decades.
14
   
 
Energy challenges 
China is one of the few countries in which energy production is dominated by coal, 
and coal accounts for proximately 75% of the energy production.
15
 The combustion of 
coal to generate electricity is a major source of GHG emissions and conventional air 
pollution.
16
 Nevertheless, there are practical difficulties for China in decreasing its use 
of coal, and adjusting its traditional energy structure is constrained to a great extent by 
its available energy resources.
17
 The national supply of supplementary sources of 
energy like oil and natural gas is expected to be depleted within two decades at the 
current rate of exploitation.
18
 In general not enough new or renewable energies are 
being developed, such as biomass, solar, geothermal and wind power, which are 
essential for optimizing the energy mix and achieving a low-carbon economy in 






Like many southern countries, China is confronted with a fundamental challenge in 
pursuing continuous economic development whilst avoiding the accompanying 
environmental degradation.
20
 In the past few years, GDP growth has been at the 
expense of an excessive extraction of environmental and atmospheric resources, 
driving China to a historical turning point. To supply the world with products, most of 
the environmentally toxic enterprises were established in China, heavily polluting 
local environments.
21
 China is now suffering from serious air pollution, water 
problems and soil contamination. The failure to protect the environment not only 
threatens public health, but also incurs significant social and economic costs. Using 
conventional air pollution by way of example, this has become so serious in China, 
that it possibly kills 400,000 to 750,000 people per year and accounts for about 5.78 % 
                                                                                                                                            
Environmental Assessment Agency/European Commission‟s Joint Research Centre, 2011 Report, The Hague, 21 
November 2011, p. 14. 
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Jeffrey Logan, Anna Mackey, “China‟s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies,‟‟ Congressional 
Research Service, 2008, p. 14. 
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was the largest driver of the rise in emissions. In 2009, electricity generated from coal combustion accounted for 
95.2% of total energy generation while electricity generated from oil and natural gas accounted for 0.6% and 0.2% 
respectively. 
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 “CO2 Emission from Fuel Combustion Peaks,” OECD/IEA International Energy Agency, 2011, p. 9. 
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 Dewey and LeBoeuf 2010, (no. 15), p. i.  
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 Idem. Despite its great potential, hydropower is increasingly limited by environmental and social problems 
associated with the construction of large dams, complicating the local task of climate mitigation. 
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 See Chris Deal, “Climate Change, Technology Transfer: Opportunities in the Developing World,” 2007 ASME 
WISE Intern, 2007, p. 2. 
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 This should be weighed up against the explosive economic 
development. Therefore climate mitigation is welcomed by Chinese citizens and 





Climate adaptation  
China is ecologically vulnerable as a result of its large population and geographical 
diversity.
24
 As a country that is self-sufficient in food, China is faced with the 
strategic pressure of supplying food for 1.3 billion people. This results in particular 
from ecological factors on which local food production depends to some extent. So far, 
climate change has had a serious impact on agriculture, forestry and water resources 
in China.
25
 These have all occurred in a short period of time, although climate 




To summarise, the current generation in every country, including China, should have 
the right to develop, while securing the next generation‟s capacity for survival. This 
requires a balance of inter-generational and intra-generational needs to ensure that the 
peaceful growth in China today does not follow the example of the northern countries, 
which relied heavily on fossil fuels and sacrificed the earth‟s environment. 
 
5.1.1.2 Climate policies, national and regional actions in China  
The Chinese leadership is aware of the recent climate reality and the severe damage 
caused by this, and is taking top-down action. Policies adopted by the central 
government will be carried out through a hierarchical structure of five levels, ranging 




At the top level, there is more than one sector involved in making and enforcing 
climate policy. As far as technology transfer is concerned, the key sectors are the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MOEP), the Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) 
and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).
28
 Furthermore, China has set up an 
interministerial agency, the National Coordinating Committee on Climate Change 
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National actions for addressing climate change 
Climate mitigation and adaptation in China is policy oriented.
30
 Instruments, 
including plans, strategies, and directives, are frequently used to set national goals for 
climate action related to aspects such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
pollution control and adaptation.
31
 Currently policy arrangements are centred on Hu 
Jintao‟s official doctrines of “Harmonious Society” and the “Scientific Development 
Concepts”.
32
 To achieve these, governments have continued to roll out five-year plans 




   
A. Climate mitigation 
China‟s climate mitigation is achieved by incorporating GHG emission reductions in 
its energy and environmental targets.  
 
Since 2003, climate mitigation has been viewed predominantly as an energy issue. 
The 11
th
 Five-year Plan aims to accelerate the establishment of a “Resource 
Conserving and Environmental Friendly Society” and subsequently set the energy 
intensity target (reduction of 20% in five years).
34
 On this basis, the NDRC has 
launched several specific actions to improve local energy efficiency, both individually 
and jointly.
35
 Governments promoted the strategy of “Conserving and Developing 
Energy Simultaneously” in their new energy policies.
36
 Market mechanisms and 
technology solutions were increased in the management of new, renewable energies.
37
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agencies. It has carried out a great deal of work in the formulation and coordination of China‟s important climate 
change-related policies and measures, providing guidance for central and local governments‟ response to climate 
change. 
30
 Teng and Gu 2007, (no. 8), pp. 5-6.  
31
 Idem.  
32
 The “Harmonious Society” and “Scientific Development Concept” serve as guidelines indicating a shift from 
“promoting all-out economic growth to solving worsening social tensions.” See Xing Zhigang, “Plan Unveiled to 
Build Harmonious Society,” China Daily, 12 October 2006, available at 
http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/China/2006-10/12/. 
33
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no. 1), p. 11. 
34
 State Council, The Outline of the Eleventh Five-year Programs of National Economic and Social Development, 
16 March 2006, available at http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm. It aims to ensure that energy 
consumption per unit of GDP will decrease by 20% within five years. 
35
 For example, these include the Medium and Long-term Energy Conservation Plan, the Notice on Strengthening 
Resource Conservation in Governmental Agencies and the Energy Efficiency Labelling Management Directive. 
Specifically, the Medium and Long-term Energy Conservation Plan covers two periods, 2005-2010 and 2010-2020, 
and identifies ten key projects in every area of conservation including coal-fired boiler renovation, regional 
cogeneration, waste heat and pressure utilization, petroleum conservation and substitution, motor system energy 
conservation, energy system optimization, building energy conservation, green lighting, energy conservation in 
governmental agencies. In response to the 11th five-year plan, the NDRC and four other governments issued the 
Notice on Strengthening Resource Conservation in Governmental Agencies. Governments take the lead in saving 
energy and reducing emissions with the target of a 20% reduction by the end of 2010. A quantified management 
system and information on house and resource conservation standards were introduced. As an example of a 
marketing mechanism, the Energy Efficiency Labelling Management Directive would assist users to identify the 
energy efficiency levels of these products by qualifying them. So far, this has been demonstrated in household 
refrigerators and air conditioners. The NDRC Environmental and Resources, Notice [2006] No. 284. 
36
 Teng and Gu 2007, (no. 8), p. 3. 
37
  For example, these include pricing, taxation, interest subsidies and loans from the treasury. Two examples are 
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China is now trying to become one of the world‟s leading renewable energy 
producers.
38
 Regarding its environmental targets, the 11
th
 Five-year Plan has adopted 
the strategy of “Total Amount Control” in which atmospheric pollution is identified as 
a priority issue. So far, China has applied measures for the total control of pollutants 
in certain areas, such as designated acid rain zones.
39
 In practice, most pollution is the 
result of poorly regulated industry.
40
 To control industrial pollution, domestic 




Greater attention was devoted to climate mitigation in the 12
th
 Five-year Plan. In 
response to the UNFCCC and Cancun Summit, the 12
th
 Five-year Plan introduces new 
target requirements for energy and the environment: (1) the target for the reduction in 
carbon intensity is to be cut by 17%; (2) energy consumption per unit of GDP to be 
cut by 16 %; (3) the 2015 non-fossil fuel target to reach 11.4% of China‟s total energy 
mix; (4) water consumption per unit of value-added industrial output to be cut by 
30 %; (5) forest coverage rate to rise to 21.66 % and forest stock to increase by 600 




B. Climate Adaptation 
The Chinese government has focused on climate adaptation since the early 1990s.
43
 
With heavy investment in infrastructure, climate adaptation was incorporated in the 
local development objectives. For example, in the case of the reconstruction of the 
railways, the future impact of the climate was taken into account. Preventive measures 
such as a road-bed cooling system, changing routes and railway bridges were applied 
in the Qinghai-Tibet railway.
44
 In general, climate adaptation measures are expensive, 
making it difficult to attract private investments, while infrastructure introduced by 
government could benefit climate adaptation in this regard.
45
 In fact, China is 
improving at making savings on adaptation costs by combining measures with 
physical infrastructure.
 46
 “The additional costs would amount to 188-376 billion 
                                                                                                                                            
introduced here: pricing and taxation. Currently, tentative management measures are being taken regarding the 
price and sharing of expenses for electricity generation from renewable energy: the price of wind generation is 
basically based on a bidding procedure, while the price of biomass generation is set as the average feed-in tariff 
plus 25 cents subsidy per kWh. The government provides tax reduction to the projects covered by the Guidance 
Catalog for the Development of Renewable Energy. For example, the Value Added Tax (VAT) is 3% for artificial 
gas projects and 6% for hydropower, while the current general VAT is 17%. 
38
 See Alok Jha, “China Leads the World in Renewable Energy,” Green Technology Correspondent, 2008, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/aug/01/renewableenergy.climatechange.  
39
 See Stefanie Beyer, “Environmental Law and Policy in the People‟s Republic of China,” Chinese Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006, p. 194. 
40
 See idem, p. 185. “More than 75 per cent of the water flowing through China‟s urban areas is unsuitable for 
drinking or fishing. Sixty million people have difficulties in getting access to water for their daily needs and almost 
three times that number drink contaminated water every day. Due to China‟s reliance on coal for its energy needs, 
almost two-thirds of China‟s cities do not meet the standards set out by the World Health Organization for 
acceptable levels of total suspended particulates and sulphur dioxide.” 
41
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no.1. ), p. 7. 
42
 See Deng Shasha, “Key Targets of China‟s 12th Five-year Plan,” Xinhua News Agency, 5 March 2011, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/China/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm.  
43
 China Initial National Communication on Climate Change 2004, (no. 4),  p. 8. 
44
 “More Investment to Ensure the Engineering Quality of Qinghai-Tibet Railway,” Xinhua Net, 21 May 2003, 
available at http://www.qh.xinhuanet.com/qztlw/2003-05/21/content_516426.htm. 
45
 The adaptation cost is assumed to be 10-20%. World Bank, “Clean Energy and Development: Towards An 
Investment Framework,” 2006. 
46
 “Statistic Bulletin on China Water Activities,” the Ministry of Water Resource (MOWR), 2006, available at 
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/gb/tj/gbmenu.asp. A good example is the South-North Water Diversion Project that was 
conducted in 2002 to alleviate the lack of water resources in North China. It spent about 500 billion RMB in total 
and governments play a dominant role in its investment. 
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RMB each year (1%-2% of GDP). Compared with China, the additional cost of 




So far, climate adaptation in China has been primarily project based. From the 
perspective of policy, the central government has launched several climate adaptation 
plans to evaluate the concrete impact of climate change, and to improve the domestic 
adaptation capacity.
48
 According to a recent report issued by the NDRC, climate 
adaptation is officially guided by four principles: its suitability for adaptation, public 
participation, synergy between mitigation and adaptation, and international 
cooperation.
49
 There is a focus on international cooperation aimed at increasing the 
scope of beneficiaries and sharing experiences with other countries.
50
 This provides a 
platform for the flows of technology for adaptation from outside China.  
 
Local actions for addressing climate change 
The specific impact of climate change varies from region to region.
51
 Environmental 
responsibility distribution between the central and local governments provides a legal 
basis for decomposing national emission reduction targets, pollution amount control 
and adaptation targets into local level. The targets set by government at the top are 
obligatory. Subnational governmental agencies are only authorized to establish local 
standards where no national standard exists, whilst more stringent standards should be 
established.
52
 Furthermore, they are expected to allocate these targets at the city and 
county level and for industrial sectors and major businesses in a consistent manner.
53
 
To enforce this, an internal communiqué system has been established for the 




It is difficult to give an overall description of the regional efforts made with regard to 
climate mitigation and adaptation in China. As is commonly known, there are 
enormous differences between local areas, particularly between the southeast and 
northwest. Even the mitigation and adaptation activities taken by similar modern 
cities vary enormously. Three cities are presented here by way of example: Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. Beijing is financially robust because of its high local 
revenue as a capital city. To reduce GHG emissions, Beijing‟s governments 
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 Teng and Gu 2007, (no. 8), p. 3.  
48
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no. 1), p. 7.  
49
 Annual Report on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2010, the NDRC, 2010, pp.30-
31. 
50 “Adaptation to Climate Change in China (ACCC) Website Opens,” 1 March 2010, available at 
http://www.ccChina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=25023. The ACCC has now opened its website to the public. 
China has undertaken some collaborative projects related to climate adaptation. A three-year project entitled 
“Adapting to climate change in China” (ACCC) was developed between China, the UK and Switzerland, focusing 
specially on pioneering policy research on climate adaptation. 
51
 This depends on many factors such as latitude, precipitation, wind patterns, coastal conditions and economic 
activities in particular districts. See Linxiu Zhang, Renfu Luo, Hongmei Yi and Stephen Tyler, “Climate 
Adaptation in Asia: Knowledge Gaps and Research Issues in China,” Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of 
Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources, 2008, pp. 14-15. 
52
 For example, in the case of pollution control, local governments are required to check and approve total 
emissions from sources and issue emission permits in accordance with the conditions and procedures stipulated by 
the State Council. 
53
 Teng and Gu 2007, (no. 8), pp. 7-8. 
54
 Idem. For example, at the local level this system has been established in the field of energy intensity and 
pollution control. However, in fact, little has been achieved because of poor information and therefore it is very 
difficult to ensure that national laws are strictly enforced at the local level. No improved communication system 
focusing on internal and external transparency and long-term information disclosure has been established yet.  
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successfully adopted a set of financial subsidies.
55
 Furthermore, external incentives 
provide Beijing with a good opportunity to deal with its serious air pollution caused 
by high emissions in the surrounding area. Guangzhou lies in the southern part of 
China. As a coastal city, it has very limited energy resources. As one of first 
developed cities in China, Guangzhou historically applied marketing mechanisms 
efficiently. To conserve energy and decrease emissions, Guangzhou initially 
introduced an energy pricing system and SO2 emission trading, which served as an 
example for other cities.
56
 The third city is Shanghai, a modern city. Shanghai has a 
high technology capacity. For example, during the World Expo 2010, green electricity 
was widely used throughout the city.
57
 It is also good at publicity. The citizens of 
Shanghai are well aware of environmental protection and contribute greatly to 




The above-mentioned three examples are not really representative of China as a whole. 
On the one hand, climate governance in China has tended to become more 
decentralized because of the recent growth of regional authorities.
59
 On the other hand, 
there is little reason to be optimistic about the enforcement of environmental/climate 
policies, institutions and standards at the local level, particularly about their 




（2）Evaluation and comments 
In response to the general threat of global climate hazards, China has made 
remarkable achievements in addressing climate change in a relatively short term. As 
shown above, climate change is an issue involving both the environment and 
development, but ultimately it is an issue of development.
61
 Whether climate 
mitigation and adaptation are priorities in specific areas or not, they have been 
explicitly integrated in central or local development plans.  
 
Chinese top-down actions on climate change used to be primarily driven by national 
concerns such as energy security and economic competitiveness, rather than by 
environmental considerations.
62
 Along with the increased frequency of extreme 
climate events, it is becoming increasingly urgent to deal with climate change. It is 
not only domestic public health concerns that are undermined and may trigger politic 
upheaval, but the strategic role in greater collaboration and reciprocity could also be 
negatively influenced under the continuing high emissions.
63
 In particular, now that 
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 These financial subsidies launched during the period of the 11th five-year plan include the green light project, 
heating system and public transportation. “Eleventh Five-year Program of Electricity Development of Beijing 
Municipality,” Development and Reform Commission of Beijing Municipality, 2006, available at 
http://www.beijing.gov.cn/zfzx/ghxx/sywgh/t713845.htm.  
56
 “Guangdong Establishes GDP Energy Consumption Quota,” 31 May 2006, available at 
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“Shanghai Green Power,” 2006, available at http://www.sh-greenpower.org/encjwt.asp.  
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 “Eleventh Five-year Program of Energy Development of Shanghai Municipality,” 2006, available at 
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 Beyer 2006, (no. 39), p. 185. 
60
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presented in Chapter 5.3.2.2 “Government Coordination and Cooperation.”   
61
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no. 1), p. 2. 
62
 See Julian L. Wong, “The Challenge of China‟s Green Technology Policy and Ohio‟s Response,” Centre for 
American Progress Action Fund, 2010, p. 2. 
63
 Idem. In addition to the public health crisis caused by the growing GHG emissions, the present social changes 
related to extreme economic development also mean that combating climate change is a priority. For example, 
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climate change is being tackled at the global level, the cost of climate policies is 
perceived to be falling.
64
 China tends to recognize the co-benefits associated with 





In the progress of climate mitigation and adaptation, policy instruments play a central 
role. The relevant legislation lags behind and is relatively less well established. There 
are also problems with regard to the implementation of climate policies, particularly 
at the regional and sectoral level. Factors which realistically influence the 
effectiveness of implementation primarily include technological factors.  
 
5.1.2 Climate change-related technology transfer in China: an overview  
Technology as a solution to tackle climate change is recognized all over the world and 
China is no exception.
66
 For many reasons, contemporary China is viewed as a 
developing country, with limited economic level and technology capacity.
67
 Since 
early 1980, China has been moving towards peaceful development with a powerful 
knowledge base.
68
 The role of science and technology (S&T) has a central place in 
this.  
 
As the evolving forecasts of climate crisis impact, the task of promoting development 
with S&T is becoming more urgent. The Chinese government is attempting to achieve 





5.1.2.1 Chinese S&T strategies, action plans  
S&T is seen as a powerful engine of economic growth and has had great strategic 
importance in China recently.
70
 To strengthen its indigenous technology capacity, 
China has drawn up several S&T development plans with medium and long-term 




As regards climate technology transfer: (1) relevant technologies have been integrated 
in sci-tech development plans and high-tech industrial development plans. 
                                                                                                                                            
there are the gap between east and west, social tensions, education and job problems and political unrest. At the 
international level, China‟s peaceful rise needs to maintain a good public image regarding the state‟s liability. As 
Winner described, “If China would suffer only modest losses from climate change domestically, it would also be 




 See Jonathan B. Wiener, “Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China,” 55 UCLA Law Review 2008, pp. 
1820-1825. Now Chinese Climate policy is based in part on national interests, in part on greater net benefits from 
climate policy. 
66
 Annual Report on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2010, (no. 49), p. 9. 
67
 Zou, Wang and Fu 2009, (no. 25), p. 31. 
68
 This means relying on progress in science and technology to promote the country‟s social and economic 
strengths. 
69
 See He Gang, “Climate Change and the Equity Principle”, China Dialogue, 19 December 2007, available at 
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/1589-China-climate-change-and-the-equity-principle. 
70
 At the World Economic Forum in September 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proclaimed: “We should see 
scientific and technological innovation as an important pillar and make greater effort to develop new industries of 
strategic importance. Science and technology is a powerful engine of economic growth . . . We will make China a 
country of innovation…We will accelerate the development of a low-carbon economy and green economy so as to 
gain an advantageous position in the international industrial competition‟. 
71
 This is known as the National Guideline on Medium and Long-term Program for S&T Development (2006-




Technologies used for climate mitigation and adaptation are at the heart of S&T 
development to solve some of the outstanding problems that obstruct the country‟s 
social and economic development, such as climate change.
72
 (2) China aims to reduce 
its reliance on foreign technology by boosting native S&T. Domestic technology 
innovation is expected to contribute 60% or more to the country‟s development in the 
next fifteen years and foreign technology sources will be decline to 30% or below.
73
 
At the Copenhagen Summit, President Hu Jintao, the pioneer of the “Science 
Development Concept”, declared that China would continue to integrate measures to 
combat climate change in its social and economic plans: “to step up efforts to… 




In the past two decades, China‟s S&T system has been reformed with a focus on 
shifting the role of government from sending orders to providing services.
75
 In the 
case of technology transfer, governments engage in creating markets to drive 
domestic technology demands. Instead of direct project management, they aim to 
provide policy guidance, demonstrate what they have experienced and establish 
infrastructure.
76
 From 1990 the MOST (Ministry of Science & Technology) published 
a series of reports on China‟s S&T indicators to send signals to local governments and 
enterprises on the market situation.
77
 In addition, investment in Research & 
Development (R&D) has constantly been increased.
78
 The well-known 863 & 973 




                                                 
72
 Idem. China will give priority to technological development in eleven major sectors by the end of 2020. 
According to the programme, the key industries include energy, water resources mining resources, environment, 
agriculture, manufacturing, communications and transport, information industry and modern service industries, 
population and health, urbanization and urban development, public security, and national defence. 
73
 Idem.  
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 “Chinese President Hu Jintao‟s Speech at the UN Climate Change Summit,” 23 September 2009, available at 
http://dk.China-embassy.org/eng/News/t605967.htm. The complete version is: “(1) to intensify effort(s) to 
conserve energy and improve energy efficiency. We will endeavor to cut carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP 
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hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 2005 levels; (4) to step up effort(s) 
to develop green economy, low-carbon economy and circular economy, and enhance research, development and 
dissemination of climate-friendly technologies.”  
75
 See Mu Rongping, “Development of Science and Technology Policy in China,” Institute of Policy & 
Management, Chinese Academy of Science, 2010, pp. 3-8. 
76
 Idem. For example, Key S&T have been put in place for big science projects, large experimental instruments 
and a document/databank. 
77
 China S&T Indicators provide an analysis and evaluation of S&T activities in China. The indicators are based 
on China's national S&T statistics and relevant economic and social statistics. “China Science and Technology 
Indicators,” available at http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=is.document&uuid=8ED0C061-
D811-BA35-226656DCDCEEA53B. 
78
 State Council, National Guideline on Medium and Long-term Program for S&T Development (2006-2020), 
2006. According to the guidelines, the investment on R&D needs to account for 2% of GDP in 2010 and 2.5% of 
GDP in 2020.  
79
 China FAQs World Resources Institute, “An Emerging Revolution: Clean Technology Research, Development 
and Innovation in China,” the Network for Climate and Energy Information, 2010, pp. 2-3. The 863 Program, also 
known as the State High-Tech Development Plan, was created to stimulate the development of advanced 
technologies in a wide range of fields in order to render China independent of financial obligations for foreign 
technologies. The program has changing focuses and priorities, depending on the needs of national economic 
development. During the 11th Five Year Plan, the 863 program set up 10 focus areas, including energy 
technologies. Complementing the 863 Program, the 973 Program focus on specific technologies. This National 
Basic Research Program also called the “973 Program.” Since its inception, core focuses of the 973 program have 
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In the Chinese reformation of the S&T system the scope of policies was extended 
from a preference for either global engagement or native innovation, to a balance that 
combines both.
80
 China devotes more attention to international S&T collaboration, 
pursuing an outgoing strategy in the field of climate related technologies.
81
 For some 
mitigation technologies, the volume of exports is already large.
82
 So far, China has 
signed 103 cooperation agreements with 97 countries, a significant number of which 
focus on renewable technology development.
83
 In China, there are classified 
technologies specifically for export.
84
 On the one hand, the domestic market is unable 
or unwilling to afford the high costs of these technologies.
85
 On the other hand, many 
regional governments value the economic returns of climate related technologies more 
than their environmental benefits which are less tangible and take much longer to 
achieve. To a large extent therefore, the outgoing strategy in current China can be 
attributed to low labour costs, large-scale manufacturing and an immature EST market, 




5.1.2.2 The current level of technology capacity in China 
There is a great change at the moment in China‟s development of climate sound 
technology. In this context, it is important to evaluate the current level of local 
technology capacity in a holistic, objective and developmental manner. 
 
（1）The push in climate sound technology  
The Chinese government promotes clean technology innovation with an array of S&T 
polices, and has some world-class technologies. During the last two decades, there 
have been remarkable improvements in the technology capacity in sectors like energy, 
resources and raw materials which are vital for climate mitigation.
87
 Inefficient 
technologies in steel, cement, and coal power plants are being phased out.
88
 In 
addition, great advances are taking place in China in the field of renewable energy. It 
is in a leading position as regards hydropower and has produced the most wind 
turbines in the world with an installed production capacity of 25 GW.
89
 In addition, 
                                                                                                                                            
natural resources conservation and environmental protection. 
80
 Mu 2010, (no. 75), pp. 10-11. It is predicted that this functional extension of Chinese S&T policies will 
influence the future sources of technology and therefore their international transfer.   
81
 China FAQs World Resources Institute 2010, (no. 79), p. 4. 
82
 See Takahiro Ueno, “Technology Transfer to China to Address Climate Change Mitigation,” U.S. Global 
Leaderships: An Initiative of the Climate Policy Program at RFF, 2009, p. 3. For example, compact fluorescent 
lamps have achieved an export figure of 70% and photovoltaic power generation of 90%. Exports of other major 
technologies which have started recently include supercritical and ultra supercritical coal-fired power plants, 
natural gas combined, waste heat recovery and energy-efficient room air conditioners cycle power plants.  
83
 See Wan Gang, “Relying on Science and Technology to Tackle Climate Change,” 2009, available at 
http://www.ccChina.gov.cn/cn/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=12193. 
84
 Solar photovoltaic panels have developed significantly in China. In 2000 the solar cell output was only 3MW, 
and by the end of 2007 it had reached 1088 MW, putting it first in the world. However, there are serious problems 
in the Chinese solar PV industry: the high purity crystalline raw materials of solar PV production mainly rely on 
imports. Furthermore, the domestic market for solar power generation is so small that its application is confronted 
with practical difficulties.   
85




 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Report for Implementing the Law for S&T Progress,” 
2003. In the last ten years, productivity increased to 11942 yuan/year/person, and energy consumption/10 thousand 
GDP decreased to 2.69 tonnes standard coal. 
88
 Wong 2010, (no. 62), p. 5. For example, supercritical and ultra supercritical coal combustion technologies, ultra 
high-voltage grid transmission wires and electrified high-speed passenger rail. 
89
 Idem. According to the statistics, the installed wind capacity of China is now the third largest in the world.  
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there are leading manufacturers of solar panels in China, as well as several projects 
for nuclear power plants.
90
    
 
（2）The low capacity of climate sound technology 
The recent technology capacity in China has grown enormously, which has resulted in 
great international concern. Some experts suggest that there is no longer any need to 
transfer technology to China. The progress made in technology is a fact, but arguably, 
it is not non-need for climate technology transfer but different needs. China‟s new and 




In general, there is a significant gap in key climate technologies. Until very recently, 
China heavily relied on foreign technologies in the wind, solar and biomass sectors.
92
 
There is a core of knowledge in a small number of climate-related technologies in the 
Chinese domestic market.
93
 An overwhelming proportion of industrial sectors is 
represented by inferior technologies, which has great economic implications.
94
 It is 
predicted that the lock-in effect of backward technologies will lead to high emissions 
for the next two decades.
95
 Despite the fact that technological change is taking place 
now, it will take a long time for the Chinese energy structure to diversify and 
ultimately slow down the rate of climate change. According to a study by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), China will need to deploy 62 key 
technologies to fulfil its carbon intensity reduction pledge of 40 to 45% by 2020, but 
it lacks 43 of these, which means significant business opportunities for foreign 
enterprises that possess these technologies.
96
 In other words, 70% of the relevant 




In conclusion, China started late on the development of climate technology and 
generally lags behind the developed countries. “Compared with developed countries, 
the overall technological level of our country still falls behind, which manifests in 
several aspects: low self-sufficiency rate of key technologies and small number of 
invention patents; (…) scientific research quality is not high enough, being short of 
top-notch talents; meanwhile, there is inadequate investment in science and 




 Wang Can, “The Field Research on Technology Transfer in Addressing Climate Change and Its Implication for 
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technology, and the current mechanism has a lot of shortcomings.”
98
 “Despite having 
technologically sophisticated cities and world-class firms, the economy-wide level of 
technological achievement in countries like China and India is not very different from 




5.1.3 International transfer of climate sound technology in China  
There is a significant demand for climate sound technology on the Chinese market, 
and therefore the transfer of foreign technology is imperative in practice. It is 
expected that this demand will increase in future. 
 
5.1.3.1 China in the negotiations on climate change 
A great deal can be achieved with diplomacy and cooperation.  After all, the climate 
sound technology race did not start at zero.
100
 China has voiced the need for climate 
mitigation and adaptation technologies on a number of international occasions.  
 
（1）China in climate change negotiations  
China is becoming a great power in geopolitics, in which climate change is an 
important issue.
101
 Although China has not yet committed to any compulsory limits 
on emissions, diplomatic and political pressure is forcing local governments to take 
collective action.  
 
Climate change affects a country‟s international image and it affects China‟s allies 
internationally because of the scale of the damage it causes. “If India and Africa 
suffer serious losses from climate change, then China, the world‟s largest emitter and 
a leader of the G77 group of developing countries, might prefer to avoid blame from 
its G77 allies.”
102
 China can actually benefit from participating in designing the 
international policy regime.
103
 Strategically it is easier for China to “join a regime that 
lacks an international consensus like climate change, so that it can choose the norms 




Driven by a perception of itself as a “responsible big country”,
105
 China is proactively 
engaged in climate diplomacy. During the climate negotiations, China put forward 
four principles as a basis for future negotiations. These are to adhere to: (1) the 
framework of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Bali Road Plan; (2) 
sustainable development; (3) the common but differentiated responsibilities; (4) 
climate mitigation and adaptation in combination with finance and technology.
106 
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 Wong 2010, (no. 62), p. 11. 
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 Wiener 2008, (no. 65), p. 1822. 
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 Idem. According to Wiener, the design of the international regime itself can affect national net benefits that are 
not static or determined in isolation but instead depend on the cooperative deal reached with other countries. 
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 Annual Report on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2010, (no. 49), pp. 74-75. 
Specifically, (1) all developed country Parties to the Convention shall commit to a reduction in GHG emissions by 
at least 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and by approximately 80-95% in 2050. (2) Nationally appropriate 




Meanwhile, China‟s status as a recipient of technology and as a developing country 
has been questioned because of its increasing international influence. Some experts 
feel that the group of developing countries is too large and that with its surging GDP 
and technology development, China no longer belongs in this group.
107
 As regards 
specific issues such as ODA, states with these views, such as the four Nordic 
countries, refuse to consider China as a recipient.
 108
 In fact, irrespective of the 
economic implications, the term “developing country” tends to be a political concept. 
On whether China is a developing country or not, it is not enough to look merely at 
the data on GDP and technology.
109
 As described above, there is an imbalance in the 
development of different regions, none of which represents China as a whole.
110
 In the 
majority of these regions, the tension between “wenbao and huanbao” still 
dominates.
111
 As regards technology, the current rapid improvements are only taking 
                                                                                                                                            
supported and enabled by technology transfer, financial assistance and capacity building to be provided by the 
developed country Parties. (3) The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between developed and 
developing countries are the keystone of the Convention and the Bali Action Plan. Any further sub-categorization 
of developing countries runs against the Convention itself and is not in conformity with the consensus reached in 
the Bali Action Plan. (4) Technology transfer and the provisions of financial support and capacity building by 
developed country Parties for national mitigation actions in developing country Parties shall be measurable, 
reportable and verifiable, and be new and additional to ODA.  
107
  From the perspective of economic development, China has risen to become a middle income country. 
Therefore, the price of technology should not be a problem anymore. In terms of its technological level, China is 
much better than many other developing countries. In some fields like hydropower, China has its own mature 
technologies which are near the top of the world‟s list. See Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal 
Saggi, “Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options,” Research 
Program on Political and Economic Change Working Paper PEC2004-0003, May, 2004, pp. 18-24. 
108
 As promised, 0.7% of annual GDP will be provided to assist developing countries to mitigate climate change. 
The Netherlands in particular feels that China should not be granted their ODA. Wang Canfa, “The Field Research 
on Technology Transfer in Addressing Climate Change and its Implication for Chinese Legislation and Practices,” 
PhD Research Program, 2011. Wang Canfa is an environmental law professor in the China University of Political 
Science and Law. He is also a distinguished environmental lawyer who participates in public interest litigation and 
has been hailed as a green pioneer by pollution victims. In 2002, Prof. Wang established the first Centre for Legal 
Assistance to Pollution Victims in China. http://www.grChina.com/aid/index.htm. 
109
 Idem. Prof. Wang Canfa has presented an important theory – Toilet Civilization. In his opinion, the 
development of human civilization is manifest in many aspects, amongst which the most vivid is in one‟s toilet. 
Almost everywhere in rural Europe has toilet paper; whilst in China even some luxury locations like Peking 
University cannot guarantee toilet paper in every toilet. The tissue theory reflects not only material civilization, but 
also spiritual civilization. When material civilization is less developed, spiritual civilization proves to be no more 
than a dream. Once the purchase of tissues becomes an economic burden, the tissues disappear in toilets. That is 
always the case in the Olympic Bird's Nest: people are always searching for tissue there. In a low-level material 
civilization, it is understandable that people do things which are not in the social and public interest, just to satisfy 
them. This is typical in most of China. Developing countries claim that environmental protection is a luxury they 
cannot afford. Conversely, the per capita consumption of resources in developed countries is much higher than in 
developing countries. In moral terms, every country including China should have a “right” to consume a greater 
share of world resources per capita. Therefore, the country which consumes greater than average share of resources 
should reduce its consumption for the sake of those who now consume less than average. Would a developed 
country be prepared to lower its standard of life to achieve a carbon-free society? As the developed countries are 
largely responsible for the climate crisis, could they give less to economic development, earn less, work less and 
be happy? It is necessary to promote public awareness in both developing and developed countries, but they are 
involved in very different ways. If developed countries are reluctant to lower their living standards and high 
consumption of resources, it is important to increase public awareness there. 
110
 Unfortunately, some people regard China as a middle-income country, though economic growth has been 
accompanied by an increasing disparity in income. The income gap between western and eastern China is 
becoming bigger and the income disparity between rural and urban areas is also a serious policy concern. Despite a 
policy commitment to balanced and sustainable development at the national level, ecological, economic, political 
and social factors make this difficult to achieve. Matters could become even worse because climate change will 
probably exacerbate the income gap. See Zhang, Luo, Yi and Tyler 2008, (no. 51), p. 14. 
111
 The so-called “wenbao and huanbao” in China is a job-versus-environment aphorism. Wenbao is the warm and 
full feeling of prosperity; huanbao is environmental protection. See Bryan Tilt, “The Political Ecology of Pollution 
Enforcement in China: A Case from Sichuan‟s Rural Industrial Sector,” 192 CHINA Q., 2007, p. 932. 
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place in a small number of fields. Local technology capacity is generally too low to 
foster the internal growth required by the increasingly urgent need for climate 
mitigation and adaptation. China could consider that questioning its need for 
technology transfer is unfair, particularly as developed countries have failed to set a 
good example in achieving their own mitigation commitments.
112
   
 
（2）International negotiations on climate technology transfer 
Climate negotiations on technology transfer are making slow progress.
113
 China plays 
a critical role in this “protracted war”, and has contributed to dynamic international 
cooperation. Together with other developing countries, China has expressed a strong 
interest in gaining improved access to climate sound technologies, and this has led to 
some tangible changes in the international climate framework.  
 
At the very beginning, technology transfer was not included at the centre of climate 
change negotiations.
114
 As a result of the efforts made by China and its allies, 
technology transfer was incorporated into the working agenda of the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI) ultimately.
115
 Following the big triumph in Bali, China went 
even further in the following negotiations. It strengthened the relationship with the 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UN agencies in climate technology 
cooperation.
116
 At the Copenhagen Summit, China was an active advocate of the $30 
billion fast-start fund to be collected from developed country Parties.
117
 Immediately 
afterwards, collaborating with G77, it presented a potential new and innovative 
proposal for a technology mechanism.
118
 Both the Cancun and Durban Summits are 




During this progress, the Chinese negotiation position and bargaining capacity have 
been greatly enhanced. China is visibly becoming more mature, pragmatic and 
flexible in the climate technology transfer negotiations.
120
 For instance, when the 
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 Wiener 2008, (no. 65), pp. 1807-1810. 
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 In the long term, the progress of climate sound technology transfer negotiations cannot be ignored, particularly 
from a historic angle. The international community has achieved substantive results in establishing a common 
political and legal basis. Relevant agreements and executive bodies are created on this basis. The spillover effects 
of climate sound technology successfully encourage developing countries to sign MEAs. In addition, climate 
sound technology transfer has aroused great concern in the existing international agencies, for instance, the COP 
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negotiations on climate sound technology transfer are making slow progress, particularly in the light of the 
increasingly deteriorating climate situation. 
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 See Li Hujun, “Witnessing Bali: A Breakthrough to Technology Transfer Negotiations,” Chinese Science 
Outpost, 19 December 2007, available at http://techlihujun.blog.163.com/blog/static/92742732007111983138722/. 
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 See Panos London, “What Bali Means for China,” Environmental News Network, 12 March 2008, available at 
http://www.enn.com/climate/article/33385. Before that, SBSTA, a technical consultancy, dealt with technology 
transfer issues. 
116
 Currently China is the largest recipient of environmental aid from the World Bank. 
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 TT: Clear, “Negotiations and Decisions,” available at http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/Negotiationsanddecisions.jsp. 
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 G77 & China for A Technology Mechanism under the UNFCCC, 2007, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/technology_proposal_g77_8.pdf. This 
proposal is based on existing activities in the Convention and comprehensively covers the definition, principles 
and procedures for the prospective technology transfer mechanism. The proposal aims to bring a practical, 
problem-solving approach to achieve the accessibility, affordability, appropriateness and adaptability of 
technologies required by developing countries for enhanced action on mitigation and adaptation. 
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 TT: Clear, “New Technology Mechanism Established in Cancun,” available at 
http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/index.jsp.  
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 London 2008, (no. 115).This change in China‟s position from being a recipient to becoming a proactive 
participant won great praise. “Many developing countries, united in the G77 plus China, have come to Bali with 
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world was generally pessimistic about reaching any substantive outcome in Cancun 
and tended to dismiss the importance of the conference, China continued to play an 
important role.
121
 Its fundamental interests in climate diplomacy were moving from 
emission reduction targets and climate justice to transparency concerns and 
technology transfer. In addition, China refined the strategy by teaming up with players 
with similar interests and established the Basic Group which seeks to re-establish the 




However, China‟s achievements in the climate technology transfer negotiations 
should not be exaggerated. Faced with many demands at home, its performance in the 
international arena still falls short of expectation.
123
 First, its overall bargaining power 
is weak.
124
 This is because the general abilities of the Chinese negotiators are limited. 
Few negotiators are available in China who is experts in both climate change and 
trade. In particular, they do not have adequate bargaining powers or expertise of the 
developed countries in the fields of technology transfer.
125
 Secondly, in a broader 
sense, a country‟s bargaining power depends on its comprehensive capacity. Although 
the skills of negotiators can improve rapidly in the short term (with training and 
communication), a country without advanced ESTs and IPRs is unable to adopt a 
favourable negotiating position. Its technology strategy, climate policy, innovation 
level and absorptive capability are very important at the negotiation table.
126
 Finally, 
to some extent, China‟s negotiation strategy has up to now relied on its stable alliance 
with the Basic Group, but it is uncertain how the Group will move forward.
127
 The 
emission reduction commitments adopted in the Post-Kyoto agreements will certainly 
affect the future bargaining capacities of these four countries. Possibility exists 
however that the potential interests will be spited within or outside the Basic 
Group.
128
   
  
5.1.3.2 To what extent does technology transfer take place in China? 
As a strong advocate of climate technology transfer, the Chinese government is trying 
to create a favourable host environment for importing and investing in technology. To 
                                                                                                                                            
considerable ambition and are showing flexibility,” said Hans Verolme, director of WWF‟s global climate change 
program.  
121
 Qi 2008, (no. 104). 
122
 The four countries include Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, the largest emitters in their regions and are 
strongly committed to the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. 
123
 One Obstacle in China‟s Low-carbon Revolution: 70% of Key Technologies Have to Be Imported 2010, (no. 
97). 
124
 Zou Ji, “The Field Research on Technology Transfer in Addressing Climate Change and its Implication for 
Chinese Legislation and Practices,” PhD Research Program, 2011. Zou Ji is a pioneer engaged in ESTs research in 
China. From the beginning of this century, Zou Ji noticed the particularity of ESTs and since then he has embarked 
on relevant issues like ESTs innovation, diffusion, marketing and transfer. As an environmental engineer at the 
department of People University, Prof. Zou‟ s research is not limited to the purely technological domain. Instead, 
he focuses on theory and policy, and has had great achievements in this new field. Because of his unique 
knowledge background, Prof. Zou Ji is working on a series of national climate change projects. In this process, he 
is combining climate change with technology, independently introducing a new set of theories. For instance, his 
theory of the lock-in effect of backward technology was included in the 2007 IPCC report. Prof. Zou works for the 
Chinese government part time as a policy consultant on climate change. He represents Chinese officials and 
attends various climate change negotiations including climate-technology transfer negotiations. In 2011, Prof. Zou 
was officially appointed as a deputy director of State Council Climate Change Panel. 
125
 See Matthew Littleton, “The TRIPS agreement and transfer of climate change-related technologies to 




 Qi 2008, (no. 10). 
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  Zou 2011, (no. 124). 
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Technology transfer in the international climate framework differs essentially from 
ordinary technology transfer. However, it is difficult to make a distinction in practice. 
Ordinary technology transfer also targets foreign clean technology sources, but is 




Under the UNFCCC, the EGTT has identified several performance indicators used to 
assess technology transfer in the field of climate change.
130
 However, applying them 
effectively is confronted with realistic challenges. For example, China is traditionally 
weak at statistics, due to sharp regional differences, a poor local capacity and some 
historical-cultural reasons.
131
 In reality, climate sound technologies have an unlimited 
scope, as is the case for the various forms of relevant technology transfer. At the same 
time, climate technology transfer involves foreign enterprises and that entails many 
problems in terms of assessment. Therefore it is difficult to assess climate technology 
transfer having been conducted, although there is one realistic exception: the CDM.
132
 
The CDM is project-based and operates as a vehicle for importing technologies that 
are not available locally.
133
 The primary source of data on the CDM projects can be 




Climate technology transfer is predominantly driven by government. 
Intergovernmental cooperation and government support in the public sector also 
contribute to the transfer of technology.
135
 The following paragraph will attempt to 
examine these channels used to introduce foreign cutting edge technologies in China. 
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 There is no division between ordinary and climate technology transfer in ordinary trade. From a research 
perspective, technology import records and technology contracts where concrete technology flows have been 
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 See Seres, S., “Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects,” Prepared for the UNFCCC Registration & 
Issuance Unit. CDM/SDM, Canada, 2008, pp. 1-4. 
134
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 There are three approaches to this: (1) official standpoints on this issue which can be accessed through 
government reports; (2) specialized institutes in charge of researching ESTs transfer: are there any coordination 
agencies and what kind of information have they mastered?; (3) energy or technology companies engaging in ESTs‟ 




（2）Climate sound technology transfer in China 
Regular technology transfer related to climate change  
More generally, there are hardly any official statistics on how many climate sound 
technologies have been transferred to China through the regular commercial 
channels.
136
 There are only a few individual pieces of research that throw some light 
on this issue, and provide some empirical data.
137
 However, this research mainly 
focuses on individual technologies such as wind turbines or clean coal, or in specific 
fields of technology such as energy efficiency or renewable energies.  
 
In one report issued recently, technology transfer is often referred to in relation to 
climate mitigation, though not in climate adaptation where local production dominates. 
“Actual installation of mitigation technologies can reduce emissions regardless of 
their origins.”
138
 For example, China ranked fourth globally in renewable energy 
technology sales in 2008, coming just behind Germany.
139
 In some fields the level of 
local technology is very high, and both North-South and South-South technology 
transfers are taking place.
140
 Attention is now being particularly devoted to South-
South cooperation and China intends to improve the quality of investment in this 




Another analysis of case studies conducted on seven key technologies in electricity, 
industry and the construction sectors, divides China‟s current level of technology 
transfer into three main stages: diffusion and deployment, local production, and 
export.
142
 As indicated above, most mitigation technologies are at the deployment 
stage where they can be well understood and available for selected commercial 
applications. The rate of diffusion is rapidly increasing in China, which means that 
                                                                                                                                            
similar technological products. Nie 2011, (no. 131). 
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 See Derek Bosworth and Deli Yang, “Intellectual Property Law, Technology Flow and Licensing Opportunities 
in the People‟s Republic of China,” International Business Review 9, 2000, p. 471.  
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 For instance, the CDM Research Centre of Tsinghua University and Environmental Engineer School of People 
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Some research has also been achieved by foreign researchers such as Takahiro Ueno, Joakim Nordqvist, Lars J. 
Nilsson. 
138
 Ueno 2009, (no. 82), p. 3. 
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 See Ward van den Berg and Anound van der Slot, “Clean Economy Living Planet: Building Strong Clean 
Energy Technology Industries,” WWF-Netherlands, 2009, pp. 12-13, available at 
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these technologies are competitive with established technologies in terms of cost.
143
 
According to this analysis, China is still operating as a world factory, but its 




As regards the form of technology transfer, ownership purchasing, technology 
licensing and FDI are frequently used in China. The full or majority ownership by 
foreign technology holders plays a role. The original equipment is imported, with 
which Chinese manufacturers could set up their production lines. It is only in special 
cases, such as photovoltaic power generation, that foreign enterprises provide turnkey 
solutions and install entire production facilities. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises are 
often licensed to produce technologies. Key components are kept in this way so that 
local partners import them from the source country.
145
 In the case of gas turbines, by 
way of example, licensees still import core components (i.e., blades and rotors) from 
their foreign partners. Finally, FDI-related activities can take place either between or 
within companies.
.146
 Foreign investors welcome inter-company technology transfer, 
particularly joint ventures. For example, Japanese manufacturers transferred waste 






There is a large CDM market in China. With 37 registered projects and more than 40 
million tons of CO2 reduction per year, China has become the biggest CER (Certified 
Emission Reduction) supplier in the world.
148
 Although CDM is uncertain in the post-
Kyoto era, China‟s domestic demand still exists and is likely to expand.
149
 CDM is 
not only a crucial part of climate governance, but the practical vehicle for introducing 




To examine technology transfer in the CDM projects, the Chinese government has 
been conducting an assessment in collaboration with the EU since 2007. A 
comprehensive report was published after three years. A summary of findings follows:    
 
 In general, the frequency of technology transfer is currently low, both in terms of how 
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it takes place and in terms of the degree of interaction between technology suppliers 
and project owners.
151
 61 projects of the total 200 claimed technology transfer in 
PDDs, i.e., approximately 40%.
152





 Of the projects which mentioned technology transfer, two thirds concern the transfer 
of physical equipment at the market price.
154
 The remaining one third involves 
capacity building, such as operation and maintenance.
155
 However, more and more 
foreign investors like the EU are showing an interest in the long-term adoption of 
ESTs with local appropriateness, and in point-to-point relocation of technology. For 
example, Germany is very active in training activities and regards them as a way of 
securing more sustainable projects.
156
 Hardly any core technologies have been offered, 




 In China, climate sound technologies originate mainly from Japan, the US, the EU (i.e. 
Germany, Denmark, France and Spain) and their multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Of these, the EU is a major supplier of renewable energy technologies (i.e., wind 
power and bio-mass).
158
 As the largest buyer of CERs, the EU is highly likely to 
obtain and maintain a competitive edge over China‟s climate technology market, 
while Japan and the US are dominant in the area of energy efficiency technologies 




 Technology transfer differs in practice, depending on factors such as the type of 
project, industry and region, and the maturity of the local market.
160
 Projects which 
involve most technology transfer are industrial gases, fuel switch and landfill gas.
161
 
In renewable energy projects, the variation in technology transfer is significant. 63% 
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 See Duan Maosheng, “Technology Transfer in the CDM, Linking Climate Mitigation Policy and Modelling in 
China,” Workshop, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 18 February 2006, p. 11.   
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 Idem. For example, on-site training and training abroad are provided occasionally by foreign technology 
suppliers when selling equipment. Also see IVL,” The Field Research on Technology Transfer in Addressing 
Climate Change and Its Implication for Chinese Legislation and Practices,” PhD Research Program, 2011. IVL, 
Swedish Environmental Research Institute, participated in compiling EU-China Technology transfer in CDM 




 Idem.Also see Zou, Wang and Fu 2009, (no. 25),  p. 18. One example is the wind power project: German 
suppliers are active engaged in technology support. They transfer their improved wind power equipment and some 
fundamental operating skills. However, they refuse to provide more related knowledge. With regard to 
maintenance, the German party sends its own operators, instead of training locals in China. 
158
 Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China 2010, (no. 151), p. 13. The EU represents 47% of the 




 Seres 2008, (no. 133), pp. 10-11. Each factor alone may not be a sufficient indictor for the probability of 
technology transfer. 
161
 Idem. Technologies such as N2O, HFC23 and methane were not widespread before the introduction of CDM. In 
contrast, there are no demands for technology transfer for the following types of project: bio-diesel, gas leakage 
recovery and utilization, waste gas recovery and utilization. 
162
 Idem. This is also because hydropower technology is highly developed in China now. A large number of 




In short, CDM is not technology-oriented either in theory or in practice. Technology 
transfer in the Chinese CDM regime is more or less passive. As described in a report 
for the UNFCCC, CDM projects in China involve a lower level of technology transfer 
in terms of the share of projects, although they achieve annual emission reductions 





Inter-governmental cooperation sometimes results in technology transfer 
opportunities for climate mitigation and adaptation. The Chinese government has 
collaborated with major clean technology suppliers, for example, in the US.
164
 A 
range of bilateral cooperation projects have been undertaken in the coal-intensive 
sectors under the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Climate Change & Development and 
Climate Friendly Technologies.
165
 In the field of renewable energy, the NDRC and 
the MOST initiated an International S&T Cooperation Program in 2007.
166
 Pursuant 
to this program, 103 agreements on renewable energy technologies were signed by 
Chinese recipients with 97 countries.
167
 It is worth mentioning that the EU and China 
very recently jointly created an Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction 





The notion of technology transfer is firmly linked to government aid, as in the case of 
ODA.
169
 As far as China is concerned, the technology transfer commitment in the 
international climate framework is very often interpreted in terms of ODA.
170
 “Private 
enterprises do not enjoy the same credibility as governmental organizations, and, 
furthermore, the occurrence of privately funded technology transfer, it is feared, might 
be used by governments of developed countries as a pretext for reductions of ODA 
funding.”
171
 Historically, the well-known Green Aid Plan (1992-2003), of which 
technology transfer is an important component, was a good example of ODA in 
action,
172
 and made a number of Japan‟s energy conservation technologies available 
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http://www.China.org.cn/english/environment/233359.htm. The Program aims to find new forms of international 
exchange and cooperation, combining the complementary strengths of all the countries and set up a technological 
cooperation platform. Special funds were earmarked for the launch of the program.  
167
 Dewey & LeBoeuf, LLP 2010, (no. 15), p. 20. 
168
 MOST 9 – EU-China SME Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Research Collaboration Fund, China 
Access 4 EU Contract no.244459 (INCO), January 2012. In this report, SME refers to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
169
 Lv 2011, (no. 141). 
170
 From the broader perspective of developing countries, ODA only accounts for a small part of the sources for 
development in developed countries, but plays an irreplaceable role in certain sections of developing countries that 
attract less private funding, such as agriculture, forestry, human health and coastal management. 
171
 See Joakim Nordqvist and Lars J. Nilsson, “Prospects for Industrial Technology Transfer in Chinese Cement 
Industry,” Increasing Productivity through Energy Efficiency, Vol. 2, 2001, p. 230. 
172
 See Li Junfeng, “The Contribution of the Commercial Transfer of Technology to Climate Change Mitigation, 





 In recent years, international ODAs have extended into the legal domain 
to improve the transparency and reliability of Chinese law.
174
  Some basic laws, like 
company law and anti-monopoly law importantly influence technology transfer 




（3）Technology needs assessment 
There is a great domestic need for technology for rapid climate change mitigation as 
well as sustainable development. In this respect, the level of climate technology 




To determine the real needs of climate sound technology, and the benefits that these 
technologies could have in terms of GHG emission reductions and adaptation to 
climate change, Chinese governments have launched several technology needs 
assessments (TNA).
 177
 Some of these are comprehensive, serving as “Tools and 
Methodologies in Assessing Technology Needs,” “UNDP Second National 
Communication” and “China/US Cooperation on the TCAPP initiative” for the 
UNFCCC.
178
 Others focus only on specific sectors, like cement.
179
 The sectoral TNAs 
operate as a knowledge centre for sector-specific technologies. During the 12
th
 Five-
year Plan period (2011-2015), the central government is undertaking the latest TNA, a 
three-year project funded by the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility.
180
 
The new round of TNA aims to contribute important value-added benefits beyond 
previous TNAs, as well as analyses of China‟s current climate technology needs.
181
 
The first version of the technology needs list was published in 2011.  
 
Conclusion  
                                                                                                                                            
Böll Foundation, the Climate Group and World Watch Institute, 2009, p. 8. 
173
 Wong 2010, (no. 62), p. 7. The main objective of the plan is for China to learn from Japan in the field of 
environmental pollution prevention and treatment, to improve the utilization of energy and mineral resources, 
reduce pollution, protect the environment and encourage cleaner production in Chinese industrial enterprises 
through technology transfer, diffusion and dissemination in the environment and energy field. Demonstration 
projects cover the three major areas of energy efficiency, clean coal, and power plant desulphurization. After the 
implementation of pilot projects, many sectors made progress on technology distribution, promotion through staff 
training, technical tours and encouraging the transfer of environmentally friendly technologies between Japan and 
China. 
174





 Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China 2010, (no. 151), p. 17. 
177
 See Zou Ji, “Technology Needs Assessment: Methodologies and Exercises in China,” Program of Economics 
and Policy Studies (PEPS), 2009, p. 16, available at 
http://www.resourcesaver.com/file/toolmanager/O105UF291.pdf. In China, these activities for TNAs are 
coordinated, jointly or separately, by the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), MOST and MOEP. 
These activities include, for example, the Green Tech Initiative known as “Green Tech Report 2009,” “China's 
green revolution,” “High-tech Development Report Year 2010,” compiled by the China Academy of Science and 
“Proposal on innovative mechanism for development and transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs)” 
conducted in Renmin University. 
178
 See Wang Can, “Experiences and Lessons Learned from the TNA of China,” UNFCCC Workshop on 
Technology Needs Assessments, Bonn, Germany, 1-2 June 2011, p. 2.  
179
 Idem. In cement sectors, there is the TNA activity named APP‟s Energy Efficiency and Resource Saving 
Technologies. 
180
 “China Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) for Climate Change Project,” 14 November 2010, available at 
http://www.tnaChina.org/#. The government of China will contribute US$ 800,000 in addition to the US$ 5 million 
grant from the GEF. WB refers to the World Bank and GEF refers to the Global Environment Facility. 
181
 World Bank, China-China Technology Needs Assessment (TNA): China-Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) 
Project: procurement plan, Project Information Document (PID) Report No.: AB5716, 2010, Para. 7. 
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China set out on a route towards peace and an increased knowledge base from early 
1980. The role of technology is central in this, and this is becoming more urgent with 
the forecasts of the imminent impact of the climate crisis. On the one hand, 
technologies used for climate mitigation and adaptation have been incorporated in sci-
tech, high-tech development plans; on the other hand, China aims to further reduce its 
reliance on foreign technologies by promoting native innovation. During the last few 
decades, China has made remarkable achievements in key sectors like energy, raw 
materials, and particularly renewable energies. However, there is a significant gap in 
the indigenous technology capacity as a whole. China is still lacking core knowledge 
in some important climate-related technologies (i.e., wind, solar and biomass), which 
means that there are significant transfer opportunities for foreign enterprises that 
possess these technologies. So far, China had expressed the need for these 
technologies during the proceedings of the climate negotiations. These needs must be 
recognized and evaluated in a holistic, objective and developmental manner. 
 
China is becoming a great power in climate geopolitics. During the “protracted war” 
of climate technology transfer negotiations, China, together with other developing 
countries, engaged in proactive diplomacy, resulting in some tangible changes in the 
international climate framework. This process led to its fundamental interests moving 
from emission reduction targets and climate justice, to transparency concerns and 
technology transfer. However, China‟s general bargaining power is weak, because 
there are few negotiators available who are experts in both climate change and trade. 
A country without advanced IP is unlikely to have a favourable position and its 
technology strategies, climate policies, innovation level and capacity to assimilate 
technologies are very important.  
 
Consequently, the Chinese government is attempting to create a host environment that 
is favourable for importing and investing in technology. Up to now, there is a 
mainstream in China that climate sound technologies are still transferred on a 
business-as-usual basis. This applies particularly for mitigation technology, most of 
which is at the deployment stage. Nevertheless, according to the EGTT, the 
technology transfer required by the UNFCCC takes place in the CDM projects, with 
inter-governmental technology cooperation, as well as with government aid. In this 
view, the occurrence of technology transfer is currently low, both in terms of how it 
takes place and as regards the degree of interaction between technology suppliers and 
project owners. In order to facilitate local technology transfer, Chinese governments 
have launched several TNAs to identify the real technology needs and determine the 
benefits that these technologies can have for GHG emission reductions and adaptation 
to climate change. More legal support is required to promote, guide and consolidate 
this process.  
 
5.2 The legal framework of climate change-related technology transfer in China 
Climate technology transfer occurs in the broader context of combating climate 
change and sharing technological resources globally. In legal terms, to regulate it in 
reality involves both climate change and technology transfer Legislation. Climate 
change legislation at the international level has been structured on the basis of regular 
negotiations. With regard to the technology transfer aspect, there is a consistent 
appeal for corresponding adjustments in the existing WTO regime.
182
 In response to 
                                                 
182
 For example, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which stated that an ambitious post-Kyoto 
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the changing legal atmosphere in the international legal regime, domestic legislation 
must also change. In the words of the IPCC, a “meaningful and effective technology 




China has signed a series of climate change agreements and its accession to the WTO 
means that there will be many opportunities for further development and the transfer 
of climate friendly technologies. China has strengthened the relevant legal framework 
to assimilate national responsibilities in its domestic legal system. Laws, rules and 
institutions have been created and the regulatory capacity has been strengthened. To 
some extent, China has developed a diverse though relatively complete legal 
framework for the transfer of climate mitigation and adaptation technology.  
 
As is the case in the international legislative progress, China‟s legal framework of 
climate technology transfer is recent, starting only in the early 1990s after it signed 
the UNFCCC.
184
 Since then, the legal framework has developed with the evolution of 
international efforts and it is increasingly seen as being integral to the country‟s future 
legal system.
185
 To date, there is no specialized technology transfer law for addressing 
climate change in China.
186
 The activities are regulated sector by sector, or even 
technology by technology.
187
 A systematic summary of all the major codifications of 
climate change related technology transfer will be provided below.  
 
5.2.1 Technology transfer in the climate change framework  
Climate sound technology has both economic and social-environmental functions. It 
is difficult to fully achieve the social-environmental function of technology in a 
market regime, and traditional private laws primarily aimed at recognising and 
ensuring the economic value of technology can have a restrictive effect.
188
 Therefore 
climate change legislation has a central role in promoting climate sound technologies 




5.2.1.1 The proposed Climate Change Act 
Although China has somehow succeeded in carrying out policies to cope with climate 
change across the nation, the progress in the legislation is lagging behind.
190
 So far 
there has been no comprehensive Climate Change Act in China. Regional 
                                                                                                                                            
agreement would require “corresponding adjustments” to be made to other international agreements, including a 
new agreement on IPRs. European Parliament Resolution (2007/2003(INI)), Trade and Climate Change, 29 
November 2007. More details can be found in Ch. 3.11.2.3 “Options for dealing with TRIPS.” 
183
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Ch.13, “Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements.” 
184
 It is well known that China is historically characterized by its policy-oriented guidance on climate change, 
rather than enacting formal law. This is not only because climate change has been a newly emerging issue in recent 
years, but also because China is currently experiencing enormous change in every aspect of society. The necessary 
stability of law is greatly challenged by the ongoing political, economic and social transformation. However, 
climate sound technology transfer previously operated on a normal business basis for which a set of existing laws 
played an important role. The adaptation of the law for climate sound technology transfer will therefore need to 
integrate climate policy initiatives in the existing legislation. A broader legal synergy is aimed for.  
185
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no.1), p. 11.  
186
 Policy instruments play a central role in adjusting the transfer of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. 
Ch. 5.1.1.2., “Climate Policies, National & Regional Actions in China.” 
187
 Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China 2010, (no. 151), p. 15.  
188
 Nie 2011, (no. 131). 
189
 It needs to achieve four different balances: the balance between private exclusive rights and the interests of 
public health; the balance between innovation and technology and its subsequent transfer; the mutual advantages 
of technological knowledge for producers and users; the balance between rights and obligations. 
190
 Idem. Also see China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no.1 ), pp. 11-12.  
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governments have proactively launched legislation for specific actions in pilot 
schemes. For example, in 2010, Qinghai province enacted the “Qinghai‟s 
Administrative Rules for Addressing Climate Change”.
191
 Subsequently, Shanxi 
province issued its own rules to overcome climate change, which constituted the 
second regional legislation in China.
192
 In a country as big as China, specific 
legislation at the regional level is much easier but not less important, particularly in 
the absence of a comprehensive act.  
 
With the increasingly mature legislative conditions, it is essential to draw up a 
Climate Change Act and this is now on the political agenda.
193
 A start has been made 
on a series of preparatory works including the title, nature and hierarchy of the 
proposed act.
194 
Based on these preliminary discussions, China is drafting a special 
law on climate change. 
195
 According to it, China has confirmed that the act would 
firmly adhere to the basic framework set up by the UNFCCC, at the same time as 




The Climate Change Act is intended to be an outline which consistently integrates the 
existing regulations, rules, standards and institutions for climate mitigation and 
adaptation.
197
 It will contain mandatory emission reduction limits to leverage China to 
take nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs).
198
 As a senior legislator 
stated, it is “a move that signals the country‟s proactive role in honouring its 
commitment to curtailing emissions, among other measures, in tackling climate 
change.”
199
 In addition, based on the example of existing regional legislation, 
governments are identified and strengthened as the principal enforcer of climate 
mitigation and adaptation. The new comprehensive act is highly likely to confirm this 
government role. In the meantime, prevention could be strengthened, for example, by 
introducing monitoring and early warning systems.
200
 Technological solutions are 
supposed to contribute to preventing the impact of climate change. China‟s top 
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 “China Enacts the First Regional Climate Chang Law,” 11 December 2010, available at 




 “Shanxi Province Has Released the Administrative Rules for Addressing Climate Change,” 29 August 2011, 
available at http://www.China5e.com/show.php?contentid=191355. 
193
 In China‟s 12th Five-Year Plan (from 2010 to 2015), climate change legislation has been incorporated as a 
crucial objective. “China Drafting Special Law on Climate Change: Official,” 27 April 2011, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/China/2011-04/27/c_13847244.htm. 
194 
More than 60 lawmakers and law experts from 16 countries and regions are participating in the Tianjin forum 
on climate change legislation, co-hosted by the National People‟s Congress and Global Legislators Organization 
for a Better Environment. 
195
 “China‟s Top Legislature Considers Draft Resolution on Climate Change,” 25 August 2009, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/25/content_11942360.htm. The relevant legislation is undertaken at 
China‟s top legislature National People‟s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. 
196
 “China Drafting Special Law on Climate Change: Official,” 2011, (no. 193). 
197
 Cao Mingde, “The Field Research on Technology Transfer in Addressing Climate Change and Its Implication 
for Chinese Legislation and Practices,” PhD Research Program, 2011. Prof. Cao Mingde is an environmental law 
professor of China University of Political Science and Law. His research areas focus on the circular economy, 
environmental tort, and energy law and climate change policy. Currently, he is in charge of the official research 
program on Chinese climate change legislation. 
198 
 More information on NAMAs is outlined in Ch.2.4.1. “The Bali Action Plan.”  
199
  “China Drafting Climate Change Law,” 8 November 2010, available at 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Energy/txt/2010-11/08/content_310266.htm. 
200
 See Li Jing, “Climate Change Law to Bring Teeth to Emissions Mandates,” China Daily, 2009, available at 
http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/China/2009-08/26/content_8617151.htm. It is attempting to encourage preparations 
for extreme weather and climate disasters. 
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legislative assembly has referred to the importance of speeding up R&D and 
promoting key technologies in energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean production 




The new act will certainly formulate some provisions on technology transfer, though 
it is likely that this will only be dealt with in a framework to share global technology 
to tackle climate change, like the 1992 UNFCCC. For example, it might enshrine 
principles like the common but differentiated responsibilities and international 




The long-awaited legislation on climate change will fill a significant gap in China‟s 
climate laws. Although a Climate Change Act does not yet add up to what is needed 
to avoid dangerous climate change,
203
 it will give China greater negotiating power in 
future post-Kyoto agreement talks.
204
 The act reflects a strong political will by 
mandating domestic emission reductions, which in turn reinforces the position of the 




5.2.1.2 Climate change-related legislation 
Many existing laws have a substantive effect on climate change and relevant 
technology transfer, though they are not created for climate reasons.
206
 In China there 
are four categories of legislation which are particularly related to climate mitigation 
and adaptation. They are constitutional law, environmental protection and pollution 
control laws, energy laws, and low carbon economy law.  
 
(1) Constitutional law 
The Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China is the highest law in China, which 
establishes an institutional foundation for all domestic activities including climate 




As regards the issue concerned here, the most fundamental provisions are contained in 
Article 9 and Article 26. Article 9
208
 defines the legal status of natural resources for 
the first time. This is advanced in that era, because the following economic surge in 
China may affect the situation of local natural resources dramatically.
209
 The article 
continues to play a guiding role in the current NAMAs. Article 29 achieves more by 
                                                 
201
 Idem. The interconnections between the low carbon economy and climate sound technology is recognized. 
Technology is seen as a new source of economic growth. 
202
 Cao 2011, (no. 197). The Climate Change Act may mention its position on rejecting trade protectionism in the 
field of climate change.   
203
 FCCC/SBI/2010/INF.4, Report on the Review and Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Implementation of 
Article 4, Para. 1(c) and 5, of the Convention, Article 67 (f), May 2010, pp.13-16. 
204
 Li 2009, (no. 200).  
205
 Zou 2011, (no. 124). Chinese negotiators can argue they have done their homework well in this case.  
206
 See Wang Shekun, “The Policies, Laws and Regulatory Regime for Climate Change in China,” Centre for 
Environment, Natural Resources & Energy Law, Tsinghua University, Seoul, Korea, 4 November 2010, p. 9.  
207
 The first Constitution was promulgated in 1954. After two interim versions enacted in 1975 and 1978, the 
current Constitution was promulgated in 1982. In China, only the highest body of the country, NPC has the 
authority to supervise its implementation and to make amendments to the Constitution. The current version was 
adopted by the 5th NPC on 4 December 1982 with further revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004 
208
 PRC Constitution, Article 9 states: “The State ensures the rational use of natural resources and protects rare 
animals and plants. The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any organization or individual by 
whatever means is prohibited.” 
209
 Soon after 1978, in the early1980s, an economic boom started in China under the policy of “Reform and Open”. 
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confirming environmental protection and pollution control as the duty of the State.
210
 
“After this significant turning point, the way was paved for further environmental 
protection legislation.”
211
 Concrete laws are being proactively drafted at both the 
sectoral and regional levels in accordance with the Constitution and superior 
legislation, and with the recognition and authority of the Constitution.  
 
Meanwhile the Constitution identifies science and technology as priority in China‟s 
modernization.
212
 Although the article was later revised to be in line with the various 
stages of development, 
213
 it has always recognised the role of technology. Based on 
this, Article 14, Article 19 and Article 20 go on to confirm and specify the ideal of 
strengthening the country with a strong knowledge base and, for example, the 
approaches to knowledge.
214
 Because the Constitution is open and flexible, these 
provisions are helpful in practice in understanding and interpreting the concrete 
legislation and its implementation. For example, in the context of climate change, 
governments are obliged to intensify their efforts to tackle climate change with 
scientific and technological solutions. 
 
On a related note, it is remarkable that the latest amendment to the Constitution 
admits the legitimacy of private property.
215
 Article 13 states: “(…) important 
political decisions towards certain individual rights that are indispensable for effective 
environmental protection have recently been made by incorporating the guarantee of 
private property into the constitution.‟
216
 The significance of the amendment to 
Article 13 for international trade and investment is enormous. Once their identity has 
been legally confirmed, technology owners are at least faced with fewer uncertainties 
when they make their ESTs available to secondary markets.
217
 International investors 
are reluctant to contribute their advanced technologies to China, unless their interests 
                                                 
210
 PRC Constitution, Article 26 states: “The State protects and improves the living environment and the 
ecological environment and prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.” 
211
 Beyer 2006, (no. 39), p. 192. Environmental protection provisions in this version were actually the result of 
amendments to the first Constitution in 1978.  
212
 PRC Constitution, the seventh paragraph of the Preamble. The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to 
concentrate its efforts on socialist modernization. 
213
 Amendment 2 of the 1982 Constitution was approved on 29 March 1993, by the 8th NPC at its 1st Session. The 
most important change is the establishment of the constitutional status of Mao Zedong‟s thoughts. Amendment 3 of 
the 1982 Constitution was approved on 15 March 1999, by the 9th NPC at its 2nd Session. This amendment 
identified the Deng Xiaoping Theory as another basic guideline. The latest Amendment 4 was approved on 14 
March 2004, by the 10th NPC at its 2nd Session 
214
 These technology-related provisions have direct effects on China‟s technology legislation, and also influence 
the associated technology cycle between the national and international markets. Article 14 of the PRC Constitution 
states: “The state continuously raises labour productivity, improves economic results and develops the productive 
forces by enhancing the enthusiasm of the working people, raising the level of their technical skill, disseminating 
advanced science and technology, improving the systems of economic administration and enterprise operation and 
management, instituting the socialist system of responsibility in various forms and improving organization of work. 
The state practices strict economy and combats waste...” Article 19 states: “The state develops socialist educational 
undertakings and works to raise the scientific and cultural level of the whole nation…” Article 20 states: “The state 
promotes the development of the natural and social sciences, disseminates scientific and technical knowledge, and 
commends and rewards achievements in scientific research as well as technological discoveries and inventions.” 
215
 Amendment 4 of the amended Article 13, which originally stated: “The State protects the right of citizens to 
own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property… and The State protects according to law 
the right of citizens to inherit private property” to “Citizens‟ lawful private property is inviolable… The State, in 
accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance…The State may, in the 
public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and shall make 
compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.” 
216
 Beyer 2006, (no. 39), p. 211. 
217
 Nie 2011, (no. 131). 
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are guaranteed. In China, private property was traditionally seen as an integral part of 
the national assets and might have been nationalized in certain circumstances.
218
 In 
2007, the National People‟s Congress (NPC) approved the new Property Rights Law. 
This strengthens the legal protection for privately owned land, representing China‟s 
first comprehensive national framework for the protection of property.  “The new law 
creates a registration system for real property ownership and transfer, provides a 
mechanism for creating securities over property and sets out clearer provisions for the 




(2) Environmentally related legislation 
In general, technologies which meet environmental standards are climate friendly. 
Laws for the protection of the environment therefore contribute to achieving climate 
justice to some extent.
220
 However, can these laws be directly applied to climate 
change conditions which are different from those that prevailed when they were 
drafted? The following will attempt to explore some critical environmental legislation 
from this perspective.  
 
Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
In Chinese environmental law the enactment of the Environmental Protection Law 
was a landmark.
221
 The law provides guidelines to protect all sorts of environmental 
elements and establish national standards. Article 2 defines the term “environment”, 
encompassing the atmosphere and most other elements of the ecosystem that coexist 
with the climate system.
222
 Today there is clear evidence that climate change presents 
new threats by contributing to the disruption of the ecological processes which are 
essential to the entire climate system.
223
 This law aims to safeguard them from these 
threats.  
 
The Environmental Protection Law also aims to prevent and control pollution and 
other public hazards.
224
 Pollution and public hazards directly or indirectly caused by 
GHG emissions will be tackled locally. Many of the articles require the government to 
manage and monitor pollutants. The liability of the private sector is identified on this 
basis.
225
 It is subject to general requirements including, for example, environmental 
impact assessments,
226
 and the registration of discharges.
227
 There are sanctions and 
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 Ueno 2009, (no. 82), pp. 7-9. 
219
 RELaw Assist Issues Paper, “Renewable Energy Law in China,” 567299v2/SYDDMS/LMT, 2007, p. 68.  
220
 Wang 2011, (no. 108). 
221
 “The Environmental Protection Law of the People‟s Republic of China,”26 December 1989, available at  
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109928.htm. The 
Environmental Protection Law was adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh 
National People‟s Congress on December 26, 1989, promulgated by Order No. 22 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China on December 26, 1989 and entered into effect on the date of promulgation. 
222
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 2 states: “Environment” as used in this Law refers to the total body 
of all natural elements and artificially transformed natural elements affecting human existence and development, 
which includes the atmosphere, water, seas, land, minerals, forests, grasslands, wildlife, natural and human 
remains, nature reserves, historic sites and scenic spots, and urban and rural areas. 
223
 China Initial National Communication on Climate Change 2004, (no. 4), pp. 2-7. Also see IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policy Makers, 2007. 
224
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 1. 
225
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 6 states: “All units and individuals shall have the obligation to 
protect the environment and shall have the right to report on or file charges against units or individuals that cause 
pollution or damage to the environment.”  
226
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 27 states: “Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants must 
report to and register with the relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions of the competent department 
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rewards for the units and individuals which discharge pollutants, and these are 




The general provisions of the Environmental Protection Law include technology 
clauses.
229
 The law has incorporated the pro-technology requirement of the 
Constitution in the specific field of environmental protection. For instance, it sets 
forth environmental standards for technological products.
230
 The technology to be 
applied must support the conservation of resources and energy efficiency, which also 
reflects the principle of best available technology under the multinational 
environmental agreements (MEAs).
231
 According to this requirement, enterprises in 
China must upgrade technologies and optimize production lines, either with internal 
innovation or external importation. Importing technology or a facility that fails to 
meet the requirements that are specified will have legal consequences: a warning 
and/or a fine.
232
 The domestic enterprises concerned will be responsible for observing 
the legal requirements of technology importation at the national level. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
of environmental protection administration under the State Council.” 
227
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 12 states: “The competent departments of environmental 
protection administration of the People's governments at or above the county level shall, in conjunction with 
relevant departments, make an investigation and an assessment of the environmental situation within areas under 
their jurisdiction, draw up plans for environmental protection which shall, subject to overall balancing by the 
department of planning, be submitted to the People's government at the same level for approval before 
implementation.” 
228
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 8states: “The People's government shall give awards to units and 
individuals that have made outstanding achievements in protecting and improving the environment.” Sanctions 
will be imposed in accordance with Article 28 and Article 39. Dischargers not only need to pay excess fees but 
must also eliminate the damage. Specifically, Article 28 states: “Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants 
in excess of the prescribed national or local discharge standards shall pay a fee for excessive discharge according 
to state provisions and shall assume responsibility for eliminating and controlling the pollution. The provisions of 
the Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution shall be complied with where they are applicable.” Article 
39 states: “An enterprise or institution that has failed to eliminate or control pollution by the deadline as required 
shall, as provided for by the state, pay a fee for excessive discharge; in addition, a fine may be imposed on it on the 
basis of the damage incurred, or the enterprise or institution may be ordered to suspend its operations or close 
down.” 
229
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 4states: “The plans for environmental protection formulated by the 
state must be incorporated into the national economic and social development plans; the state shall adopt economic 
and technological policies and measures favorable for environmental protection so as to coordinate the work of 
environmental protection with economic construction and social development.” Article 5 states: “The state shall 
encourage the development of education in the science of environmental protection, strengthen the study and 
development of the science and technology of environmental protection, raise the scientific and technological level 
of environmental protection and popularize scientific knowledge of environmental protection.” 
230
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 25 states: “For the technological transformation of newly-built 
industrial enterprises and existing industrial enterprises, facilities and processes that effect a high rate of the 
utilization of resources and a low rate of the discharge of pollutants shall be used, along with economical and 
rational technology for the comprehensive utilization of waste materials and the treatment of pollutants.” 
231
 Jonathan Verschuuren, Principles of Environmental Law, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 2003, p. 58. 
For instance, the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollution, Article 6 states: “Parties 
undertake to develop control measures compatible with balanced development, in particular by using the best 
available technology which is economically feasible.” In this case, China‟s Environmental Protection Law appears 
to be a weaker version.  
232
 PRC Environmental Protection Law, Article 30 states: “A ban shall be imposed on the importation of any 
technology or facility that fails to meet the requirements specified in the regulations of our country concerning 
environmental protection.”  
Article 35 states: “Any violator of this Law shall, according to the circumstances of the case, be warned or fined 
by the competent department of environmental protection administration or another department invested by law 
with power to conduct environmental supervision and management for any of the following acts:...(4) importing 
technology or a facility that fails to meet the requirements specified in the state provisions concerning 
environmental protection; or (5) transferring a production facility that causes severe pollution for use by a unit that 




The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s Republic of China 
China has gradually become central for the supply chain of the world economy and is 
also promoting a modernized lifestyle domestically.
233
 In practice this leads to heavy 
industrial, municipal discharges. To support the national anti-pollution goals, China 
has enacted a range of legislation under the overarching framework of Environmental 
Protection Law.
234
 In the context of climate change, the anti-pollution goals 
concerned mainly relate to the atmosphere. The IPCC states: “(…) future climate 
change may cause significant air quality degradation by changing the dispersion rate 
of pollutants; the chemical environment for ozone and particle pollution generation; 
and the strength of emissions from the biosphere, fires, and dust.” 
235
 Air pollution 
and climate change policies can be therefore be developed on the basis of an 
integrated approach. 
 
Air pollution is a very serious issue in China and a major threat to public health.
236
 
The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law was adopted in 1987 as an institutional 
solution.
237
 In the first instance, this established a broad but general framework for 
regulating air pollution. Because of the lack of effective measures in the initial version, 
this law had only a minor impact on the deteriorating environment in China. 
Consequently, it was substantially revised in 1995 and 2000. Very recently, China 
made a new amendment to the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law to 






Following the general routine of legislation, the Chinese Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law starts by describing the policies on which it is based, as well as the 
responsibilities of various government actors in its general provisions.
239
 The law has 
not yet defined what is meant by atmospheric pollutants. Instead, it categorizes three 
major sources of cause air pollution: coal combustion, motor-driven vehicles and 
other industrial discharges.
240
 For each of these, there are limitations on the 
concentration of emissions, the amount of emission and administrative sanctions.
241
 
                                                 
233
 See GreenBiz Staff, “Chinese Anti-Pollution Laws Still Being Ignored,” 19 October 2009, available at 
http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2009/10/19/chinese-anti-pollution-laws-still-being-ignored-report-finds?page=full. 
234
 Therefore three laws were enacted: the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, the Solid Waste Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law, and the Noise Pollution Prevention and Control Law.  
235
 IPCC Report 2007, WGIII, Ch.7.1.3, “Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate.” 
236
 In China, the concentration of airborne particulates is two to five times the maximum level deemed acceptable 
by the World Health Organization. For instance, China has the world‟s highest number of deaths attributed to air 
pollution. The Chinese government has calculated that if the air quality in 210 medium and large cities were to be 
improved from “polluted” to “good” levels 178,000 lives could be saved. See Jeffrey Hays, “Air Pollution in 
China,” July 2011, available at http://factsanddetails.com/China.php?itemid=392&catid=10&subcatid=66#99. 
237 
The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People‟s Republic of China was adopted at the 22nd 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on 5 September 1987. Throughout the 
1980s China also enacted numerous regulations and decisions relating to environmental matters, including air 
pollution. 
238
 “Air Quality Management in China: Backgrounder for Air Regulators‟ Study Tour,” 19 May 2011, available at 
http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_AQMinChinaOverview_2011_05_19.pdf. 
239
 There is, for instance, PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Chapter I General Provisions. 
240
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Ch. III, Ch. IV and Ch. V. 
241
 For instance, Article 17 provides a system of collecting fees generally based on the categories and quantities of 
the atmospheric pollutants discharged. PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 14 states: “The 
State implements a system of collecting fees for discharging pollutants on the basis of the categories and quantities 
of the atmospheric pollutants discharged, and establishing reasonable standards for collecting the fees therefore 
according to the needs of strengthening prevention and control of atmospheric pollution and the State's economic 
and technological conditions.  
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However, in the current context, GHG or carbon dioxide (CO2) are not included in the 
definition of atmospheric pollutants. According to the relevant interpretation, 
atmospheric pollutants refer to “the introduction into the atmosphere of chemicals, 
particulate matter, or biological material that are harmful to humans or other living 
organisms and damaging the environment.”
242
 As indicated, air pollution refers to the 
discharge of substances which have an adverse impact and were not, or only rarely 
present in the atmosphere originally. However, this does not apply to CO2, which is an 
important component in the air.
243
  Up to now, the legal status of CO2 in China has 
been that of a substance with an impact on the atmosphere (atmospheric impact 
substance) in that it has led to global warming, though it does not necessarily 
constitute air pollution. In fact, the current amendment to the Air Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law intends to introduce a normative definition of atmospheric pollutants. 
There are already appeals to follow the approach of the recently revised Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Law, which excludes GHG from the category of 
ordinary pollutants.
244
 As regards these appeals, economic incentives are more 
appropriate and acceptable for reducing the emission of GHG than any regulatory 





In this respect, the Chinese Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law mainly 
contributes to local climate mitigation by reducing coal combustion.
246
 In practice, 
this can be achieved by switching to other fuels or by replacing small units with larger 
ones.
247
 Similarly, the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law is trying to reduce 
the emissions from motorised vehicles, waste gas and dust, to tackle climate 
change.
248
 It has established national environmental standards for air quality and 
pollutants, e.g., for coal production, acid rain and related matters.
249
 For example, 
there is a strategy to cap the total amount of emissions that pollute the air.
250
 
                                                                                                                                            
The standards provided by the State shall be observed in the collection of fees for the discharge of pollutants, the 
concrete measures therefore and the State Council shall enact the implementing procedures.  
The fees collected for the discharge of pollutants shall all be turned over to the Treasury and shall be used for the 
prevention and control of atmospheric pollution as prescribed by the State Council and may not be 
misappropriated. The auditing authorities shall exercise supervision through auditing according to law.” 
242
 See Jerry Coffey, “Atmospheric Pollution”, 1 December 2010,avaible at  
http://www.universetoday.com/81792/atmospheric-pollution/ 
243
 See Chang Jiwen, “On the Control of Carbon Dioxide Discharge and Revision of the Air Pollution Control Act,” 
Law Journal Issue 5, China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House, 2009, p. 75. 
244
 See Idem, p. 76. The PRC Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law was revised in 2008. In Article 60 (1), 
water pollution is defined as “the introduction into a water body of any substance which alters the chemical, 
physical, biological or radioactive properties of the water in such a way as to affect its effective use, endanger 
human health, damage the ecosystem or be deleterious to water quality.” 
245
 Idem. There is also a resolution for this: to change the name of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law to 
the Air Protection Law, which incorporates measures addressing atmospheric impact in the control of air pollution. 
CO2 emission reduction is therefore included in the measures aimed at tackling the atmospheric impact. 
246
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Ch. III Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution by the 
Burning of Coal. 
247
 Teng and Gu 2007, (no. 8), p. 4.  
248
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Ch. IV and Ch.V. 
249
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 6. 
250
 The concept of Total Emissions Control was first introduced in the Ninth Five-year Plan in 1996, which reflects 
a shift of the focus of regulatory attention from emission rates to total emissions. Finally, in April 2000, the 
People‟s Congress adopted sweeping changes to the 1987 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPCL) to 




Reflecting the principle of prevention, this strategy has been widely applied to control 




From the perspective of polluters, the relevant standards that have been prescribed are 
known as the emission permits.
252
 Once they have obtained a licence, they are 
authorized to emit the amount stipulated in the permit. In fact, establishing this right is 
a fundamental condition of market measures such as emissions trading, which 
clarifies rights related to poverty.
253
 Unfortunately, the current Air Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law has not yet formulated emissions trading.
254
 Also, 
emission permits serve as a benchmark for establishing legal liability. It imposes a 
range of sanctions on non-compliant individuals and units, including fines up to RMB 




Technology is another important element in the revised Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law. Article 8 was essentially rewritten in 1995, requiring the application of 
economic and technological measures to control air pollution.
256
 China promotes and 
supports the innovation, dissemination, utilization and consumption of clean 
technologies in the industries concerned, such as coal washing.
257
 In the light of the 
                                                 
251
 Although current research shows that SO2 emission reductions could actually cause increased global warming, 
the total control of SO2 serves as a policy instrument for CO2 emission reduction. “SO2 Emission Reductions May 
Increase Global Warming,” 9 July 1999, available at http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=1404. 
252
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 15 states: “The enterprises and institutions obliged to 
control their total emissions of air pollutants must emit their pollutants according to the checked and approved 
standards for the total emissions of major air pollutants and the conditions of emission provided by the license.” 
253
 According to Article 8, the state encourages and supports the application of economic measures for addressing 
domestic air pollution. 
254
  Despite this limitation, practices in piloting SO2 emissions trading in China are being proactively undertaken. 
Since 1994, SEPA has conducted policy experiments in air pollutant emissions trading in six cities (Baotou, 
Kaiyuan, Liuzhou, Taiyuan, Pingdingshan and Guiyang) on the basis of air pollutant emission permit pilots in 16 
cities. In 1999, SEPA and the US EPA began to cooperate on a study to assess the feasibility of introducing 
SO2emissions trading in China. In order to gain more experience and facilitate the nationwide promotion of 
emissions trading, SEPA organized pilots in seven provinces in 2002. However, whether the proposed amendment 
creates such a program remains unclear. 
255
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Ch.VI, Legal Liability. Article 48 states: “Whoever, in 
violation of the provisions of this Law, discharges pollutants to the atmosphere in excess of the national or local 
discharge standards shall make treatment thereof within a time limit, and shall also be imposed [upon] a fine of not 
less than 10,000 Yuan but not more than 100,000 Yuan by the administrative department of environmental 
protection under the local people's government at or above the county level. The power to decide on the treatment 
within a time limit and the administrative penalty for violation of the requirements for treatment within a time limit 
shall be prescribed by the State Council.”  
Article 50 states: “Whoever, in violation of the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 24 of this Law, mines 
coal with toxic or harmful substances, such as radioactive and arsenic, that exceed the prescribed limits, shall be 
ordered to close down by the people's government at or above the county level according to the limits of authority 
prescribed by the State Council.”   
Article 61 states: “An enterprise or institution which causes an atmospheric pollution accident through violation of 
this Law shall be fined less than fifty percent of the direct economic losses thus caused but not more than 500,000 
Yuan to the maximum level. Fines shall be administered by the competent administrative department of 
environmental protection under the local people's government at or above the county level on the basis of the 
damages incurred. In serious circumstances, those in charge who are directly responsible and others who are 
directly responsible shall be subject to administrative sanctions according to law. Sanctions shall be administered 
by the unit to which they belong or by a higher competent authority. Should a serious atmospheric pollution 
accident occur that leads to any grave consequences of heavy public or private property losses or serious personal 
injuries or deaths, and if the act constitutes a crime, the criminal liability shall be investigated in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 338 of the Criminal Law.”  
256
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 8 states: “The State adopts economic and technological 
policies and measures to facilitate the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution and comprehensive 
utilization...”  
257
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 9 states: “The State encourages and supports the 
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above-mentioned standards, new mines must use clean coal or install technologies 
designed to reduce emissions, while established mines must replace or phase out 
obsolete technologies within a specific period.
258
 To streamline this process, the 
relevant government departments under the State Council issued details of 
technologies and facilities that seriously pollute the atmosphere.
259
 Enterprises which 
engage in importing, using and transferring these technologies must rectify the 
situation, suspend operation or close down.
260
 Attention was devoted to the origin of 
technologies in the legal statutes and Article 49 broadly applies to any domestic 
enterprises involved in the importation of obsolete technologies. However, it is 




(3) Energy-related legislation 
Soaring energy consumption in China leads to high carbon emissions.
262
 The 
government is aware that there is an essential link between energy and climate 
change.
263
 This has led to an active legal construction: a series of basic laws for 




                                                                                                                                            
scientific and technological research into the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution, disseminates 
advanced, feasible technologies for the prevention and control of atmospheric pollution…;” Article 26 states: “The 
State adopts economic and technical policies and measures conducive to the clean utilization of coal, encourages 
and supports the consumption of fine coal of low-sulfur or low-ash, and encourages and supports the development 
and popularization of the technology of coal cleaning.‟  
258
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 24: “The State promotes the method of dressing coal by 
washing for the purpose of reducing the sulfur and ash in coal, and restricts the mining of high-sulfur or high-ash 
coal. If the coal mined from a newly-built coal mine is of high-sulfur or high-ash, supporting facilities for the 
dressing of coal by washing shall be installed to make the sulfur and ash in coal fall within the prescribed limits…” 
259
 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 19 states: “Enterprises shall give priority to the 
adoption of clean production techniques that are instrumental to high efficient use of energy and to reducing the 
discharge of pollutants so as to decrease the generation of atmospheric pollutants. The State shall eliminate 
backward production techniques and equipment that seriously pollutes the atmospheric environment. The 
competent department for comprehensive economic and trade affairs under the State Council, in conjunction with 
other relevant departments under the State Council, shall publish a catalog of the techniques which seriously 
pollute the atmospheric environment, ones that shall be prohibited from use within a time limit. It shall also 
catalog the equipment which seriously pollutes the atmospheric environment and which shall be prohibited from 
production, sale, import and use within a time limit…”  
260 PRC Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Article 49 states: “Whoever, in violation of the provisions of 
Article 19 of this Law, produces, sells, imports or uses the equipment that is prohibited to produce, sell, import or 
use or employs the techniques that are prohibited to employ shall be ordered to make rectification by the 
competent department for comprehensive economic and trade affairs of the people's government at or above the 
county level; if the circumstances are serious, the said competent department shall put forward suggestions thereon 
and submit them to the people's government at the corresponding level, which shall, according to the limit of 
authority prescribed by the State Council, order the offender to suspend operation or close down. Whoever 
transfers obsolete equipment to another person for use, the illegal earnings therefrom of the transferor shall be 
confiscated by the administrative department of environmental protection under the local people's government at 
or above the county level or any of the competent departments exercising the power of supervision and 
management. This will be in accordance with the law in the place where the transferor is located, and a fine of not 
more than twice the illegal earnings shall be imposed concurrently.”  
261
 Idem. It states that administrative or judicial procedures “will be in accordance with the law in the place where 
the transferor is located.” 
262
 “China Is the World‟s First Largest Energy Consumer beyond the United States,” China Online, 12 May 2010, 
available at http://www.cn1n.com/economy/resources/20100512/21889640.htm. 
263
 China Initial National Communication on Climate Change 2004, (no. 4),  p. 11. 
264
 Annual Report on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change: the Progress Report 2009, 
National Development and Reform Commission, November, 2009. The corresponding special or auxiliary 
regulations are, for instance, the Regulations on Energy Conservation for Buildings, Administrative Measures for 




So far, the existing energy legislation has focused on specific sectors.
265
 Nevertheless, 
the domestic energy challenge is based on the systemic conditions that go beyond any 
energy sector per se, and the lack of a comprehensive act is causing increasing 
problems.
266
 The Energy Act was drafted in this context and is currently being revised 
as a legislative target of the 12
th
 Energy Five-Year Plan.
267
 As indicated in the draft, 
which was opened for public consultation, the act intends to increase government 
control.
268
 The emphasis is on the issues common to all the energy sectors and on the 
coordination of an energy analysis with the broader policy agenda on macro and 
external imbalances.
269
 The Act will have a wide-ranging impact on all the 
participants of China‟s energy market. 
 
On the basis of the research question of this PhD, we will focus on the existing 
Energy Conservation Law and the Renewable Energy Law. 
 
Energy Conservation Law of the People’s Republic of China 
The promulgation of the Energy Conservation Law was a remarkable step towards a 
low carbon economy in the last century for China.
270
 In order to achieve the new 
targets set by the five-year plans, the Energy Conservation Law has been 
progressively revised.
271
   
 
The Energy Conservation Law is based on China‟s energy development strategy. This 
consists of trying to conserve energy and exploit energy simultaneously, with priority 
for conservation.
272
 It is establishing an energy conservation administration system for 
both the government and projects.
273
 Quantitative standards have been drawn up for 
                                                 
265
 China enacted the Electricity Law in 1995 and the Law on Coal Industry in 1996.  
266
 See Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser, “China Energy, A Guide for the Perplexed, China Balance Sheet,” 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007, p .5. 
267
 “Discussion Paper on Energy Law Seeks for Experts Opinions,” 12 November 2009, available at  
http://www.linksChina.com/eN/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77:-discussion-paper-of-
energy-law-seeks-for-experts-opinions&catid=7:alternative-energy&Itemid=10. Also See “China‟s Energy Law & 
12th Energy Five Year Plan,” 6 February 2009, available at 
http://www.Chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/02/06/Chinas-energy-law-12th-energy-five-year-plan/. To date, the 
Act has been now been incorporated in the legislative target for the 12th Energy Five-Year Plan. This states that 
China‟s priorities in the 12th Energy Five Year Plan will be: first, to develop nuclear power, second, to develop 
wind power and third, to develop hydro power.  Coal will, of course, remain the primary energy source for China 
for some time to come. Key energy and climate targets in the 12th Five-Year Plan are as follows: from 2010 levels, 
(1) increase the proportion of non-fossil fuels in energy consumption to 11.4 per cent by 2015; (2) reduce energy 
consumption per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 16 per cent from the 2010 levels by 2015; (3) reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 17 per cent from the 2010 levels by 2015. 
268
 See A. van Pabst, “Clean Coal Technology in China: A Strategy for the Netherlands,” University of Twente, 
NIKOS International Management Program, 2009, p. 41. In our opinion, the Act should focus on the government‟s 
controls on energy, rather than continuing to create an open and competitive energy market. 
269
 Rosen and Houser 2007, (no. 266), p. 5. For instance, energy strategy, energy development plan, energy 
industry management, energy structural improvement, energy conservation, environmental protection in the energy 
sector, promotion of renewable energy, energy reserve, and energy emergency. Zhao Xiaoguang, a division director 
of the Legislative Affairs Office under the State Council, said that the establishment of this law will bridge an 
existing gap in energy law, solve the problems that are difficult for the existing law to settle or settle well. 
270
 The Energy Conservation Law of the People‟ s Republic of China which was adopted at the 28th Meeting of 
the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People‟s Congress on 1 November 1997 has now been 
promulgated.  
271
 The revised Energy Conservation Law was officially implemented on 1 April 2008. China set a target of a 20% 
reduction in energy intensity for 2006-2010. 
272
 NDRC, “Energy Conservation Policies and Measures of China,” 2008,  available at  
http://www.asiaeec-col.eccj.or.jp/st-takes/pdf/chi/China_eng.pdf. 
273
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Chapter II Energy Conservation Administration. For example, there is an 
energy conservation target and responsibility for regional government; for investment projects, the law introduces 
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energy-consuming products/equipment on this basis. For products and equipment 
which use a lot of energy, there is a compulsory energy consumption limit.
274
 Energy-
inefficient and obsolete industrial facilities and technologies must be phased out 
within a specific period and power plants must be closed down. To ensure that the law 
is implemented, there is a system of accountability for energy conservation targets 
which consists of evaluating the performances of the government or “other 




Technology has been recognised as a driving force for enhancing energy efficiency 
and exploring alternative energies.
276
 There is a separate chapter devoted to 
technological solutions; the text covers 10 of the 49 provisions.
277
 This charter states 
that China will promote the popularization of energy conservation technologies at the 
domestic level.
278
 Governments are required to draw up a catalogue of technologies, 
and provide guidelines for enterprises to implement new large-scale technologies.
279
 
Central government then undertook a “Program on Energy Saving Technology 
Policies”.
280
 Rural areas, agriculture and the renewable energy sectors were identified 
as a priority for potential technology needs.
281
 In addition, the revised Energy 
Conservation Law supports incentives.
282
 For example, regional governments must 
                                                                                                                                            
energy conservation assessments and an examination system.  
274
 Seven appliances were implemented in 2008, including variable-speed air conditioners, multi-connected air 
conditioners, electric water heaters, household induction cookers, computer monitors and copiers. NDRC 2008 (no. 
272), p. 1. 
275
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Chapter II. 
276
 China Initial National Communication on Climate Change 2004, (no. 4), p. 11. 
277
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Ch. IV, Technological Progress in Energy Conservation. 
278
 According to the charter, the state prioritizes energy conservation technologies, guides the research, 
development, popularization and application of energy conservation technologies. 
279
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 58 states: “The energy conservation administrative department under 
the State Council shall, jointly with the departments concerned under the State Council, formulate and publicize 
the popularization catalogue of energy conservation technologies and products, and guide energy consuming 
entities and individuals to adopt advanced technologies and products of energy conservation.” 
280
 Fei and Gu 2007, (no. 8), p. 5. This programme was conducted concurrently with the amendment of the Energy 
Conservation Law. 
281
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 59 states: “People‟s governments at or above the county level shall, in 
accordance with the principles of suitability to local conditions, provision of multiple forms of energy to 
complement each other, comprehensive utilization and stress on benefits, strengthen the energy conservation work 
in agriculture and rural areas, and increase the capital investment in the popularization and application of energy 
conservation technologies and products in agriculture and rural areas. The agriculture, science and technology and 
other administrative departments shall support and popularize the application of energy conservation technologies 
and products in agricultural production, processing, storage and transport of agricultural products, and encourage 
the upgrading and elimination of highly energy consuming agricultural machinery and fishing ships. The State 
encourages and supports vigorous development of marsh gas, and popularizes biomass, solar power, wind power 
and other renewable energy in rural areas, develops small-scale water power generation, popularizes energy saving 
rural houses and stoves, etc., encourages the use of energy plants grown on non-arable land, and vigorously 
develops firewood forests and other energy forests according to the principle of scientific planning and orderly 
development.” 
282 The newly revised law adds a chapter on incentive measures and incorporates some technology provisions in 
this chapter. The 1997 Energy Conservation Law contains 10 clauses. After the revision, there are five clauses in 
the chapter on technology progress, and another five clauses were moved to the newly introduced chapter on 
incentive measures. PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 66 states: “The State implements the price policy good 
for energy conservation, and guides energy consuming entities and individuals to conserve energy. The State 
adopts finance, tax, price and other policies to support the popularization of power demand side management, 
contract energy management, voluntary energy conservation agreement and other energy conservation measures. 
The State implements the systems of peak-valley TOU power price, seasonal power price and interruptible load 
power price, encourages power users to rationally adjust power load; and implements differential power price 
policies of elimination, restriction, permission and encouragement to the enterprises of iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals, building materials, chemicals and other major energy-consuming industries.‟ Article 65 states: „The State 
guides financial institutions to increase the credit support to energy conservation projects, and offer preferential 
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arrange particular capital constructions to strengthen the motivation for policies.
283
 In 
fact, many regional governments, such as the government of Shanghai have 
established special energy conservation funds.
284
 “Priority of fund use is given to 
supporting the technical transformation projects for energy conservation and emission 
reduction with remarkable effects and popularization significance through 




Article 63 of the Energy Conservation Law contains a specific provision on 
international technology transfer: 
“The State uses tax and other policies to encourage the import of 
advanced energy conservation technologies and equipment and to 
control the export of highly energy-consuming and products which 
are seriously polluting during the production process.”
286
 
This provision is considered to establish the legal foundation for the state to enable 
domestic policy and law environment, particularly for technology transfer, in 
accordance with the international climate framework.
287
 Governments are required to 
take favourable measures to facilitate the import of energy conservation technologies. 
As one aspect of an enabling environment, the Energy Conservation Law encourages 
governments to expand the scope of services to information sharing centres and trade 
platforms for energy conservation.
288
 These organizations are expected to broaden the 
knowledge base or at least to set out the conditions for application.   
 
The Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China 
In China‟s energy landscape, the widespread development of renewable energies is 
not an alternative but a necessary policy.
289
 The Renewable Energy Law is an 
                                                                                                                                            
loans to qualified projects for research and development of energy conservation technologies, production of energy 
conservation products and transformation of energy conservation technologies, etc. The State encourages and 
guides relevant social sectors to increase monetary investment in energy conservation and accelerate technological 
transformation of energy conservation.” 
283
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 60 states: “The central finance and the provincial local finance shall 
arrange special energy conservation funds to support the research and development of energy conservation 
technologies, demonstration and popularization of energy conservation technologies and products, implementation 
of key energy conservation projects, publicity and training of energy conservation, information service, prizes and 
awards, etc.” 
284
 Municipal Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal Finance Bureau, “Notice of the General 
Office of Shanghai Municipal People‟s Government on Transmitting the Procedures of Shanghai Municipality on 





PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 63. 
287
 For example, China began to amend its trade policies, such as tariffs and value added tax, in favour of foreign 
transferors. More details will follow in Ch. 5.2.2, “Technology Transfer in Economic Laws.” 
288
 PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 23 states: “(…) the state encourages trade associations 
in…popularization of energy conservation technologies …and information consultancy, etc.” According to this 
article, these agencies could popularize energy conservation knowledge, provide training in energy conservation 
technologies, and provide information on energy conservation. PRC Energy Conservation Law, Article 22 states: 
“The State encourages the development of energy conservation service agencies, and supports energy conservation 
service agencies in their provision of consultancy, design, evaluation, detection, audit and authentication and other 
services. The State supports agencies in their popularization of energy conservation knowledge and the training of 
energy conservation technologies, and their provision of energy conservation information, energy conservation 
demonstration and other energy conservation services for public welfare.” 
289
 China’s National Climate Change Program 2007, (no. 1), p. 10. 
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important driving force to increase the local renewable energy capacity.
290
 It was 
originally adopted in 2006, and just one week after the Copenhagen Summit the 
Chinese highest legal authorities passed the relevant amendments.  
 
The Renewable Energy Law is a groundbreaking law which establishes a uniform 
framework for renewable energy in different sectors.
291
 The central government‟s 
oversight of renewable energy planning and development at all levels of province, 
autonomous region and municipality is strengthened.
292
 In content, the Renewable 
Energy Law refers to the Energy Conservation Law on many points, such as the total 
target,
293
 special government fund,
294
 incentives and liabilities.
295
 Moreover, it puts 
pressure on the management of the renewable energy market. For example, it 
introduces advantageous price fixing with a guaranteed power price for generators, 
linking to a purchase obligation on utilities aimed at stimulating market 
development.
296
 Separate pricing laws apply for each type of renewable energy and so 
far wind, solar and biomass prices have been determined.
297
 The energy pricing policy 
provides an insight into the choice of specific technologies. For example, if the price 
of a feed-in tariff is too low, only inexperienced developers would undertake 
renewable energy projects in China.
298
 This means that China could miss out on the 
benefits of technology transfer from experienced operators.  
 
China is gradually developing as an important emerging market for renewable 
technology. The Renewable Energy Law confirms this. The law appeals for consistent 
support for technology, and this has prompted the government to issue a number of 
                                                 
290
 PRC Renewable Energy Law was approved by the Standing Committee of the National People‟s Congress 
(NPC) of the People's Republic of China in the 14th Session on 28 February 2005. The law aims to boost China‟s 
renewable energy capacity to 8% by 2005, in which renewable energy provides 16% of the total electricity output. 
This is expected to more than double by 2020. See Bill Hare, “China‟s Renewable Energy Law and the Challenge 
of New Green Technology,” 26 February 2009, available at http://www.opednews.com/articles/China-s-
Renewable-Energy-L-by-Bill-Hare-090225-105.html. 
291
 In this law, renewable energy refers to non-fossil fuel energy, such as wind energy, solar energy, water energy, 
biomass energy, geothermal energy, and ocean energy, etc. Article 2 of the PRC Renewable Energy Law.  
292
 PRC Renewable Energy Law, Ch. I, General; Ch. II, “Resource Survey and Development Plan”. 
293
 PRC Renewable Energy Law, Article 7states: “The energy authorities of the State Council set middle and long-
term targets for the total volume for the development and utilization of renewable energy at the national level, 
which shall be implemented and released to the public after being approved by the State Council. The energy 
authorities of the State Council shall, on the basis of the target of total volume in the previous paragraph, as well as 
the economic development and actual situation of renewable energy resources of all provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities, cooperate with the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities in establishing middle and long-term targets and release them to the public.” 
294
 A special government fund that finances renewable energy R&D and deployment as part of the 2005 law has 
been consolidated. Previously, the fund was collecting a 0.4 fen/kWh (0.06 US cents/kWh) surcharge on electric 
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 The law particularly emphasises independent domestic 
innovation, while relatively little attention is devoted to international technology 
transfer. The technology provisions contain hardly any references to the “import”, 
“international cooperation” as the Energy Conservation Law does. This is not to say, 
however, that technology transfer is not important in the Chinese renewable energy 
landscape. Taking wind power as an example, 95% of large-scale wind turbines 
(including components) currently being installed in China are imported.
300
 To date, 





In conclusion, China‟s National Climate Change Program has identified national 
technology needs in which technologies related to energy conservation and renewable 
energy are dominant.
302
 This makes energy-related legislation significant in practice. 
First, although the primary objective of energy laws is to promote the rational use of 
energy and improve the quality of the environment, the measures concerned have in 
practice resulted in reductions in GHG as a positive side effect. Secondly, the Chinese 
energy and relevant technology market presents a paradox, particularly in renewable 
energy. Basically, China aims to meet energy needs independently with local 
production and its own innovation capacity. However, the growing urgency to 
mitigate climate change requires not only internal growth, but also external supply. 
The existing energy laws provide inadequate support in this respect. Thirdly, although 
both the Energy Conservation Law and the Renewable Energy Law emphasise the 
role of technology, they treat it differently. Unlike the Renewable Energy Law which 
strategically focuses on indigenous technology development, the Energy Conservation 
Law also encourages international cooperation and technology exchange.  
 
(4) Legislation for a low carbon economy  
The low carbon economy is changing from an idea into reality, and is flourishing 
across China.
303
 Key legislation aimed at a low carbon economy, such as the Circular 
Economy Promotion Law and the Cleaner Production Promotion Law, plays a crucial 
role in mitigating GHG emissions. 
 
The Circular Economy Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China 
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The Circular Economy Promotion Law, as a result of policy repeating, makes many 
declarations.
 304
 “Although there are few new requirements, the law is significant for 
attempting to introduce a more comprehensive approach to more efficient and less 
wasteful development, and providing examples of how these principles might be 




In this law the circular economy is defined as any activities involving “decrement, 
recycling and resource recovery in production, circulation and consumption.”
306
 The 
scope of the Circular Economy Promotion Law is cross-sectoral.
307
 It focuses on the 
environmental performance of all manufacturers and service businesses. At the 
organizational level, circular economy activities are managed by the NDRC, and the 
actual implementation and enforcement is delegated to separate sectors and local 
authorities. Since the Circular Economy Promotion Law was promulgated in 2008, 26 
provinces and municipalities have launched pilot projects in some key industries such 




The Circular Economy reduces GHG both at source and during the production process, 
which encourages clean technologies.
309
 To streamline this, the government has 
compiled and issued technology catalogues that cover technologies to be encouraged, 
restricted or abandoned.
310
 In fact, there is an apparent improvement in Circular 
Economy Promotion Law. The law increases the accountability of enterprises in the 
industrial sector. Enterprises are seriously urged to phase out outdated production 




In order to “encourage the import of technologies, equipment and products that may 
save energy, water and materials”, the Circular Economy Promotion Law requests the 
relevant departments in the State Council to adopt preferential measures.
312
 In 
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People's Republic of China.” 
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addition, financial assistance is provided for capacity building and the assimilation 
and incorporation of technology.
313
 The financed technology transfer is obligated to 
make a plan on how to specifically localize these technologies, under the coordination 




The Cleaner Production Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China 
The circular economy goes hand in hand with cleaner production. “Without the 
implementation of cleaner production, [the] circular economy remains a conceptual 
framework.”
315
 At the beginning of this century, China adopted its first special law to 
comprehensively implement cleaner production.
316
 Cleaner production is entering a 
new era of legislation and standardization.  
 
Industry is the major source of GHG. Before cleaner production was promoted, the 
prevailing approach in the Chinese environmental regulatory framework was an end-
of-pipe approach.
317
 On the basis of the new rationale on pollution prevention, the 
Cleaner Production Promotion Law establishes institutions to stimulate the greening 
of industrial sectors with regard to: (1) cleaner production standards; (2) compulsory 
cleaner production audits; (3) an assessment and acceptance system of audits for key 
enterprises.
318
 The National Cleaner Production Centre (NCPC) was created to 
provide technical assistance to fully implement these measures, e.g., to support audit 
                                                                                                                                            
activities conducive to promoting circular economy, and make use of measures including tax to encourage the 
import of technologies, equipment and products that may save energy, water and materials, and restrict the export 
of products which have high energy consumption and heavy pollution in production. Specific measures shall be 
formulated by the financial and tax departments under the State Council. Where any enterprise uses or produces 
any technology, process, equipment or product under the catalogue in which the clean production and resource 
comprehensive utilization are encouraged by the State, it may share tax preferences in accordance with relevant 




 PRC Circular Economy Promotion Law, Article 43 states: “…Any entity using fiscal capital to introduce main 
technologies and equipment relevant to circular economy shall make a plan for digestion, absorption and 
innovation, submit the plan to competent departments for approval and implement it under the supervision of such 
departments. Competent departments shall establish a coordination system according to actual needs to make a 
comprehensive coordination of the introduction, digestion, absorption and innovation of such main technologies 
and equipment, and give a financial support.” 
315
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316
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317
 “The Cleaner Production Promotion Law Has Taken Effect in China, Small and Medium Scale Industries 
(SMIs),” Newsletter, Vol. 5, Issue No. 16, 2003, pp. 1-2. 
318
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shall periodically conduct cleaner production audits, and report the audit results to the relevant administrative 
departments for environmental protection and the relevant departments for economics and trade under the local 
people‟s government at or above county level. 
The administrative procedures for conducting cleaner production audits shall be formulated by the relevant 
departments for economics and trade under the State Council jointly with the relevant administrative department 










Industry can also be the major provider of technical solutions. As the Beijing Centre 
for Environmentally Sound Technology Transfer (CESTT) showed, the widespread 
adoption of cleaner production in China was in fact constrained by the indigenous 
technology capacity.
321
 To overcome this, Cleaner Production Promotion Law 
generally promotes technology development and international cooperation in this 
field.
322
 “The coverage of industries by law and policy is absolutely necessary, 
because change of industrial production technologies from traditional environmentally 
detrimental ones to environmentally friendly ones is essential for GGER.”
323
 One 
result of the above-mentioned end-of-pipe approach is that China used to focus 
primarily on pollution control technologies. Compared with pollution control 
standards that can be achieved with technical changes and upgrading, clean 
production standards also involve changes in management and organizational 
structures – the essence of climate technology transfer.
324
 Enterprises are even more 
discouraged from producing discharges with these fundamental changes. 
 
5.2.1.3 Other specific regulations 
In China‟s official documents, the CDM is often cited as a means not only to obtain 
funding to combat climate change domestically, but also to obtain advanced 
technologies from Annex I countries. The latter has undoubtedly been given more 
weight at policy level.  
 
With regard to legislation, China enacted the Interim Measures for Operation and 
Management of CDM Projects in 2005 to provide guidelines for CDM stakeholders 
for real world scenarios. Substantive licensing requirements and project 
implementation procedures were drawn up concretely.
325
 According to the measures, 
sources which lead to emission reductions are a national asset.
326
 The state therefore 
charges management fees for benefits produced by CERs, e.g., HFC23: 65%, N2O: 
30%.
327
 At present, three areas are identified as priorities: energy efficiency 
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 See C. Hicks, R. Dietmar, “Improving Cleaner Production through the Application of Environmental 
Management Tools in China,” Journal of Cleaner Production 15, 2007, p. 400. Taking technology capacity as an 
example, the vast majority of small and medium-sized enterprises in China have insufficient financial and 
technical resources.  
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improvement, renewable energy, recovery and utilization of methane and coal bed 
methane.
328
 Any CDM projects involved in these priority fields will be offered 
preferential measures of only 2% on their revenues. To conduct CDM projects in 
China it is necessary to obtain approval from the relevant authorities.
329
 Although 
there is a National CDM Board, the NDRC was actually designated and given 
substantive powers to assess and approve CDM projects. Together with the NDRC, 
the MOST co-chairs the CDM Board.
330
 Other agencies like the MOEP and the China 




One important objective of the CDM is to promote the transfer of environmentally 
good technologies to China.
332
 The National CDM Board reviews the concrete 
technology transfer terms in the PDDs submitted by project developers.
333
 However, 
no standard is provided for what constitutes technology transfer in the CDM projects. 
The existing PDDs show that individual project developers define technology transfer 
differently.
334
 Moreover, as technology transfer is not mandatory, the interpretation of 
that term rarely has an influence on the approval of projects that are registered, unless 
the correlation between technology transfer and additionality can be fully verified in 
PDDs. 
 
Under the Chinese CDM rules, not all MNEs are eligible to engage in local CDM 
projects. The percentage of foreign shareholders is restricted and only wholly China 
owned or China controlled enterprises can develop CDM projects.
335
 This is the well-
known 49/51% rule.
336
 The primary aim of the 49/51% rule is to define ownership so 
that Chinese firms can keep a controlling interest. As CERs belong to the state, 
private foreign enterprises should theoretically not profit from their revenues.
337
 
However, in practice, many CER buyers consider the 49/51% rule as a barrier because 
of its potential to limit risk management possibilities and their potential returns.
338
 It 
is not only the question of ownership, but also the type of foreign investment that 
must meet certain conditions. For example, currently only equity joint venture (EJV) 
structures are allowed to apply for CDM projects.
339
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 RELaw Assist Issues Paper 2007, (no. 219), p. 53. The major types of corporate structure available to foreign 
investors in China are Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) and Equity Joint Venture (EJV). The different features and 
requirements that apply to EJVs and CJVs are significant for investors seeking to undertake renewable energy 
projects in China. CJVs may provide a flexible structure through which investors can make their contributions to 
registered capital, manage the JV, and distribute its profits. In contrast, EJVs are typically viewed as being less 
flexible than CJVs. For instance, management control and profit distribution are typically proportionate to each 




5.2.2 Technology transfer in economic law 
International technology transfer for addressing climate change is an interdisciplinary 
subject. Different perspectives are based on different views of climate sound 
technology: as knowledge innovated in the private sector, as a public commodity for 
global climate welfare or as a socio-economic learning process. Technology transfer 
is also rooted in classical economic theory which is based on comparable advantages 
and knowledge spillover.
340
 From the legal perspective, macro-economic legislation 




As a recipient of technology, China adopts a “Reform and Open” policy to develop its 
domestic economy, technology capacity and international competitiveness, and 
legislation is an integral part of this.
342
 China‟s accession to the WTO opens up the 
international technology market to it, requiring appropriate adjustments in the 
traditional trade-related laws. Confronting the new context of climate change, the 
existing laws must be carefully and constructively re-examined. In order to ensure 
that the research questions are firmly adhered to, we will focus on certain aspects of 
selected Chinese economic laws. 
 
5.2.2.1 Technology trade laws in China 
Unlike climate change legislation, technology transfer is not a new aspect of foreign 
trade/investment legislation. When innovations have been made, climate technologies 
enter the secondary markets and are confronted first of all with the confirmation, use 
and transfer of property rights. The Chinese regulations on IP, contracts, competition, 
and foreign trade therefore play a crucial role in this process. 
 
(1) IP Laws 
For a long time, developed countries have argued that strong patent laws in 
developing countries ease technology transfer “does not hold water”.
343
 Under the 
international pressures, China has implemented elements of its innovation strategy. At 
every juncture China has revised the original Patent Law correspondingly.
344
 For 
instance, the latest National Intellectual Property Strategy was formally issued in 2008 




On the whole, the current patent law strengthens the protection of patents in 
substantive and procedural terms. As a Member of TRIPS and WIPO, China agreed 
on minimum standards for intellectual property protection (IP).
346
 For this purpose, 
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China introduced a set of far-reaching amendments. Taking the “absolute novelty 
standard” as an example, an invention must be new to the world, not just to China.
347
 
It is “another step in the right direction and should stop patent grants to Chinese 
applicants who were effectively hijacking inventions from abroad.”
348
 Another 
amendment to joint ownership could have an influence in the case  of collaborative 
R&D between MNEs and Chinese enterprises/institutions,
349
 for example, if they 
cooperate to invent a piece of climate technology. The new Patent Law clarifies the 
joint ownership of patents in more detail. This implies the unilateral exploitation of 
patent rights without the consent of joint owners.
350
 The principles regarding contract 
priority and actual inventor were confirmed to determine the property right of 
inventions.
351




From the perspective of procedures, three different types of litigation have been 
formulated to deal with patent infringements, including civil, administrative and 
criminal litigation.
353
 Civil litigation usually results in the termination of the 
infringement and compensation based on the damage. The more recent Patent Law 
increased the fine to 1 million RMB, even if the infringement did not result in any 
profit. 
354
 Additionally, it supports the termination of infringements and proving 
patent infringements. For example, this can be done by extending the time for the 
court to grant injunctions and by avoiding the rejection of applications.
355
 
Administrative litigation for patent deposition is exercised by the relevant agencies 
such the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO).
356
 In serious cases, criminal 




In China‟s patent law, there is a delicate balance between the protection of IP and the 
promotion of inbound technology flow on the basis of foreign licences.
358
 For 
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example, patent exhaustion aims to prevent the abuse of IP. Once a technology has 
been sold to the market, its patent right is exhausted, and the parallel importation of 
these products will never constitute an infringement. In these circumstances, local 
recipients are more likely to access patented climate technology at a lower cost. 
However, it is not clear how patent exhaustion applies to imported technology under 
contractual restrictions. 
 
Compulsory licensing is of great concern to foreign technology owners, and was 
consolidated in the new Patent Law. According to the TRIPS, members are allowed to 
stipulate concrete conditions for compulsory licensing in domestic law. Article 49 of 
the Chinese Patent Law stipulates that patent administration agencies under the State 
Council may grant a compulsory licence in a “national emergency”, “extraordinary 
state of affairs” or in the “public interest”.
359
 Public health has been added as new 
grounds for granting a compulsory licence for countries which are signatories to an 
international treaty, and this is particularly relevant to climate sound technology.
360
 
Patented pharmaceuticals are subject to compulsory licensing in accordance with the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
361
 However, whether 
the climate crisis can be also regarded as a compelling public interest or national 
emergency remains an open question.
362
 More details related to the scope and period 
for compulsory licensing bring China more closely in line with TRIPS.
363
 The law 
also improves the procedures for granting licences, and imposes obligations for patent 
administration agencies to notify, register and announce their decisions promptly.
364
 
When the relevant agencies decide to issue a compulsory licence, they must seriously 
consider: (1) the appropriate use of patents; (2) proper justification for the decisions 
of patent holders and a (3) reasonable exploitation fee paid to the patentee.
365
 
However, the key provisions that were formulated are not sufficiently clear to serve as 
a definitive statutory basis for implementation and enforcement. Up to now, no 




In conclusion, there are visible changes in China‟s Patent Law, particularly in patent 
protection. These changes are generally positive, though there is no particular foreign 
focus. History serves as a guideline. In many cases, sudden surges in foreign 





(2) Competition law 
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The majority of climate technologies are invented in the private sector. Their transfer 
to the market is legally permitted, provided there are no monopolies. Where necessary, 
competition law defines the conditions for legitimate technology transfer.
368
 In 
general, it is illegal for technology transfer to violate the fundamental principles of 
competition law, such as the equal protection of both parties, good faith and pro-
competition etc. 
 
The adoption of the Antimonopoly Law was a milestone in the Chinese efforts to 
promote a fair competition market and crack down on monopoly activities.
369
 In 
conjunction with the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Company Law, it constitutes 
an intensive competition system in China today. Basically, the Antimonopoly Law is 
designed to correct the side effects of IP. Its scope of application covers not only 
domestic economic activities, but also the behaviours of certain foreign and 
international enterprises.
370
 Enacted after the accession of China to the WTO, the law 
has provoked worldwide concern for its potential impact on foreign competition.  
 
The Chinese Antimonopoly Law contains a general and broad prohibition on 
restrictive business practices (RBPs), ranging from monopoly agreements and the 
abuse of market dominance to the control of mergers. Article 13 provides that any 
terms “restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the development 
of new technology or new products” constitute a monopoly and should be mandatorily 
prohibited.
371
 It is of great importance for technology transfer, because it guarantees 
the reasonable use of IP at the marketing and distribution stages.
372
 However, as far as 
the abuse of market dominance is concerned,
373
 there are fewer opportunities for 
recipients of technology to use this argument against foreign climate technology 
holders. Market dominance is difficult in practice for alternative technologies 
available in the domestic market (e.g., hydro-electric power technology) and different 
sectors (e.g., wind power, solar and geothermal sectors).
374
 In order to promote 
scientific progress and public welfare, the Antimonopoly Law has adopted new 
exemptions for enterprises engaged in monopolistic activities. Public welfare 
activities, such as “conserving energy, protecting the environment and relieving the 
victims of a disaster”, serve as a potential defence against lawsuits brought for IP 





China‟s Antimonopoly Law has created a threefold enforcement model including the 
NRDC, the MC and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) to 
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 These are all accountable to the Antimonopoly Commission, 
but all have a different focus. The NDRC is specifically in charge of monopoly 
agreements, while the SAIC is responsible for the abuse of market dominance.
377
 This 





Last but not least, given the inherent link between IP protection and competition 
promotion, foreign climate technology holders must exercise their lawful monopoly 
IP rights carefully when they are extended beyond the normal scope in technology 
transfer deals. To clarify this, Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law defines the legal 
boundary between IP law and competition law. “Lawful conduct in accordance with 
its legitimate IP rights” does not apply for businesses in the case of antimonopoly. 
Article 55 has a profound influence, reflecting China‟s global concerns about giving 
IP regimes and the pro-competition regime an equivalent status.
379
 However, as the 
language is imprecise, this legal immunity is considered to be too general to be 
implemented in practice. Up to now, there have been no provisions with more detailed 
definitions for the phrases “eliminate or restrict competition” and “abuse of 
intellectual property rights”. Many foreign IP holders are afraid that Article 55 will be 





(3) Technology Contract Laws 
The parties involved in technology transfer must sign a contract and implement it in 
practice, and this depends on private negotiations to a great extent. The state 
influences this process by managing technology transfer contracts.
381
 In principle, the 
government will not intervene in private contracts unless they break any public laws 
or mandatory regulations.  
 
Although climate sound technologies have been identified as a priority in China, they 
are transferred on the basis of regular contracts. There is a basic Contract Law which 
sets out the general principles for a technology transfer contract. For example, one of 
the leading principles is that any technology contract that illegally monopolizes 
technology, impedes technological progress or infringes other technologies will be 
deemed to be null and void.
382
 On this basis, China has enacted the Technology 
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Contract Law to regulate all sorts of technology agreements. Because of its limitations 
as regards the applicable scope and international recognition, China then also 





The main contractual issues related to international technology transfer, such as the 
items concerned and the form of transfer, are structured in the Regulation on 
Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts.
384
 For example, a technology 
introduction contract should at the very least contain the scope of the patent, the 
conditions and payment.
385
 Where this is required, both the recipient and supplier 
must conclude a written contract.
386
 According to the Regulation, imported 
technology not only has to be new, but must also meet economic and social functions 
such as environmental effectiveness.
387
 During the transfer of technology, foreign 
suppliers are obliged to guarantee that they are the legitimate owners of the 
technology and that the technological objectives will be achieved in a particular 
way.
388
 More importantly, the Regulation prohibits the contract for importing 
technology from containing restrictions.
389
 Seven major kinds of restrictions that may 
occur when technology is introduced are indicated in concrete terms: 
 
- requiring a transferee to accept additional conditions that are not 
indispensable to the importing of the technology, including requiring a 
transferee to purchase unnecessary technology, raw materials, products, 
equipment or services; 
- requiring a transferee to pay royalties or assume obligations for technology 
for which the relevant patent protection has expired or been invalidated; 
- restricting the improvement or use of the particular technology by a transferee; 
- restricting a transferee’s right to obtain similar or competing technology from 
other sources; 
- unreasonably restricting the sources from which a transferee may purchase 
raw materials, parts, products or equipment; 
- unreasonably restricting product output, variety or sales price; 
- unreasonably restricting export channels for products based on the imported 
technology. 
 
Nevertheless, the Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts 
does not indicate the legal effects of a contract which includes prohibited monopoly 
provisions.
390
 This leads to disputes, which often cause problems for technology 
transfer practitioners. To resolve this, the Chinese Supreme Court issued the Opinion 
                                                                                                                                            
a restriction will lead to the whole contract being null and void. 
383
 Nie 2011, (no. 131). 
384
 The technology transfer activities contain IP licences, the ownership of technology and technical services. PRC 
Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts, Article 2. 
385
 PRC Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts, Article 5. 
386
 PRC Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts, Article 4. 
387
 The environmental effectiveness includes: being capable of improving the quality and performance of products, 
reducing production costs and a reduction in the consumption of energy or raw materials; promoting the maximum 
utilization of local resources; promoting environmental protection. PRC Regulation on Administration of 
Technology Introduction Contracts, Article 3. 
388
 PRC Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts, Article 5. 
389





on Application of Law in the Adjudication of Technology Contract Disputes (the 
Supreme Court Opinion).
391
 On the one hand, Article 10 of the Supreme Court 
Opinion adds many details about the circumstances that constitute a misuse of 
monopolies.
392
 However, on the other hand, in its interpretation of Article 10, the 
Supreme Court does not exactly comply with the basic principle of contract law.
393
 
Instead of applying a strict interpretation standard, the Court maintains that the legal 
force of monopoly provisions is not retroactive.
394
 Even if they are considered invalid 





Article 10 of the Supreme Court Opinion has been widely recognized as a milestone 
in the handling of abusive monopolies of MNEs in their technological cooperation 
with China. It reveals: (a) where Chinese public laws and mandatory regulations are 
restrictive; (b) the actions of the contractual party that abuses IP can be prohibited in 
court. Practitioners are not allowed to exclude these formulations from their 
agreements. For China, where the bargaining powers of clean technology enterprises 





(4) Technology trade rules 
In the Regulation on Administration of Technology Introduction Contracts, 
technologies are divided into three categories: freely transferable, restricted and 
prohibited technology.
397
 The regulation adopts the contract registration system as a 
crucial component of the administration for importing technology.
398
 A foreign party 
must be approved and registered so that the technology importation contract can start 
on a legal basis.
399
 According to the recently revised regulation, technology transfer 
that falls within the “freely import[ed] technologies” classification is only subject to 
online registration. Approval is still required however. 
400
 The primary objective of 
approval is to examine whether the contract contains unreasonably restrictive 
                                                 
391
 The Supreme Court is the highest court in the mainland area of the People‟s Republic of China. The decisions 
and the legislative interpretations of judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China can be considered as a 
part of mainland China‟s customary law. 
392
 The Supreme Court Opinion on Application of Law in the Adjudication of Technology Contract Disputes, 
Article 10. 
393
 PRC Contract Law, Article 329. 
394
 See John Huang and Patrick Ma, “Technology Transfer under the PRC Antitrust framework,” China Law Alert, 
2008, p. 2. 
395
 Idem. The Chief Justice of the Intellectual Property Division of the Supreme Court, Jiang Zhipei, commented 
on the Supreme Court Opinion, explicitly stating that only those parts of the contract which include illegal 
monopoly provisions would be deemed to be invalid and that other provisions in the contract would remain valid. 
Although Judge Jiang‟s comments were not officially announced on behalf of the Supreme Court, it is anticipated 
that his explanation will be largely respected because of his key role in the PRC judicial system. 
396
 Nie 2011, (no. 131). 
397
 Technology classified as prohibited from import may not be imported; restricted technologies require approval 
from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Science and Technology before the technology 
transfer contract is enforceable; and freely transferable technology transfer contracts require registration. See Mai 
Lin, “China‟s technology transfer rules: a step along the path to high-new-tech enterprise status,” China’s Law & 
Practice, 2008. In reality, the competent foreign trade department under the State Council shall, in conjunction 
with other relevant departments under the State Council, formulate, regulate and publish catalogues of 
technologies the import of which is prohibited or restricted. 
398










 A contract that fails to be registered cannot obtain a remittance in foreign 
exchange and consequently the transfer fee cannot be legitimately paid to a party 
outside China.
402
 For all these examples there are similar formulations in the 
Regulations on Technology Import and Export Administration which took effect in 





The importation of climate technology in China follows China‟s foreign trade policies 
and local industrial strategy. In Chinese trade, technologies for climate mitigation and 
adaptation are seen as freely imported technologies and can be registered directly 
online. They are given priority in the catalogue of technology and products for which 
importation is encouraged, and are included in the range of subsidies given in the 
national interest.
404
 For example, in the 2011 catalogue, technologies concerning 
energy savings, the manufacture of advanced equipment, and vehicles involving new 
materials and new energy were added to the list.
405
   
 
More detailed measures have been adopted in line with technology catalogues. Two 
institutional tools, duty and value added tax (VAT), are frequently used to achieve 
particular social and economic objectives. Taking wind turbines by way of example, 
the domestic wind energy industry has been established and developed in China in the 
past three decades.
406
 At the very beginning, China attempted to build an internal 
wind power base and therefore applied zero import duties to boost large-scale foreign 
imports of wind turbines. Once the manufacture of wind turbines had become 
established, the government‟s strategic focus shifted to protect the local market from 
fierce foreign competition. Local enterprises were therefore requested to pay an 
additional 3%-30% import duty if they purchased foreign wind technologies and 
components.
407
 In view of China‟s progress in the wind industry, these duties have 
been reversed occasionally, especially in the last five years.
408
 China has now again 
removed import duties and VAT on wind technologies in order to consolidate the 
wind industry.
409
 Only those turbine manufacturers that can produce 1.5 MW or larger 
turbines and that sell more than 300 MW per year can import components duty 
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 See Liu Wenqiang, “Cost-competitive Incentives for Wind Energy Development in China: Institutional 




 China first refunded import duties and VAT on core wind power technology in 2008. It aims to ease the cost of 
imports and provide incentives for local manufactures importing essential components. See Federico Caprotti, 
“China‟s Clean tech Landscape: the Renewable Energy Technology Paradox,” 9 (3) Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy, 2009, p. 7.  
409
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 International technology suppliers are predicted to benefit from this policy, 




Measures have sometimes been taken which are seen as a barrier in the trade regime, 
for example, in the field of clean coal technologies. China‟s Air Pollution Prevention 
& Control Law strategically promotes the innovation and development of clean coal 
technologies.
 412
 Therefore the central government imposed a 40 % duty. As some 
observers stated, this constituted a green trade barrier and made it difficult for foreign 




5.2.2.2 Technology investment laws in China 
The vast market potential for climate mitigation in China attracts foreign investors.
414
 
In order to create a hospitable host environment for foreign investment, China is 
actively establishing legal constructions in the context of its “Reform and Open” 





(1) General formulations on technology investment 
With regard to technology transfer, there are the Law on Sino-foreign Joint Venture, 
the Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Enterprise and the Law on Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise. These laws allow the ownership of technology as a form of 
investment, subject to certain conditions.
416
 For example, the Law on Sino-foreign 
Joint Venture states that the technology to be contributed to a joint venture must be: 
(1) under legitimate ownership; (2) the application of the technology and the resulting 
products has significant social and economic benefits for China, or are competitive in 
the international market.
417
 Both sides must conduct an appraisal of the assets when 
the investment is made. Investors contributing to intangible technology must also 
provide an asset appraisal or valuation reports. In general, foreign investment shall be 
less than 20 % of the venture‟s registered capital in a contractual joint venture.
418
 In 
special cases such as high-tech ventures, this proportion may be allowed to reach a 








 Idem. For example, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany all have strong policies to promote the 
installation of wind energy. 
412
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Basically, China encourages foreign investment. As the Foreign Direct Investment 
Industry Guidelines show, the constraints on foreign investment are relaxed.
420
 
According to the latest Guidelines issued in 2011, China allows foreign direct 
investment more readily to clean energy industries concurrently with the domestic 
modernisation of existing large-scale mines and the development of new 
technologies.
421
 In these areas, MNEs can enjoy various preferential treatments such 




By way of example, income tax and sales tax are frequently employed to attract 
foreign investment for climate mitigation/adaptation.
423
 There is a two-tier system of 
income tax in China for domestic and foreign companies.
424
 The income tax paid by 
foreign investors is calculated differently depending on the proportion of their 
contribution to the joint venture.
425
 In general, China gives income tax reductions for 
energy-saving and environmental technologies, both for domestic and foreign 
enterprises.
426
 For example, foreign technology investors are granted a 50% reduction 
for three years after the initial five years.
427
 As far as sales tax is concerned, profits 
from the transfer of technology that was developed solely by foreign investors will be 
exempted from sales tax.
428
 Very recently, China began to reform corporation tax, 
primarily at a national level. Since 2008 February, enterprise income tax was 
increased from 15% to 25% in general.
429
 But for clean technology enterprises, they 
are exempted from this increase and still enjoy lower tax rate. In addition to tax 
incentives, foreign ventures are given special privileges. For instance, those which 
carry out R&D in China are allowed to sell their high technologies on local markets 




(2) Other legal issues  
The promotion of inter-company technology transfer  
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 See Long Guoqiang, “China‟s Polices on FDI: Review and Evaluation.” In Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. 
Graham and Magnus Blomström (eds.), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? 2005, p. 330. 
429
 PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law, Article 28. 
430
 Long 2005, (no. 428), p. 330. Only a small quantity of high technologies is permitted for import and sales.  
167 
 
In reality, MNEs can transfer their advanced technologies either to subsidiaries based 
in China or directly to local enterprises (known as intra-company transfer and inter-
company transfer). China aims to promote inter-company technology transfer, in 
particular joint ventures. “Such cooperation could nourish trust between developed 
and developing countries, which is a prerequisite for global climate cooperation.”
431
 
“Such a policy stance may be an attempt to protect incumbent firms from competing 
with MNEs, or may reflect a desire to maximize technology transfer to local 
agents.”
432
 It is also easier for technology recipients involved in inter-company joint 
ventures to benefit from the innovation in FDI, and make full use of technology 
spillovers.
433
 By the end of 2008, the local capacity of sound climate technology had 
increased in this process from 15.4% to 84.6%.
434
 Similarly, foreign investors are 
increasingly finding that they must establish joint ventures in China.
435
 If it has close 
links with climate mitigation policies, a joint venture can produce positive results. For 
instance, China recently introduced a strict policy limiting carbon emissions from new 
vehicles, together with processes for enforcing this policy, which led to Toyota 





In China, CDM projects can only be conducted in the form of an equity joint 
venture.
437
 To strengthen the implementation of these measures, China has specified 
Implementation Regulations for the Equity Joint Venture Law, in which the 
introduction technology is outlined in a separate chapter.
438
 This states that a joint 
venture enters into a technology transfer agreement as part of the process of 
technology introduction.
439
 This agreement remains independent from the business of 
the joint venture.
440
 In general its duration should be no more than ten years, and after 
that the recipients can continue to use the technology.
441
 Significantly, a licensing fee 
is required to ensure that it is fair and reasonable. This is particularly significant for 
climate sound technologies.
442
 In order to control unreasonable restrictions even 
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further, the implementation regulations generally prohibit the technology exporting 
party from abusing its rights and advantageous position.
443
 However, both the parties 
involved in technology transfer are permitted to exclude these provisions, provided 




Local requirements on technology transfer 
Very often, FDI is expected to be an integral aspect of the local development 
objectives. One of the key Chinese development objectives is to introduce the most 
promising technologies. To achieve this, a technology transfer requirement is imposed 
on foreign investors in practice. The classic example is the “Swap Market for 
Technology” strategy.
445
 Former Chinese FDI policies all show signs of similar 
requirements, whether these are of a compulsory or voluntary nature.
446
 Currently 
climate mitigation and adaptation are key policies in China. There are thus broad 
mandatory technology transfer requirements in the clean energy and technology 
sectors, such as gas turbines, new-energy vehicle production and wind turbine 
technology.
447
 Taking the wind power industry by way of example, China launched 
the “Ride the Wind Program”, in which transferring wind turbine technology was a 





In addition to the performance requirement, China has recently encouraged joint 
ventures to purchase as many domestically produced materials and components as 
possible.
449
 This local content requirement is also commonly imposed in the Chinese 
clean energy sector. Technology transfer through the “Ride the Wind Program” 
started with a 20% local content requirement and the goal of an increase to 80%, as 
the Chinese partner‟s skills increased.
450
 If the foreign providers do not opt for the 
strategy of local products, the unfavourable tariff might serve as an incremental cost 
hurdle for the deployment of the already highly priced foreign technology.
451
 
Imposing the requirement of a particular percentage of domestic manufacturing aims 
to strengthen the links of joint ventures with the local economy.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
particularly significant.  
443
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However, in practice the effectiveness of local requirements has been questioned, 
particularly that of compulsory requirements. Local governments were thought to 
favour domestic players over foreign investors, which is likely to violate the principle 
of national treatment under the WTO.
452
 After acceding to the WTO, China revised its 
three major FDI laws and cancelled some compulsory technology transfer and local 
content requirements; only some voluntary requirements remained.
453
 In the meantime, 
“a sovereign country has the right to design its own investment policies.”
454
 The 
acceptability of technology transfer and the local content requirement also depend in 
practice on their specific structure.
455
 From the perspective of a foreign partner, it 
appears that up to now few have raised the issue with regard to China. In fact, many 
have been willing to engage in technology transfers in China. As Lewis stated, “China 
is certainly not the only developing country pushing for foreign technology transfer, 






“In practice, climate-related policies are seldom applied in complete isolation, as they 
overlap with other national polices…and, therefore, in many cases require more than 
one instrument.”
457
 Like many developing countries, China has left climate 
technology transfer to market forces and economic legislation. Unfortunately, China 
not only lacks a specialised technology transfer law related to climate change, but also 
a general law on regular technology transfer. Therefore in practice the existing foreign 
trade and investment laws play an important role, including IP protection and 
competition, technology contracts, foreign trade and FDI.  
 
The legal definition, protection and management of intellectual property are closely 
related to technology transfer. China has now comprehensively improved its IP 
protection. Nevertheless, it is still too early to conclude that Chinese IP laws have a 
particular foreign focus. In fact, there is a delicate balance between the protection of 
IP and the promotion of technology coming in with foreign licences. In the Chinese 
economic law system, there is an internal balance regime for IP. The Antimonopoly 
Law was promulgated to correct the side effects of the IP market at the same time. Its 
goals of promoting science, fair competition and public welfare are likely to improve 
the access of clean technologies to the market. As regards foreign technology holders, 
they will have to promote their lawful IP rights with care if they are to extend them in 
technology transfer deals.  
 
In foreign trade, technology for climate mitigation and adaptation is deemed to be 
freely transferable. Energy-saving measures, new materials and new energy vehicles 
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have been added to the encouraged list for importation, and incorporated in the range 
of national subsidies. Detailed favourable measures such as the removal of duties and 
tax concessions (VAT) have been put in place. However, because of the lack of long-
term planning in the clean energy and technology industries, the entire situation of 
imports into China is less stable. China has introduced a contract registration system 
to serve as a procedural guidance and examine whether imported technology 
corresponds to local development interests. It is worth noting that recently online 
registration has been applied to any freely imported technologies, including climate 
sound technologies, provided that the contract was approved by the competent 
authority. A national review is to be conducted primarily for unreasonable restrictions 
in a contractual context.  
 
China also frequently introduces climate technologies with foreign investment. 
According to Chinese foreign investment policies, laws and regulations, foreign 
investors are allowed to contribute intangible technology when investing in China, 
provided that the asset appraisal meets certain conditions. Very recently, China 
opened up FDI wider to clean energy industries, and foreign investors have been 
given preferential treatment, e.g., in relation to income tax and sales tax. China is 
trying to promote inter-company joint ventures to make full use of knowledge 
spillovers. This investment structure could promote trust among stakeholders, which 
is a prerequisite for global climate cooperation. Meanwhile, FDI must meet certain 
key local policy objectives. Local content and technology transfer requirements have 
occasionally been imposed in clean energy and technology sectors such as gas 
turbines, new-energy vehicle production and wind turbine technology. However, these 
practices have triggered some complex problems with regard to implementation. 
 
In conclusion, risks and opportunities go hand in hand when climate technology 
transfers occur in a traditional mechanism. Some amendments have been made 
recently in an attempt to follow the global trend and bring China more in line with 
international requirements like the TRIPS. However, others proceed on the basis of 
different assumptions. For example, compulsory licences are basically formulated to 
exempt certain technologies from strong patent patentability. Interestingly, this is a 
point which corresponds to climate sound technology by its very nature. The whole 
theoretical basis of climate sound technology entails constant conflict between 
combating global climate change and its traditional character. As a result, there are 
various barriers in the course of international technology transfer.  
 
5.3 Legal barriers to receiving climate sound technologies in China 
As a technology recipient, China‟s legislation and practices reflect certain common 
problems present in the developing countries, which were examined in a general way 
in chapter 4. China has its own conditions, and as a result, the institutional constraints 
on technology transfer have a unique character. Based on a review of the policy 
backgrounds and legal framework, this section will conduct a deep and systematic 
analysis of the important shortcomings in the Chinese legal efforts for transferring 
climate sound technologies.  
 
Before this, it is important to realize that different stakeholders involved in 
technology transfer perceive the barriers differently. “Views diverged in particular on 
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the impact of different aspects of domestic regulation on technology transfer.”
458
 
These legal barriers are presented here as a starting point to provide an overall picture 
for future improvements in legislation.  
 
5.3.1 Barriers resulting from the legal basis of climate sound technology transfer 
According to the IPCC, a sound policy or law must satisfy environmental 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, distributional considerations and institutional 
feasibility.
459
 In the light of these criteria, the present Chinese legal system for climate 
technology transfer is far from ideal. As analysed in the previous section, there is no 
special technology transfer law in China, and relevant formulations are scattered 
throughout technology transfer provisions and can be found in the wider context of 
environmental and economic legislation.  
 
5.3.1.1 Technology transfer provisions 
Sharing similar objectives, technology transfer is directly written into in climate 
change-related laws.
460
 Relevant provisions lie at the heart of the Chinese legal 
framework associated with climate sound technology transfer. Despite their important 
role, technology transfer provisions are less complete and robust because of their 
inherent deficiencies with regard to their content, scope, nature and quantity.  
 
First of all, none of the existing Chinese climate change laws defines technology 
transfer at the conceptual level. Technology transfer activities aimed at mitigating and 
adapting climate change are distinguished from normal technology transfers, which 
should receive special treatment and be clearly defined in legal terms. Otherwise, 
when a transfer is decided not to make or make under normal commercial terms, no 
mandatory requirements can be claimed on the basis of these technology transfer 
provisions.
461
 In particular, the lack of a legal definition of technology transfer is set 
against the priority which climate technologies have in the policy domain.
 462
 The 
traditional market mechanism which focuses on the economic function of technology 
is unlikely to fully reflect and accomplish environmental effectiveness.
463
 It is climate 
change legislation that should take a leading role and send a clear signal to the private 




Secondly, the draft legislation on climate sound technology transfer is limited in 
scope. It fails to cover all the key sectors, the lifespan of the technology and the 
relevant stakeholders. (1) Technology development and transfer in China is consistent 
with the priority of mitigation. The relevant provisions are centralised in the energy 
conservation, renewable energy and clean industry sectors.
465
 The legislation pays 
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scant attention to climate adaptation and related technology in general, even though 
many regions are highly vulnerable to drought, flood and other effects of global 
warming. (2) The technology transfer provisions make few distinctions between the 
different developmental stages of technology. Technology transfer is seen in narrow 
terms as a transaction, rather than as a broad learning process.
466
  Critical pre-and-post 
transaction activities still lie outside the central climate change framework. Although 
some newly enacted laws like the Circular Economy Promotion Law throw some light 
on this, their scope is rather inadequate.
467
 (3) Existing technology transfer provisions 
take a big step by obliging the government, as the liable party, to promote the transfer 
of technology.
468
 The national commitment to create an enabling environment, as 
requested by the UNFCCC, was included in the Chinese domestic legislation. 
However, it fails to confirm the critical role of private participants, who are the major 
producers of GHG and who could be a major contributor of technical solutions.
469
 To 
some extent it could be argued that no real consensus has been achieved among the 




Thirdly, the formulations on technology transfer seem to be rather timid. Technology 
transfer provisions in themselves tend to be less stringent, and are more like a policy 
declaration or another “best effort” requirement. The word “should” is used very 
frequently in these provisions, rather than the stronger term “shall” or “must”. The 
scope of legal obligations resulting from these provisions, if any, seems to be unclear 
at best. There are no concrete or explicit legal consequences, or procedures for non-
compliance, but many general provisions with a few liability stipulating small fines 
that do not deter violations.
471
 Taking the Energy Conservation Law by way of 
example, obligations are imposed on governments to make preferential rules and 
measures needed for climate technology transfer.
472
 On the one hand, there are few 
specific goals or procedures to implement and monitor them; individuals can only 
invoke this legislation in relation to government, not to other citizens. On the other 
hand, it is often considered to have little practical legal meaning, because in China, 
administrative proceedings between government and citizen are confronting with 
many realistic difficulties. Moreover, in some emerging laws like the Cleaner 
Production Promotion Law, technology transfer provisions were promulgated as a 
dictation directly arising from policies. Therefore, the policies have an ambiguous 
character. As will be discussed below, a great deal of discretion is left for the 
interpretation and implementation of these policies in practice.  
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Last but not least, there are few technology transfer provisions, and hardly any 
specialising in technology transfer in the climate change framework. The survey 
shows that the term “technology transfer” is only used in a few laws, for example, the 
Energy Conservation Law.
473
 In most cases, technology transfer is defined as an 
aspect of technology solutions, such as upgrading technology nationally, or an attempt 
to meet international trends such as international cooperation.
474
 This indicates that 
technology transfer is taken seriously to some degree, but it is doubtful that the 
provisions can provide a solid basis for comprehensive technology transfer for climate 
mitigation and adaptation, as there are so few. Unless the technology transfer 
provisions are accompanied by mandatory technological or environmental standards, 
they will hold little influence.  
 
5.3.1.2 The legal context in which climate sound technology transfer is regulated   
China still lacks its own Climate Change Act.
475
 Technology transfer provisions are 
formulated randomly and there are no uniform guidelines, principles or institutions. 
Therefore climate change related technology transfer must be seen in the wider 
context of (1) climate governance, (2) environmental protection, (3) technological 




(1) Climate governance 
Climate governance in China is policy-oriented, and the strategies and plans have a 
central role in the reduction of GHG emissions and relevant technological 
solutions.
477
 For instance, the Chinese National Climate Change Program outlines two 
principles to guide technology transfer: (1) relying on technological advancement for 
effectively mitigating and adapting to climate change; and (2) actively and 
extensively participating in international cooperation on climate change.
478
 By and 
large, the strategic national program fills the gap that there are no particular legal 
principles for climate technology transfer. Meanwhile in China, government plans 
usually contain specific target requirements which local governments must meet. 
“Plans are as important as laws or may even be considered more important, practically 
speaking, because statutes and other legal instruments tend to be rather general 
without details about specific goals and methods of implementation.”
479
 This applies 
specifically for climate adaptation.  
 
Institutional arrangements 
In China, climate governance is predominantly arranged from the top down in a five-
tier hierarchical structure. The NDRC is at the top of this structure. Climate mitigation 
and adaptation have been strategized as an economic/energy issue. It falls under the 
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NDRC, one of the most powerful governmental agencies, which is responsible for the 
implementation of a wide range of energy and industrial policies. For example, it 
compiled and issued the Chinese GHG Inventory Database and the National Climate 
Change Programmes. However, the MOEP is required only to assist and supplement 
the NDRC in tackling climate change-related matters. This arrangement suggests that 
climate change is above all an economic issue rather than an environmental one.  
 
The central government in Beijing issues vertical directives to its branches throughout 
the country. In fact, administrative directives issued by the Chinese State Council 
under the authorizion of law are legally binding.
480
 Therefore the regulation has a top-
down structure. When local government implements GHG emission reductions, these 
are usually based on the specific directives of their superiors. Administrative 
directives are likely to respond to climate change rapidly and flexibly. However, it is 
difficult to effectively monitor whether and to what extent these directives have 
actually been implemented, particularly under the current system of administrative 
accountability.
481
 Moreover, in the absence of legal consolidation, these 
administrative directives work for a specific time and in a specific place, but this 
could be counterproductive for a stable and long-term environment in the future.
482
 
For example, they vary enormously and the implementation process is highly 
bureaucratic in nature, which leads to inconsistency and uncertainty.
483
 As regards 
technology transfer, the climate administrative directives are certainly not on an equal 
footing with existing technology legislation (e.g., the Technology Contract Law, and 




Concrete mechanisms  
Two concrete mechanisms, the CDM and the ODA will be discussed below to 
illustrate the difficulties of climate change technology transfer to China. 
 
A. Clean Development Mechanism 
Chinese CDM rule-makers are well aware of the significance of technology transfer 
and have included it as an important objective in conducting CDM activities.
485
 So far, 
“half of CDM projects have brought in technologies that are not available in China, 
but whether CDM contributes to technology transfer in developing countries 
efficiently and effectively is questionable.”
486
 The current Chinese CDM rules have 
resulted in a number of barriers which must be overcome if the CDM is to stimulate 
significant market growth in climate technology in a meaningful way.
487
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There is an apparent barrier in the Chinese CDM rules at the conceptual level. China 
seeks to promote technology transfer though the CDM, but does not define 
technology transfer, or provide a uniform standard for it.
488
 The lack of an operational 
definition of technology transfer, for example in PDDs, is an obstacle to the project 
participants‟ choices to invest in clean technologies in the real world.
489
 For example, 
aware of the local requirement of technology transfer, some foreign investors use 
technology transfer as a strategy to successfully obtain approval for registration.
490
 As 
regards the implementation, they carry out technology transfer activities very 
superficially, e.g., simply introducing equipment.
491
 “An important determinant of the 
impact of technology transfer on the technological capacity of recipient countries is 
the degree of integration involved.”
492
 It is difficult for foreign suppliers to be 





Currently, China imposes limits on the ownership (49/51%) and the structure of 
foreign investment, so that Chinese firms can retain a controlling interest in CDM 
projects.
 494
 This rule was cited by some international CER buyers, such as the EU, as 
a legal barrier. As far as they are concerned, technology transfer is highly likely to 
happen in projects with a large investment, or foreign-owned enterprises, because 
they have a better technological and financial capacity.
495
 However, the relevant 
formulation prevented this large investment required in the early stages of projects.
496
 
In addition, “(…) this restriction is resulting in a number of projects not being 
developed, as many investors are unwilling to cede control of a project to an unknown 
or inexperienced domestic partner.”
497
 China maintains that the limitation is not a 
major barrier, and it is reasonable to manage and profit from CERs that are a part of 
national assets.
498
 It is understandable that there is a constant debate about the 
importance of this barrier to technology transfer. However, if China seeks to scale up 
the foreign clean technologies continuously, this argument appears less convincing. 
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The correlation between additionality and technology transfer is weak in theory. 
Neither the international rules nor the Chinese domestic CDM rules can change this 
situation overnight.
499
 “In most cases, the transfer of technology had occurred before 
the implementation of proposed CDM projects and the CDM project only extended 
the scale of technology transfer, but did not induce the transfer of new technology.”
500
 
As a result, it is less likely for the introduced technology to generate CERs and 
contribute to projects. Furthermore, the localization of technology is a complex 
process, and this also increases the uncertainty and risks for CERs.
501
 Unless 
technologies are supplied directly from CER buyers, the suppliers concerned are 
entitled to the shares of users and could take the CERs and profits from technological 
equipment operation.
502
 Not to mentioned that if the benefits of new technologies are 
insufficient to compensate for the costs of technology transfer, such as royalties and 
production lines. 
 
There is also potential conflict between the additionality requirements and some 
specific new industrial regulations. In clean coal technology, for example, the relevant 
regulations require the use of coal bed methane (CBM) and coal mine methane (CMM) 
when the concentration rate is above 30%.
503
 Similar requirements also apply in 
several new regulations on the utilization of waste heat in the cement industry.
504
 
“While these regulations will be beneficial for the environment and energy 
development in these specific sectors in China, [the] introduction of foreign 
technologies through CDM may be impeded since, by definition, these projects may 




B. Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
According to the UN, a minimum target of 0.7 % of industrial countries‟ annual GDP 
is allocated to international development. “It is critical that public financing sources 
for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and climate change action 
are scaled up hand in hand.”
506
 Unfortunately, few countries comply with this 
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 In the developing countries, there has been a general 
decline in projects with ODA, both in absolute terms and as a percentage, particularly 
those with a significant impact on technology transfer.
508
 There are generally limited 
resources available for ODA, and China is finding it increasingly difficult to attract 
them. The competing priorities which deserve support need to be identified among the 
developing countries, and the competition is tough. There are many uncertainties in 
the process because many criteria have to be considered. Ultimately, only a marginal 




As far as climate technology transfer is concerned, the role of ODA is very 
complicated. International ODA is increasingly focusing on eradicating poverty and 
the links between reducing poverty and technology transfer have not been widely 
recognized for a long time.
510
 Meanwhile, as a recipient, China is not legally ready to 
receive and benefit from ODA. For instance, the UNFCCC makes it clear that 
NAMAs supported by technology transfer are subject to the MRV criteria 
(measurable, reportable and verifiable).
511
 Many international donors are concerned 
that the ODA will not be distributed appropriately, in view of the generally weak 
transparency in developing countries, including China.
512
 The reliability and 
predictability of local legislation and implementation must be improved in this respect, 
so that ODA will benefit not only China with the promotion of low-carbon 
technologies, but also donors with the creation of a favourable environment for ODA 
activities in China. 
 
(2) Environmental protection 
In the case of the rare legislation on climate change, the existing Chinese 
environmental laws play a central role in regulating and managing climate sound 




Like many other developing countries, China has a short history of creating 
environmental law. The environmental regulatory regime appears to be ineffective, 
particularly with regard to climate change, because the environment where it is 
implemented does not correspond with the design of the legislation. “Achieving the 
original goals of environment-related regulations will require a careful assessment of 
long-standing assumptions, as well as decisive action to change regulatory practices in 
ways that accommodate, offset, and mitigate climate change.”
514
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First, there are essential loopholes in the regulations and standards on the reduction of 
GHG emissions. “The most important factors that influence the technology 
dominance process and the choice for specific clean coal technologies are emissions 
and environmental policy regulations.”
515
 However, one major source of GHG, CO2, 
is still exempt from the environmental regulatory regime, which may cancel the effect 
of reducing GHG emissions in general.
516
 Although no normative definition has yet 
been delivered to atmospheric pollutants, CO2 is statutorily omitted as a pollutant 
under the Chinese Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law. There is a trend to 





Secondly, not enough weight has been given to technology transfer in the 
environmental regulatory regime. Until recently, the transfer of environmentally 
sound technology was largely left to market forces and economic legislation.
518
 
Technology transfer basically facilitates compliance, but the environmental legislators 
in China do not seem to be aware of this. Instead, it has been presented in general as 
technology solutions which are exhortational and aspirational in nature. These articles 
will have only a superficial influence, unless they are accompanied by specific 
mandatory standards.
519
 However, there are problems when it comes to adapting 
domestic technology/environmental standards, because there are few uniform 
benchmarks between suppliers and recipients.
520
 Some local standards, such as the 
standard for the discharge of pollution, are considered too lenient to be effective.
521
 In 
other fields, for example, clean production, the clean production methodology itself, 




Thirdly, there are some inherent statutory deficiencies. Numerous provisions on 
technology are vague and incomplete, e.g., Article 25 of the Environmental Protection 
Law and Article 19 of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.
523
 Typically, 
actions are encouraged but rarely required, and there are few detailed goals, 
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operational actions or proper procedures. “This clearly demonstrates the difficulty of 
evaluating and determining the potential of China‟s environmental statutes to direct 
specific behaviour.”
524
 In practice, some environmental laws, particularly laws related 
to climate change, were passed very quickly in an attempt to meet departmental 
agendas or deadlines for the adoption of particular laws.
525
 Inadequate legal research 
had been conducted in advance, so that the provisions and the practices did not 
correspond. The Renewable Energy Law is a good example. The relevant standards 
were drawn up very quickly and failed to fully consider cost-effective alternatives or 
incentives for improvement. Specifically, renewable energy standards require that 
they represent a certain minimum percentage of the generating capacity, but do not 
dictate how much electricity must be generated by that capacity.
526
 In practice, this 
limits the flow of international technology, as local power companies have an 
incentive to buy the cheapest renewable energy technologies available even if they do 
not produce that much electricity in practice. Local technology suppliers are usually 
preferred over foreign enterprises because they offer lower prices. 
 
Finally, the environmental regulatory regime is not cost-effective in China today. It is 
cheaper to break environmental laws than to abide by them, which means there is a 
strong incentive for domestic and foreign enterprises to break China‟s environmental 
protection laws.
527
 The climate change-related Legislation, like the Clean Production 
Promotion Law and the Energy Efficiency Law, particularly involve higher costs 
related to implementing new large-scale industrial technologies to achieve 
incremental improvements in existing technologies. Although the cost of climate 
policies is perceived to be falling in the wake of global climate action, there is an 
excessive focus on their financial returns.
528
 The incentives must be strengthened for 
domestic enterprises to adopt a long-term and comprehensive perspective rather than 




(3) Technology change  
Technology transfer takes place in a broader context of technological change. As a 
process of knowledge spillover, technological change contributes to technological 
capacity that “enables future innovation to take place and is most likely to ensure long 
term adoption and development of low carbon technology in recipient countries.”
530
 
To increase the indigenous technology capacity, the transfer of low carbon 
technologies is the most important consideration.
531
 Three aspects of technological 
change will be analysed: technology capacity, S&T policies and TNAs. 
 
                                                 
524
 Beyer 2006, (no. 39), p. 206. 
525
 See Wang Canfa, “Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms,” 
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 8, 2006, p. 170. 
526
 See Carolyn Fischer, “The Role of Technology Policies in Climate Mitigation,” Resource for the Future, Issue 
8, July 2009, p. 4. 
527
 See Ma Zhongfa, “The Effectiveness of [the] Kyoto Protocol and the Legal Institution for International 
Technology Transfer,” Journal of Technology Transfer 37, 2012, p. 96.  According to Ma, (…) the cost of 
protecting the environment by adopting precautionary measures and facilities to deal with polluted airs, waters and 
industrial dusts is much higher than the fines imposed by the government. Some lawbreakers of the environmental 
protection laws or regulations may avoid punishment for different reasons, such as regional protectionism, weak 
implementation, etc.   
528
 Guerin 2009, (no. 483), p. 383. 
529
 Ma 2012, (no. 527), pp. 94-95. 
530





Technology capacity  
As described above, China was late starting with the development of climate 
technologies and the technology capacity concerned is at the primary stage. From a 
historical perspective, China is traditionally weak at technology innovation and 
entrepreneurial capacity. By contrast, it is better known for mass manufacturing. 
Technological activity in China is based on the idea of cost cutting, which fails to 
encourage innovation.
532
 The large domestic market and cheap labour are likely to 
reduce the costs of technology in a short time. It is not surprising that this also applies 
to the Chinese „Going-out‟ strategy on exports.
533
 Due to an overreliance on the 
market, any core technology and IP which can be commercialized is confronted with 
the limitations of indigenous innovation.
534





Enterprises prefer to purchase manufactured or semi-manufactured technological 
products and process them further. This means a lack of advanced technological 
knowledge in enterprises which are basically reluctant to foster their own IP.
 
IP 
design and the production of components only take place in the countries where the 
technology originates, not in the local economy.
536
 Therefore China always relies on 
foreign suppliers and must pay for the high added value of technological products. For 
example, China has the raw materials for solar power, but local enterprises only can 
provide the basic processes for the relevant technological products.
537
 China‟s 
reliance on foreign clean technologies is unlikely to change in the short term, because 
of its far-reaching traditions. These traditions in Chinese technology development and 
transfer must be seriously considered in terms of policy and law. 
 
S &T policies 
Technology transfer is a significant part of S&T policies aimed at increasing the 
indigenous technology capacity. Typically, “(…) the flow of knowledge and expertise, 
determines whether or not technology transfer results in the development of 
technological capacity within recipient countries.”
538
 There are many S&T policies in 
China.
539
 Some critical platforms for climate technologies have been carefully 
selected as core technology areas and pioneering fields.
540
 Nevertheless, China still 
lacks top S&T policies for the development and transfer of climate sound 
technology.
541
 It is a relatively new field for local recipients and explicit new policies 
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are needed to create regulatory certainty.
542
 However, most S&T policies in China 
today do not really form a comprehensive technology strategy, but are simply 




(1) A balance is needed in the S&T policies between national technology innovation 
and international technology transfer. In China, the government has made a long-term 
commitment to innovative climate sound technologies.
544
 Increasing the scale of 
foreign technology transfer seems to contradict this. In fact, the number of technology 
suppliers involved is not particularly high because they are worried that the 
technological knowledge that is accumulated could eventually lead to lower-cost 
competitors.
545
 Therefore how to increase international involvement is the key to S&T 
policies. For example, the EU and China have cooperated on joint R&D for low-speed 
fan technology, second-generation bio-liquid fuel technology, new thin-film battery 
technology, but it is difficult to extend this to the rest of the world.
546
 “Recognizing 
that climate mitigation and technological advances are a global effort, countries can 
use their own R&D resources in international partnerships and agreements to 




On the demand side, many developing countries fail to incorporate technology 
transfer in their national S&T policies.
548
 The Chinese S&T policy also used to focus 
purely on national innovation. This situation has improved slightly since 2006. The 
newly issued S&T Guidelines adopted an integrating approach to use imported 
technologies in local technology capacity building.
549
 This will have to be 
consolidated in law to increase institutional stability. As in the case of the amendment 
of the Chinese Patent Law, S&T strategies were implemented in advance,
550
 but there 
has not yet been a legislative response to the absorption and re-innovation of imported 
technologies. “The legal system necessary for regulating domestic environmental 
technology needs to be established with the aim of transforming it to achieve 




(2) S&T policies should be coordinated with other policies and areas of law to achieve 
synergy. In general, Chinese S&T policies are poorly linked to the climate change 
framework such as to regional strategies for energy efficiency improvement and 
controlling pollution.
552
 Reducing GHG emissions requires more support from S&T 
policies, rather than the mere identification of technology options. For example, local 
enterprises could be encouraged to become more involved in technology innovation 
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and transfer. Furthermore, local S&T policies fail to respond to some important issues: 
a tradition of innovation,
553
 the weak links between research institutions and 
equipment manufacturers, which discourage foreign companies from attempting to 
transfer climate sound technology to China.
554
 Moreover, sometimes there is no 
support for infrastructure
555
 and R&D investment
556
 required. Compared to other 
countries, particularly developed countries, “the investment is still insufficient, the 
investment structure is not reasonable and the basic conditions for science and 
technology are still weak.”
557
 As for physical infrastructure, China has less experience 
of developing technologies in advance and creating the support networks needed to 
switch from old to new technologies.
558
 Unlike its neighbour Japan, it has carried out 





Technology needs assessment (TNA) 
“Once a technological development plan is set and an organizational structure is in 
place, the next step is normally to determine what the needs of the nation are and what 
technology will satisfy those needs.”
560
 There is a general mismatch between new and 
existing technology in developing countries, and China is no exception.
561
 Although 
dozens of TNA activities have been launched for technology transfers in the Chinese 
context, there is no comprehensive summary of regional differences or technology 
suppliers.
562
 The TNAs drawn up in China are chaotic: they vary from region to 
region, and have different contents, making it difficult for international technology 
transfer participants to use them. It is extremely difficult to obtain complete and 
effective information from all the stakeholders, in particular from the private sector, in 
order to draw up a TNA.
 563
 In addition, little attention has been given to the specific 
stage of technologies, which has an impact on the feasibility and applicability of 
technology in practice.
564
 To a large extent, TNAs in China are lists of technologies 
rather than lists of technology needs. 
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China is now conducting a new round of TNAs in accordance with the requirements 
under the UNFCCC and NAMAs.
565
 This is the starting point in China for the long-
term mechanism to regularly and professionally assess technology needs with 
establishment of institutions, networks and capacity building.  
 
(4) Economic concerns  
Technology transfer to address climate change has a strong background of economic 
legislation, although it is to a large extent based on climate/environmental policies 
and laws.
566
 In practice, the transfer of climate sound technology through the more 
traditional mechanisms is challenging for China. Foreign technology holders can 
delay their investment or be unwilling to license technologies, unless the host country 
ensures a reasonably open trade and investment regime. 
 
IP protection and pro-competition  
At the global level, the legal protection of IP is a controversial issue. It is an open 
question whether the Chinese IP system provides adequate protection for foreign IP 
holders to license their advanced clean technologies. On the one hand, China has 
moved on in the last two decades, from considering IP as public property and has 
introduced a raft of modern IP legislation; on the other hand, there are continuous 
concerns at the international level that the local IP laws are not strong enough to 
ensure effective safeguards.
567
 It is not easy, but it is necessary to remain neutral and 
objective with regard to the assessment of the Chinese IP system.  
 
The major IP legislation in China, the Patent Law, has been improved in many 
respects, as described in the previous chapter.
568
 Although the newly amended Patent 
Law does not focus on either the foreign participants or on the transfer of technology, 
it has comprehensively strengthened the standards of protection.
569
 However, the main 
difficulties relate in the first place to the remaining differences in the law and its 




Chinese Patent Law differs from that of most industrialized countries in a number of 
ways. This is a matter of concern for their MNCs hoping to license technologies in 
China. In the first place, there are differences in the degree of local legal protection of 
IP. Foreign technology holders expect their rights to be protected in the same way as 
in their home countries, and sometimes they are too insistent on protecting their 
IPRs.
571
 However, it could be argued that once a technology has been sold, it belongs 
to the recipient and not to the vendors. “What western enterprises fear most, may be 
the risk of being confronted with more intense competition from developing countries 
exporting to their own domestic markets once their technology is no longer weak. 
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This is why they are often reluctant to sell the most advanced technologies”.
572
 In fact, 
the conflict arising from this is of a long-term, political and cultural nature rather than 
of an immediate legal nature.  
 
China is still actively improving the legal protection of IP in accordance with both its 
international commitments and national conditions. For example, under the current 
Patent Law, a trade secret is difficult to protect, and many IP lawsuits involve leaks of 
trade secrets from former employees.
573
 China is now a member of the WTO and is 
automatically bound by its minimum standard on IP protection. This certainly 
alleviates the concerns of their international partners. “It is logical to expect countries 
that are predominantly users of externally generated IP to be less likely to protect it 
than countries that are net producers of IP.‟
574
 As for many other developing countries, 
there is a delicate balance between national innovation and technology transfer. 
“China‟s ambivalence about ownership of any property, much less intellectual 
property, magnifies the reluctance of most growing economies to protect rights of 
foreign patent holders.”
575
 To a large extent, strong IPRs reduce the scope for 
informal technology transfer by means of imitation which has proved to be an 




Secondly, compulsory licensing is seen as being different by foreign technology 
owners.
577
 Compulsory licensing is clearly based on a different starting point. Chinese 
Patent Law introduces new standards, theoretically opening up a broad range of 
technologies to compulsory licensing. Climate mitigation and adaptation technologies 
are to be exempt from patentability on the grounds of “public health”, “public interest” 
or “anti-monopoly behaviour”.
578
 However, some key expressions in the compulsory 
licensing provisions are not explicitly defined, and this leads to radical problems of 
implementation and enforcement.
579
 For example, it is not clear whether the climate 
crisis is a compelling threat to the “public interest”, and this has been left to the 
discretion of the courts.
580
 Unsurprisingly, compulsory licensing has never been 
granted in practice, even for patented pharmaceuticals.
581
 Therefore, more definitive 
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terms are needed to make it more feasible and likely that compulsory licences will be 
granted in the field of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. 
 
Furthermore, there has been a systemic failure to enforce the IP laws in China, despite 
the overall improvement resulting from the amended Patents Law. China has a 
divided patent litigation system. The People‟s Court decides on infringements and the 
SIPO Patent Reexamination Board hears the challenges to valid patents.
582
 In the 
settlement of disputes, patent infringements and proceedings about the validity of 
patents often take place at the same time. “It is common for disagreements and 
contradictions to occur between administrative agencies and between them and the 
courts with regard, for example, to the interpretation of the law, judgments made and 
their respective policies towards IP and its protection.”
583
 As will be discussed below, 
this “dual-track” system results from the remaining weaknesses of the IP legal 
framework and enforcement procedures. 
 
In this respect, China has introduced the basic Antimonopoly Law to correct the side 
effects of IP. The behaviour of technological MNEs will be examined and supervised 
under this law for potential restrictive or monopolistic practices. In China there are 
laws which protect and oppose IP, which must be consolidated to remove 
inconsistencies.
584
 Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law was formulated to define the 
legal boundary between Patent Law and Competition Law.
585
 Nevertheless, Article 55 
is considered vague and has been challenged, especially where foreign technology 
holders are involved.
586
 Given China‟s background of state economic planning and 
the urgent need for clean technologies, there is some concern that China will adopt a 
broader approach to this subject in respect of restrictive practices, for example, by 
expanding the application of Article 55 to discourage MNEs from enforcing their IP 
against domestic competitors.
587
 Meanwhile, the situation remains vague outside the 
Antimonopoly Law. “The lack of detailed implementing regulations and guidelines on 
the interrelation of IP and competition laws has resulted in legal uncertainty for both 




Up to now, environmental protection and energy conservation have been identified as 
new exemptions so that enterprises can conduct monopolistic activities: “These 
provisions are obviously designed to encourage foreign investment in research and 
development and encourage the transfer of new technology to China.”
589
 As problems 
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have arisen in this respect, all the exemptions are subject to a national review.
590
 The 
failure to comply with this review will result in no exemption being granted. This is a 
risky strategy in the light of China‟s current complex institutional structure.
591
 As 
described above, the threefold enforcement model (MOC, NDRC and SAIC) is 
authorized to implement the Antimonopoly Law. It is still unclear which specific 
agency is the “competent anti-monopoly authority” under Article 15, and will have 
the final power to determine whether exemptions will be granted. 
 
Technology trade and investment  
In China, the context for importing climate technologies is unstable. There are many 
factors which account for this. For example, there is the potential paradox in clean 
industry in China, for which the government has failed to prepare long-term and 
coherent planning. The classic example is wind power technology. Due to the 
frequent strategic switches between home-grown innovation and technology transfer, 
trade measures for wind power technology and the associated components vary in 
every case. “The resulting shifting import duty and tax landscape is not conducive to 





Foreign policies related to the globalization of technology are therefore very sensitive: 
they neither imply an attempt to create a protectionist barrier around an economy‟s 
technology base, nor the need to abolish the national policies.
593
 This is even more 
apparent with regard to low carbon technologies. As illustrated by clean coal 
technology, on which import duties of up to 40 % have been levied, these are like 
green trade barriers, according to some observers, which made it difficult for foreign 
investors to compete in China.
594
 Relevant trade measures should be applied carefully 
so that imports can be absorbed without any claims for trade protectionism.  
 
When ESTs are transferred from abroad, both sides must sign a technology 
introduction contract.
595
 In general, Chinese contract laws and regulations do not 
allow unreasonable restrictions to be imposed on licensees by technology transfer 
agreements.
596
 To examine this and determine whether the technology transfer meets 
local developmental interest, China has established a contract registration system. On 
the one hand, the risks and uncertainties can increase in the registration process; on 
the other hand, there has recently been a noticeable improvement in the local 
registration procedure: key climate technologies such as energy savings and 
renewable energy technologies are identified as “freely imported technologies” and 
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are only subject to online registration.
597
 Above all, this favourable procedural 
treatment is based on the general classification of technology in the Chinese trade 
regime, and has a broad scope. There is no particular focus on climate mitigation and 
adaptation technologies, for example, through TNAs and CDMs. A pre-determined 
list of technologies could be developed for CDMs. They would be deemed to be 
additional by the EB, which could speed up their registration.
598
 These legal 
instruments are vital for combating climate change, but are not effectively 
incorporated in the Chinese technology trade regime. Considering the current 
legislation, it would not be unrealistic to bridge this gap.
599
 Chinese legislation has not 
improved these procedures with substantive laws. For example the technology 
introduction contract does not include any special provisions for climate sound 




China is relaxing the conditions for foreign investment in the clean energy and 
technology sectors.
601
 The chief challenge in this is the lack of legal harmonization. 
For example, foreign enterprises when investing clean technology could enjoy lower 
income tax rate (15% compared with normal tax rate 25%), provided that they are 
eligible to be deemed as “Hi-tech/New-tech” enterprises.
602
 For many of them, this 





Typically, there are investment requirements related to technology transfer and local 
content.
604
 These requirements are a logical development of a different point of view: 
as a sovereign country, China has the right to design its own investment policies, 
whereas their acceptance in practice seems problematic, particularly when their 
structure is not very specific and is not voluntary. Also, the performance requirement 
is not very efficient in practice. For example, under the local content requirement, 
foreign investors must purchase a particular percentage of domestically produced 
materials and components. It can be met by developing a Chinese manufacturing base, 
without necessarily involving Chinese-owned firms in the relevant design and 
assembly activities.
605
 This does not promote a comprehensive form of technology 
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transfer that includes the transfer of know-how and IPRs. Only two Chinese wind 
turbine producers have acquired independent property rights in joint ventures.
606
 At 
the international law level, both the local content requirement and the technology 
transfer requirement were at risk of being deemed to contradict the national treatment 
principle, and this is likely to become the subject of a trade dispute under the WTO.
607
 
It is important that green investments are encouraged without leading to green 
protectionism. 
 
The Chinese government is trying to encourage joint ventures for the purpose of 
technology transfer.
608
 However, the current framework of foreign investment 
contains restrictions on the percentage of registered foreign capital in a contractual 
joint venture.
609
 In regular CDM projects, foreign investors are entitled to jointly 
implement CDM projects, provided that the stock sharing accounts for less than 49% 
in total. According to the framework, this percentage of ownership is not necessarily 
proportional to the profits shared by the investment partners. In practice, joint 
ventures operate ineffectively. “One of the reasons is that many foreign managers 
have come to perceive their local partner as a disabler rather than as an enabler.”
610
 
For them, it is a fundamental requirement for any environmental/ climate technology 




5.3.2 Implementation and enforcement 
To a large extent, the success of laws depends on how effectively they are 
implemented and enforced. Currently in China, it is perhaps fair to say that the 
implementation and enforcement of laws has not been as successful as their 
formulation. The gap is narrowing but is still significant. Similarly the 
implementation and enforcement of the provisions in climate technology transfer are 
lax and superficial, and in general the legislative objectives are not achieved. Several 
critical factors are responsible for this: (1) legal traditions; (2) government 
coordination and cooperation and (3) capacity.   
 
5.3.2.1 Legal tradition 
The barriers raised by different legal traditions are of a general nature, but require 
specific attention as regards technology transfer for climate mitigation and adaptation. 
Legal traditions have a broad scope, involving every aspect of a country. In the case 
of China‟s unique “Confucianism”, the legal system, regulatory transparency and 
institutional attitudes have a profound and complicated impact on the issue concerned 
here.  
 
Legal thought  
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It is commonly known that the Chinese legal tradition is based on the philosophy of 
Confucius, which contrasts radically with the western system of “legalism”. 
Confucianism, the system of human governance with an emphasis on moral education 
and social harmony, has been dominant in China for a long time.
612
 We are concerned 
here with environmental protection, climate governance and the IP issue. (1) As a 
result of Confucianism, there is no sufficiently independent system of implementation 
and enforcement in China.
613
 Although they were approved several years ago, many 
Chinese environmental laws still have no viable means of implementation.
614
 Local 
environmental protection, particularly when it is climate related, is subject to 
administrative law. Therefore its implementation largely falls under administrative 
jurisdiction, rather than that of the judiciary.
615
 Although the legislation can formally 




(2) Under Confucianism, the existing Chinese judicial system is restricted to 
providing fair and effective IP-related resolutions.
617
 As mentioned above, 
Confucianism reflects moral values, in which education and knowledge play a key 
role. A well-known Confucian saying in China is that “stealing a book is not stealing”. 
Nowadays intellectual property is extensively commercialized and this appears to 
have a profoundly negative impact on people‟s values and behaviour. IP is difficult to 
protect in China for this reason, and many IP lawsuits involve knowledge-related 
leaks from former employees.
618
 Similarly, Confucianism has always determined the 
model for the settlement of disputes, with a focus on preventing disputes from 
happening rather than on finding out whose rights have been infringed.
619
 There is a 
common aversion to litigation in China, particularly in the business world.
620
 For the 
settlement of IP disputes, the two-track system consisting of administrative controls 
and judicial proceedings prevails. “The general order of preference in China runs 
from judicial litigation, as the least preferred, through to non-judicial administrative 
adjudication, (and) then private mediation as the most popular means of dispute 
resolution.”
621
 However, foreign technology holders who perceive court proceedings 
as a last resort are concerned about their unfavourable position in the settlement of a 
dispute related to an IP leak because of their unfamiliarity with local laws and 
networks. “The terms are interpreted by SIPO and China‟s courts to require 
production in China, as opposed to importation, or to require sale at particular prices 
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The legal system  
China has a system of civil law in which cases play a marginal role. As a basic 
principle, Chinese courts are not authorized to interpret laws and are confined to the 
implementation process.
623
 As described above, many technology transfer provisions 
are formulated in vague terms and do not have adequate procedures or compliance 
mechanisms for the law to operate in practice. For example, in the current Renewable 
Energy Law, it is not clear who is responsible for the accuracy of resource 
assessments and data. It is important to formulate implementation procedures in more 
detail, as they have a considerable impact on the willingness of foreign enterprises to 




Because of the limited role of the courts, one successful experience cannot be directly 
applied to another case. This leads to much inconsistent enforcement in practice. At 
the regional level, governments particularly have a considerable influence on the 
People‟s Court. “It is not unusual for one court to fail to cooperate in the enforcement 
of the judgments made by higher and similar level courts. Few rules and guidelines 





Another common obstacle in China is the continuing lack of transparency.
626
 
Although China has moved politically towards better information sharing, problems 
still exist in the domestic carbon market and legal system.
627
 The transparency of the 
carbon market depends on administrative accountability, which has to be sufficiently 
clear in climate governance. For example, if estimates and projections of emissions 




From a legal point of view, the WTO, and in particular the TRIPS and Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM), require that laws, regulations, and administrative 
methods are published in tradable services, or to a more limited extent, investment 
regimes.
629
 Although there has been some legal reform in the past decades, the 
requirements do not correspond with the relevant legal domains for basic historical 
and cultural reasons. As regards climate change related technology transfer, 
transparency is essential for a country to measure, report and verify their pledged 
mitigation activities. In the case of China, this can be very challenging, although it is 
necessary to strengthen the administrative and legal processes in order to ensure 
transparency. The role of the citizen has historically been ignored in China, 
particularly in regulatory policymaking and the implementation of environmental 
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protection, and public participation continues to be generally weak.
 630
 “Public 
participation requires a balance between economic interests and environmental 
protection.”
631  




Although legislation can be promulgated relatively quickly and its implementation 
will improve in time, a country‟s institutional attitudes take longer to change. 
 
Because of poor past performances which failed to keep up with current performance 
standards, recipient enterprises may be prejudiced against technology transfer.
632
 
Taking the Clean Production Promotion Law by way of example, higher standards 
have been adopted for industries in comparison with the pollution control standards 
based on the end-of-pipe approach. Although the participation of private recipients in 
GHG emissions reduction has certainly increased, technology transfer is still not one 
of their primary interests.
633
 In fact, this prejudice against technology appears to be 
generic in developing countries, e.g., in the Philippines where low carbon 




Contracts are another example. The different interpretation of the term “contract” 
between western and Chinese businesses is widely recognised.
635
 Typically, China 
emphasises the ideal of the contract and the personal promise, while western partners 
incline to underline the content of the contract and draw up agreements in terms 
which are as concrete as possible. In the case of climate technology transfer which 
implies long-term commitment from investors to share technology with local 
recipients, serious problems can arise after the contract has been signed. For example, 
irregularities often occur in the performance and monitoring of contracts. Disputes 
usually start when the recipients of climate technology become familiar with the 
licensed technologies. It then becomes difficult to collect the royalties from the 




5.3.2.2 Government coordination and cooperation   
By defining technology transfer as an economic/energy issue and using a performance 
evaluation system, the central government has placed the transfer of climate sound 
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(1) The implementation and enforcement by local governments  
The development and transfer of climate sound technology in a national context is 
mainly related to policy, fiscal, and economic issues which can be predominantly 
local.
638
 However, the many levels of the Chinese administrative and legal system 
make the straightforward implementation of technology transfer difficult. Basically it 
is almost impossible to draft general provisions for different local situations when 
creating legislation.
639
 “The laws fail to anticipate the possibility that certain 
government interests might diverge sharply from those of the environment department 





The local environmental protection agencies are not adequately coordinated with the 
state environmental protection agency and peer administrative agencies to implement 
the law in concrete terms. 
641
 Although local environmental protection agencies are 
theoretically subject to local or broader jurisdictions, this on its own cannot ensure the 
effective implementation of national regulations and standards. First, the relevant 
agencies have their own interests which may not always be consistent with the central 
agency. For instance, they are often major shareholders of polluting enterprises, or 
significantly benefit from them financially. In Pingnan County in Fujian Province, the 
amount of tax levied on a heavily polluting chemical factory accounts for 25% of the 
county‟s income.
642
 Secondly, the driving force from the outside is weak at the local 
level. The supervisory mechanism is not effective in legal terms, and incentives do 
not play any part. “There are no rewards for climate action and the prevailing 
perception is that reducing GHG emissions and energy consumption will thwart 
economic growth.”
643
 “Obsolete products, technologies and services are then 





The traditional top-down deployment appears to result in constraints with regard to 
steering local government action towards climate change which has not been a 
priority historically.
645
 Two main reasons account for this: the fiscal system and the 
performance evaluation system. (1) The fiscal system. The fiscal authority of local 
government is adequate to promote the development of the local economy, but it is 
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unfavourable for supporting sustainable development.
646
 Because “environmental 
protection bureaus obtain their funding from sub-national governments of which they 
are part, the enforcement of environmental policies faces significant financial 
constraints and is frequently undermined by economic pressure.”
647
 (2) The 
performance evaluation system. This system, a method of governance by which local 
officials are held accountable, is characterised by its emphasis on targets and 
flexibility.
648
 However, it has been argued that the current performance evaluation 
system is highly sensitive with regard changing preferences for new policy goals such 
as energy conservation.
649
 Traditionally the performance of local agencies was 
reviewed primarily on the basis of economic growth targets. Faced with diverse 
priorities and incentives, local governments are not so motivated to act on climate 
change. For most of them, climate change is a rather distant concept that makes sense 
globally, but has no tangible policy implications, at least in the short-term, and little 
practical relevance to their activities.
650
 Just as in the Chinese “Going-out” strategy of 
clean technologies, local governments value the economic returns of clean 





(2) The implementation and enforcement by sectors  
Similar problems arise in different sectors. China suffers from sectoral fragmentation 
with regard to climate governance. The NDRC has overall responsibility for 
managing and coordinating all the climate change issues, including technology 
transfer. Because of the broad range of climate sound technologies and the highly 
interdisciplinary nature of technology transfer activities, more than one sector is 
involved in decision making.
652
 For example, the NDRC, the MOST and the MOEP 
are all delegated to deal with CDM projects. Typically there are overlapping 
authorities in these sectors with interests which are not always consistent, and in some 
cases there is competition between the sectors. Therefore the interaction with 
governments can be very complex and difficult. There are also overlaps and loopholes 
in the sectoral authorities in relation to antimonopoly practices.
653
 “Especially in cases 
of overlapping competences, hardly any measures for co-operation processes exist 
that could modulate deviating enforcement policies.”
654
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As regards the legislation, strategies are developed both for cross-sectoral and sector-
specific technologies. Most climate change laws have a comprehensive nature and are 
aimed at all the technologies in all the sectors. However, actions for specific sectors, 
as well as sectoral cooperation, are lacking.
655
 Taking renewable energy and 
technology by way of example, more detailed planning and co-ordination is required, 
including the co-ordination of the renewable with overall electric power sector 
development and transmission planning.
656
 The Circular Economy Promotion Law 
and the Clean Production Promotion Law particularly focus on clean technologies 
across all industries, while their practical implementation and enforcement are carried 
out by individual sectors in most cases.  
 
Furthermore, some sector-specific regulations which address climate change also 
involve technology development and transfer. In China, regulations for the transfer of 
climate sound technology at the national level and at the sectoral level are mainly 
mutually supportive, although they are not always in harmony. For example, in the 
wind power industry, wind power projects are not allowed to import more than 30% 
of equipment from abroad. Project owners are therefore forced to choose domestic 
equipment which still lags behind foreign alternatives.
657
 These sector-specific 
regulations usually follow an isolated strategy within industries, and on the whole 
they do not promote clean technology transfer. In fact, greater macro-level 
coordination is required between the key sectors of clean energy and technology.  
 
5.3.2.3 Capacity for implementation and enforcement  
Capacity building is characteristic of technology transfer. China is not ready to 
introduce climate sound technologies in practice as was expected, due to the lack of 
adequate implementation and enforcement capacity that is undermined by (1) 
technical, (2) market, (3) financial and (4) institutional shortcomings. 
 
(1) Technical barriers 
Recently there has been a trend in China to shift the role of governments from sending 
orders to providing services.
658
 The statutory support for this shift is found, for 
example, in the Energy Conservation Law.
659
 However, the government‟s capacity to 
mobilise the scientific resources of the whole of society has proved to be limited, 
which in turn limits domestic innovation and the capacity to absorb technology.
660
 As 
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The end user implements the technologies, and the progress of adopting imported 
technologies slows down because of the poor technological base of local recipients. 
This phenomenon is particularly prominent in the renewable energy sectors. For 
example, the solar photovoltaic industry is a high-tech industry, and at present many 
Chinese solar photovoltaic enterprises do not have the necessary professional 
background, even though they produce components on an enormous scale.
662
 It is not 
only the private recipients who lack their own R&D, but they are actually not very 
interested in adopting upstream technology.
663
 The gap between the R&D of Chinese 
enterprises and that of their western counterparts is apparent from the very start. 
Compared to Siemens, where R&D investments account for 10% of sales revenues, 
Chinese enterprises which manufacture power generating equipment invest only 2%-3% 




 (2) The market 
Climate sound technology transfer and the carbon market are closely linked. The 
potential of the Chinese carbon market has been reported as being the world‟s largest, 
attracting many international buyers who may bring clean technologies which are 
unavailable locally.
665
 Despite the massive potential, this market is highly volatile 
because of the regulatory uncertainty. Carbon reductions tend to be too small in scale 
to carry out a technology transfer. In addition, the inadequacy of the relevant laws 
leads to loopholes and irregularities in the clean technology market and a lack of 
confidence in foreign IP owners. For example, China probably lacks the prerequisites 




In the meantime, the overall level of commercialization in China is low (roughly 
10%), making it difficult to trade low carbon technologies commercially.
667
 In order 
to improve the services for the commercialization of technology, China is 
encouraging the establishment of trade platforms.
668
 Because this has started late and 
there is a lack of management expertise, these trade platforms are not really 





(3) Financial capacity  
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Financial capacity is another pressing issue. The lack of purchasing power is 
commonly seen as a formidable barrier to the introduction of foreign advanced 
technologies. In general, local enterprises are not capable of developing a long-term 
strategy or a reasonable assessment of the costs of new technology. Even though 
lower fuel and operating costs may make clean technology cost-competitive on a life-
cycle basis, higher initial capital costs hold back many potential recipients.
670
 Small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly find it financially difficult to 
engage in international technology cooperation.  
 
In this respect, governments must take the lead in financing commercial production in 
order to reach a certain level of cost effectiveness and reduce the risks which confront 
private recipients.
671
 As described above, the Chinese energy laws introduce special 
government funds for energy conservation and renewable energy development.
672
 In 
the absence of a uniform standard/model for these purposes, these government funds 
have not been developed, and there is little publicity about them.
673
 In other field such 
as the circular economy, extended producer responsibility has been adopted in 
Circular Economy Promotion Law.
674
 However, there are no incentives for the 
majority of producers, which deters private investors from investing in preventive 




(4) Institutional capacity 
Finally, serious shortages of institutional capacity in personnel and financial resources 
limit the implementation and enforcement of technology transfer provisions. For 
example, in western provinces like Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang, which are far poorer 
compared with other Chinese regions and more vulnerable to the impact of climate 
change, there is an urgent demand for the relevant technologies. The local 
governments do not have the capacity to attract foreign technologies and take full 
advantage of them.
676
 In recent years, attention has again been devoted to the 
relationship between institutional capacity and the enforcement of environmental laws 
in China.
677
 Increasing the funding and improving human resources are likely to help 
in overcoming the obstacles to enforcement of regulations, e.g. in relation to the 
reduction of pollution.  
 
At the same time, to strengthen the institutional capacity of the private sector proves 
essential for a meaningful and effective technology transfer. For example, Siemens 
agreed to transfer gas turbine blade manufacturing technology to China, but failed to 
achieve this, as the Chinese recipients lacked the necessary human resources to 
receive, operate and maintain the technologies up to the time of this survey.
678
 The 
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absence of qualified personnel often results in the technology transfer being below 
par.
679
 Furthermore, climate mitigation and technology upgrades in China are centred 
in state-owned enterprises. On the one hand, these enterprises are often heavily 
subsidized, and foreign investors in clean energy industries often find themselves 
competing against them in the local market.
680
 On the other hand, state-owned 






Climate change is addressed with a country-based approach. In the Chinese situation, 
the institutional obstacles to technology transfer reflect some of the common 
problems found in the developing world, but also have unique features. In China, the 
legal system contains technology transfer provisions and climate governance, 
environmental protection, technological change and economic policy are dealt with 
together in a broader context. At the moment, this system is far from ideal.  
 
Despite their limited number, technology transfer provisions are at the heart of the 
climate change framework associated with the transfer of technology. However, as in 
many other developing countries, these provisions have not achieved a breakthrough 
by clearly defining the key concept of technology transfer. The limitations of the 
scope of technology transfer are apparent. Crucial issues such as climate adaptation, 
and post-transfer activities remain outside the central climate framework. Typically, 
almost all technology transfer provisions lack explicitly determined legal 
consequences, resulting only in policy being dictated or yet another “best-effort” 
requirement. 
 
As the technology transfer provisions have a relatively superficial influence, there are 
naturally high hopes for climate governance, though this has proved to be highly 
policy-centric and bureaucratic.
682
 Technology transfer operates inefficiently with 
regard to concrete mechanisms such the CDM and ODA because of the potential 
barriers. Some barriers originate from the design of the mechanisms, such as the 
additionality required for CDM approval, to which the transfer of technology 
marginally contributes. These barriers could certainly be affected by possible 
international developments. Other barriers are of an entirely local nature. In current 
China, clean technology policy and law are developed without any underlying 
theory.
683
 Furthermore, some specific industry regulations on technology make it 




Environmental protection and pollution control are speeding up the phasing out of 
coal intensive technologies. In China, several environmental laws, particularly climate 
change- related laws, have been introduced in short succession in an attempt to meet 
departmental agendas or legislative deadlines for the adoption of certain laws. 
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 Zou, Wang and Fu 2009, (no. 25), pp. 77-79. Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China 2010, (no. 151), 
pp. 14-15. 
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 This is because climate sound technology transfer has basically been defined as an energy/economic issue in 
China. 
683
 Wang 2010, (no. 206), p. 2575. 
684
 Ch.5.3.1.2 “The Legal Context in Which Climate Sound Technology Transfer is Regulated.” 
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Inadequate legal research was carried out in advance, resulting in a lack of 
correspondence between the provisions and practices. The barriers which arise in this 
respect are more or less similar to those in the technology transfer provisions, e.g., the 
ambiguous, aspirational language that is adopted. Up to now, GHG have been 
considered distinct from atmospheric pollutants in China and thus are excluded from 
the existing regime for the control and prevention of air pollution. In the absence of a 
comprehensive Climate Change Act, this limits the reduction of GHG emissions in 
general. Furthermore, the role of technology transfer in facilitating compliance has 
been largely ignored, which is inconsistent with the policy priority of technology 
transfer as well as the national commitment to providing an enabling environment. 
However, it is also important to be aware of the different environment for the 




In fact, technology transfer takes place in the broad context of technological change. 
China still lacks well-designed S&T policies for the development and transfer of 
climate sound technology, and lacks the mechanism to achieve a balance. In common 
with many developing countries, China‟s S&T policies are poorly linked to mitigation 
policies. However, in China, the tension between national technology innovation and 
international technology transfer is exceptionally strong in the clean energy and 
technology sectors. In addition, China is traditionally weak with regard to technology 
innovation and entrepreneurial capacity. Most of the local S&T policies do not give 
weight to these deeply-rooted traditions. Instead of developing comprehensive 
technology deployment strategies, they merely produce lists of technologies. This also 
applies for the current TNAs in China.  
 
For many developing countries, it is not easy to soundly integrate environmental 
agenda with economic objectives.
686
 The economic laws essentially limit the 
promotion of climate sound technology, as their aim is to maximize the economic 
value of innovative technology. Fundamentally, laws which proceed from a clear 
business-as-usual assumption are not likely to play a role in the technological solution 
to climate change. Rules and measures are highly sensitive to structure in this respect. 
Related key issues concern the accessibility and affordability of climate technologies, 
the formidable barriers which are emerging from IP protection, pro-competition, 
importation controls and FDI. In the current international political, economic and 
legal order, host developing countries have been asked to provide a reasonably open, 
completely competitive market. The barriers which occur in this respect appear to be 
particularly formidable in China at the moment. For example, there has been a 
systemic failure to implement IP laws in China. Because of the comprehensive, 
though as yet incomplete domestic reformation at the same time, there are great risks 
as well as great potential in the clean technology market in China, though the relevant 
legislation has failed to respond promptly and appropriately, or this has basically been 
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 Hansen and Pyke 2007, (no. 514), p. 26. “Achieving the original goals of environment related regulations will 
require a careful assessment of long-standing assumptions, as well as decisive action to change regulatory 
practices in ways that accommodate, offset, and mitigate climate change.” 
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 For instance, the frequent switch between home-grown innovation and technology transfer means that trade 
measures for wind power technology and associated machine components vary from time by time. 
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In conclusion, climate sound technology and its transfer are relatively new to China 
and explicit new formulations are needed in order to create regulatory certainty. To a 
large extent, the Chinese legislation has failed to achieve the desired result. 
Meanwhile, it could be said that the implementation and enforcement of laws in 
contemporary China have not been as successful as their formulation. There are 
several reasons for this, ranging from historical reasons rooted in legal traditions to 
practical reasons resulting from weak capacity. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese 
traditional practices in legal doctrine, the civil law system, transparency and 
institutional attitudes have an enormous impact on climate change related technology 
transfer. The legal doctrine of Confucianism, for example, has a profound influence 
on the role of law, the public perception of knowledge and the model for the 
settlement of disputes. Realistically, the transfer of technology is hampered by an 
inadequate capacity of both government and enterprises, and their potential technical, 
marketing, financial and institutional shortcomings. The capacity for implementation 
and enforcement is even weaker at the subnational level, i.e., by local governments 
and different sectors.
688
 Fortunately Chinese environmental law has devoted some 
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 By defining technology transfer as an economic/energy target and using a performance evaluation system and a 
fiscal system, the central government has placed the transfer of climate sound technology on the agenda of local 
governments and key sectors. In the Chinese judicial system, there are vertical and horizontal overlaps between 
various responsibilities, competition and complicated interests. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Since the adoption of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), technology transfer has played an increasingly important role in 
international and national climate change law and policy. Acknowledged as a 
favorable solution to address global climatic problems, the UNFCCC technology 
transfer has been codified in national legislations worldwide. However, the signing of 
an international agreement in itself does not guarantee complete, valid and sustainable 
fulfillment. A survey of the international climate framework primarily structured in 
the UNFCCC proceedings and of national legislation and relevant practices shows 
that climate change-related technology transfer does not operate effectively.
1
 This 
makes it imperative, for both suppliers and recipients, to explore more precisely the 
impediments to a meaningful and effective transfer of technology that has the 
potential to reduce GHG emissions and cope with the impact of climate change. One 
commonly perceived barrier concerns regulatory, instrumental and/or legislative 
obstacles. The low effectiveness of regulation is frequently a consequence of legal 
obstacles, and the identification, evaluation and prioritization of these obstacles are 
very much context-based. Actions must be tailored to reflect specific circumstances, 
such as those in China. At present, China has a crucial role in climate geopolitics: as a 
new leading emitter and a proactive advocator of technology transfer, China and its 
legislation and practices set an interesting example.  
 
In this PhD study, we have tried to answer the following research question: “what are 
legal barriers to the technology transfer for addressing climate change and are there 
any implications for Chinese legislation and practices?” Four sub-questions have been 
dealt with to be able to answer this main question: 
 
1. What do we mean by technology transfer in addressing climate change? What are 
the distinctive features in comparison with regular technology transfer and what is 
the theoretical basis behind this?
2
 
2. What is the legal framework of climate change-related technology transfer? What 
specific principles, rules, institutions and mechanisms have been formulated?
 3
 
3. What are the legal barriers in the process of supplying and receiving climate sound 
technologies in general and specifically how do they impact on international 




4. Has climate change-related technology transfer been regulated in China? What 




To address the above questions successfully, the thesis applies a combined 
methodology of literature review and field research. In the first place, general 
legislation and literatures on the subject have been reviewed through desk study. 
Chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4 provide an overview of the legal barriers to 
                                                 
1
 Considering that foreign technologies generally are 30% more efficient, this might reduce GHG reduction 
opportunities. 
2
 Chapter 1 “Introduction.” 
3
 Chapter 2 “The Legal Framework of Climate Change-related Technology Transfer.” 
4
 Chapter 3 “Instrumental Barriers toSupplying Climate Sound Technology”, Chapter 4 “Instrumental Barriers to 
Receiving Climate Sound Technology.” 
5
 Chapter 5 “Chinese Legislation and Practices of Climate Sound Technology Transfer.” 
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technology transfer under the UNFCCC, i.e., from the perspective of both technology 
suppliers and recipients. Secondly, chapter 5 devotes special attention to the 
legislation and practices in China. There is a specific review of the literature on the 
Chinese situation as regards climate mitigation and adaptation technology transfer. 
For more information on what is happening at ground level, a field research has been 
conducted in China which covers governments, technology enterprises, financial 
agencies and scholars. Key persons in the field of technology transfer and climate 
change were interviewed. These all contribute to this thesis to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
 
In this concluding chapter, we will recall the previous chapters and formulate answers 
to the four questions.  
 
6.1 What do we mean by technology transfer in addressing climate change? 
What are the distinctive features in comparison with regular technology 
transfer and what is the theoretical basis behind this? 
The recent progress in overcoming transboundary environmental problems brings 
substantial vitality to a traditional business: international technology transfer. Given 
the scale and urgency of the climate crisis, technology transfer has become more 
negotiable. However, it seems impractical – or at least, rather difficult – to formulate 
a catch-all definition of technology transfer.
6
 Recognizing this status quo, the 
UNFCCC has so far refrained from adopting normative definitions at a statutory level. 
 
To reach a better understanding of technology transfer, the definition of climate sound 
technology has to be clarified first. Although it does not specify what constitutes a 
climate sound technology, the IPCC cites a general concept of environmentally sound 
technologies (ESTs) formulated by Agenda 21. The central concern of such 
technologies appears to be environmental solutions that mesh with the ideal of 
sustainable development. Climate sound technologies can therefore be taken to refer 
to ESTs that have the potential to significantly decrease the intensity of GHG in the 
atmosphere and to prepare for the effects of climate change. In this respect, two major 
categories of technologies are involved: climate mitigation technologies (i.e., energy 
conservation technologies, renewable energy technologies and clean production 
technologies) and climate adaptation technologies (i.e., technologies in agriculture, 
forestry, biodiversity, ocean management and human health that are aimed at adapting 
to a changing climate).  
 
On this basis, the IPCC has developed a comprehensive concept of technology 
transfer that has achieved high referential value and widespread acceptance. This 
concept views technology transfer as multifaceted and inclusive: it is a product of 
technological innovation, a public commodity for global climate welfare as well as a 
socioeconomic process of learning. To ensure that this concept is functional rather 
than formal, we recommend that four concrete performance indicators are in place:  
 
1. Geographic origin. Either the major or essential components of  or rights to 
technologies (patents, licenses, copyrights, trademark) must come from abroad; 
2. Novelty. Imported technologies must not already be in use in the receiving 
                                                 
6
 There are a variety of definitions with regard to technology transfer in response to climate change, only few of 
them are viewed as a standardized reference by the different stakeholders or at the operational level. 
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markets, any specific regions or industrial sectors; 
3. Environmental improvement. Technologies to be transferred should contribute to 
climate improvement; 
4. Capacity building. Science-intensive climate technologies are not autonomous 
processes, but rely heavily on human skills. 
 
The definition of climate sound technology has decisive implications for how 
technology transfer is perceived in a climate change context. In essence, such transfer 
is different from technology transfers that take place in the business as usual. Climate 
sound technologies produced by the private sector are expected to increase in value, 
which means the price will be higher than a marginal cost. The transfer of technology 
thus primarily takes place in response to market forces. However, the market 
mechanism plays only a limited role in relation to the atmosphere as “common 
property”. The environmental costs of climate change are not internalised and 
therefore the incentive for innovation in the private sector is reduced, unless 
governments push the supply and pull the demand to encourage the private IPR 
holders and supervise the climate technology market. Even so, it is perhaps fair to say 
that there is no viable global governance by a supranational government. The 
challenge is to achieve the global public good of climate protection by means of the 
concerted action of heterogeneous national actors who have a stake in climate 
technology transfer related to energy security, economic growth and international 
competitiveness. “With no global sovereign to adopt coercive regulation, countries 




6.2 What is the legal framework of climate change-related technology transfer? 
What specific principles, rules, institutions and mechanisms have been 
formulated? 
In the context of climate change, technology transfer is predominantly regulated by 
the UNFCCC. Designed as a broad framework to comprehensively deal with the 
climatic crisis, including solutions involving technology, the UNFCCC codifies two 
legal principles that strongly influence technology transfer: the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and the principle of international cooperation.
8
 In 
particular, the well-known principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
takes historical and realistic factors into account, through which an equal balance 
acceptable to the great majority of developed and developing countries has been 
reached. Further, the UNFCCC specifies technology transfer commitments for three 
categories of Parties: all participants, and the participants from developed countries 
and developing countries. A general technology transfer commitment is common to 
all Parties, as are technology promotion and the exchange of technology information. 
In this respect, it is assumed that developed countries will undertake obligations of 
solidarity and assistance both in technology and in finance; whilst developing country 
Parties are allowed to suspend their implementation of the convention under the 
conditionality clause and, to create an enabling environment for the improved 
participation in technology transfer.  
 
                                                 
7
 See Jonathan Wiener, “Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China,” 55 UCLA Law Review, 2008, p. 
1805. 
8
 These two principles are also stated in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. Due to the nature of these policy 
documents, however, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration only indicate strong moral duties that serve as an open 
benchmark for international actions on technology transfer.  
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The UNFCCC regards technology transfer as a crucial tool to realize specific 
environmental objectives, and the Kyoto Protocol has subsequently developed it to 
become more pragmatic, specific and stringent by introducing a range of flexible 
mechanisms. One of these is the clean development mechanism (CDM). Although the 
CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate, it serves as an important 
practical vehicle to finance emission reduction projects that employ clean 
technologies currently unavailable in host countries.
9
 Furthermore, responding to the 
Protocol‟s call for a robust compliance mechanism, the COP7 ultimately made a 
breakthrough in setting up an institutional framework for technology transfer. The 
Facilitative Branch, entrusted with the task of ensuring that the common but 
differentiated responsibilities of the Parties are fulfilled, was responsible in the case of 
the violation of “positive measures” like finance, technology transfer and capacity 
building as well. 
 
Marking another milestone in the prolonged climate negotiations, the 2007 Bali 
Action Plan strategically elevates technology transfer to a higher level by 
incorporating it in the working agenda of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). Together with mitigation, adaptation and financing, technology transfer is seen 
as one of the four “building blocks” for the upcoming negotiations. As required by the 
Bali Action Plan, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), supported and 
enabled by technology, finance and capacity building, will be assessed internationally 
in accordance with measurable, reportable and verifiable criteria (MRV).
10
 
Immediately afterwards, many Parties have forwarded proposals blueprinting their 
preferred Technology Mechanism (TM) scenarios on the basis of their experiences 
and specific circumstances. The follow-up proceedings such as Copenhagen Summit, 
Cancun and Durban Climate Talk all aim to create such a TM and making it fully 





In short, from a long-term historical perspective, achievements have been made in 
regulating climate technology transfer. The transfer of technology has gradually re-
entered the international arena and is now at the centre of the relevant legislation. The 
practical implementation of it, however, gives rise to a different picture.
12
 Up to now, 
climate technology transfer is seriously hampered by two obstacles: (1) the 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) of climate sound technologies in the private domain; 
(2) the financial measures in the public domain. In fact, there have been inherent 
deficiencies from the very beginning. Firstly, global climate governance was 
fragmented by its very nature. The likelihood of strong compliance is not initially 
high, although the UNFCCC progress on the whole has been positive. Secondly, in 
theory the UNFCCC is flexible enough to accommodate a wide variety of approaches, 
but in reality it cannot deal with the vast range of climate sound technologies, the 
                                                 
9
 The CDM forms a constructive link between international assistance and CERs. 
10
 Ch. 2.4.1 “The Bali Action Plan.” 
11
 For example, how to link the Technology Mechanism to the Finance Mechanism (the Green Climate Fund set up 
by the Copenhagen Accord) in theory, and how to structure the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the 
Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) under the proposed Technology Mechanism. 
12
 Yvo De Boer, “Beijing High-Level Conference on Climate Change: Technology Development and Technology 
Transfer,” 2009, available at 
www.unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/pdf/081107_speech_beijing.pdf. “Nowhere in the 
realm of the climate is change debate the need for alternative thinking more critical than in the development and 
transfer of clean technology.” 
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applications of which span many sectors. Finally, the essence of climate change-
related technology transfer –to address global climate externalities– has been 
inadequately considered. It is worth noting that the areas where the current progress 
reflects consensus are also the ones where consensus is relatively easy to find. 
Technology negotiations have not yet resulted in any new rules on technology transfer 
under the UNFCCC. Instead, key issues remain unresolved, and the progress achieved 
in formulating appropriate regulations is thus confronted by compromises, tensions 
and obstacles. 
 
6.3 What are the legal barriers in the process of supplying and receiving climate 
sound technologies in general and specifically how do they impact on 
international technology transfer? What kinds of solutions, if any, have been 
proposed to tackle these barriers? 
The effectiveness of climate change-related technology transfer requires participatory 
development.
13  
To achieve this, the UNFCCC establishes a broad foundation for 
multilateral actions on enabling environment, which accommodates the endeavors 
from both technology supplying and technology receiving countries, public and 
private sectors. Therefore, the question arises: what legal barriers occur in this process?  
 
（1） Legal barriers to supplying climate sound technologies 
The market of climate sound technology is becoming increasingly globalized. In this 
market, northern industrialized countries such as the US, Germany and Japan are clear 
leaders in technology innovation and will determine the rate at which the most 
advanced technologies spread in the next ten years. Because excessive GHG 
emissions were ignored during the industrial development of these countries and it is 
felt that they should reduce the costs of technology innovation usually (i.e., under 
normal circumstances) borne by recipients. Intergenerational equity has been encoded 
in this way, with priority for removing the legal obstacles to supplying technology.  
 
To date, there is a fundamental absence of explicit, definite and stringent 
commitments for technology transfer in the international climate framework. On the 
one hand, states need to be seen to be complying with commitments to build 
confidence and maintain trust. Rules, procedures that help to indentify non-
compliance increase the agreement‟s effectiveness in terms of mitigating and adapting 
to climate change, as free-riders can be identified.
14
 This, on the other hand, can only 
be done if a sound MRV structure exits. Existing MRV criteria are well-defined and 
work well in the field of national emission limits, but are deficient in others such as 
technology transfer. Unlike the Montreal Protocol, which clearly defines technologies 
and details technology transfer commitments, the inadequate specificity of relevant 
provisions in the UNFCCC makes reliable measurement difficult and results in 
unverifiable data. To determine where the violation is, the UNFCCC has to specify 
the minimum amount of assistance required by compliance. In particular, the MRV 
criteria for technology transfer are commitments made by developed countries in 
addition to the primary commitments of emission reductions. “It is unclear where 
technology commitments rank on the scale of all commitments in the climate change 
                                                 
13
 IPCC Report 2001, WGIII, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, Ch. 2.2.3 
“Developing Countries Actions.” It has been widely recognized to date, as a way of achieving effective technology 
transfer at all levels of development endeavors. 
14
 See Dominic Marcellino and Christiane Gerstetter, “Technology Transfer in the International Climate 
Negotiations: Assessment of Proposals and Discussion of Open Questions,” Ecologic Institute, 2010, p. 42. 
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agreement – and the preferred ranking may differ between countries.”
15
 The 
compliance system proves weak, from a procedural point of view. Disputes over 
climate technology transfer often resort to the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
of the WTO, and it remains unclear whether the UNFCCC can be considered to be on 
an equal footing with the WTO in dealing with disputes.
16
 The powers of the 
UNFCCC and the WTO must be coordinated in more detail. 
 
Concurrently, potential constraints exist in the international legal regime, e.g., IP 
protection. The IP related to TRIPS under the WTO has a complicated impact on 
technology transfer, and there has been no consensus on this among the key 
stakeholders. Northern countries have been reluctant even to negotiate on amending 
the TRIPS, or introducing controls on the external activities of their multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). In the US, for example, the Congress issued a directive in which 
it refused to accept any new climate treaty that limited the scope or exercise of 
American IP rights.
17
 Nevertheless, it is arguable that TRIPS is, on the whole, more 
concerned with how developing countries can provide an appropriate environment for 
technology transfer, than how developed countries can actively promote technology 
transfer.
 18
 Showing the awareness of this discrepancy, a number of Parties on the 
supply side, such as the EU, its Parliament have called for “corresponding 
adjustments” to be made in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
19
 Up to now, the IP 
issues are still major and the most challenging barriers to market-led technology 
transfer. To make progress on this issue is politically important in the current situation.  
 
Therefore, to strengthen its technology transfer mandate, the UNFCCC at the very 
least has to:  
 
- define the scope of climate change technology transfer and the details of the MRV 
criteria on this basis in the actual implementation of technology transfer provisions;  
- improve the compliance mechanism to reinforce legislation, particularly the improved 
and additional functions of the Facilitative Branch in the Compliance Committee;  
- re-evaluate the existing international legal regime and explore its potential 
contribution, while remove the existing barriers within or outside the UNFCCC 
framework. 
 
Domestically, key players such as the US and the EU have made specific 
announcements for emission reduction targets and financial supports; there has been 
no similar announcement presented in the field of technology transfer.
20
 In itself, this 
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 See Idem, p. 43. “For example, would an Annex II country that fully met its reduction commitments but did not 
meet all of its technology transfer commitments be deemed noncompliant?” 
16
 Specially, it is not clear whether the Facilitative Branch in the UNFCCC has equal weight to its counterpart in 
the WTO, for example how to define their jurisdictions concrete cases if a conflicts of jurisdictions, how to 
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adjudicate upon the case once trade measures are in place”.
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 See Harald Winkler, “Measurable, Reportable and 
Verifiable: the Keys to Mitigation in the Copenhagen Deal,” Climate Policy, Issue 8, 2008, pp. 544-545. 
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 See K. Maskus, “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate Technologies,” 
OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing, 2010, pp. 7-29. 
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Developing Countries,” DESA Working Paper, No. 71, 2008, p. 13.  
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passivity is not surprising, given that very few substantial incentives, like export 
credits, tax reliefs and green loans, are in place to enable technology flows towards 
developing countries. On the contrary, tight controls have been imposed on those 
technologies that make a major contribution to clean energy, energy efficiency and 
other environmental initiatives. Captured by dual-use export controls, these 
technologies are regarded to be sensitive and therefore require export licenses for the 
purpose of facilitating secure trade in this important area. On a global scale it slows 
down the natural spillovers of technologies, triggering information asymmetry and 
accountability deficiencies. Meanwhile in the official development assistances 
(ODAs), they play an irreplaceable role in certain sectors which attract fewer private 
funds, and are experiencing an overall decline both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage, particularly those with a significant impact on technology transfer to 
developing countries. The barriers stemming from this prove to be long-term, political 
and economic rather than immediate and legal. 
 
There is a gradual increase in the importance of the private sector in international 
technology transfer. The achievability of technology transfer sharply increases when 
this actor is engaged actively and effectively. However, given the common strategy of 
profit maximization and the often inadequate awareness of corporate social-
environmental responsibilities (CSRs), a great number of players in the private sector, 
particularly MNEs, adhere to restrictive business practices (RBPs) when transferring 
low carbon technologies abroad. These contractual RBPs are less likely to be 
completely prohibited in an environment dominated by regular technology transfer. 
Indeed, when countries insist on pursuing their economic interests, they are difficult 
to make real progress in transferring climate technologies on concessional and 
preferable terms. To reduce the private-sector barriers, efforts have been made to 
elaborate CSRs. Prescribed by some international industry standards, MNEs are 
assumed to promote the innovation and transfer of clean technology, as an essential 
part of their environmental responsibilities.
21
 The UNFCCC also sheds light on this, 
requiring cooperation and support from enterprises in the process of transfer. Another 
useful contribution comes from the newly emerging public private partnerships 
(PPPs), which target a wide range of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies. Within a context of less assertive and well-endowed national states 
which are reluctant to transfer powers to international bodies, PPPs have the merit of 
involving various stakeholders from intergovernmental agencies, private enterprises 
and non-governmental organizations. 
 
（2） Legal barriers to receiving climate sound technologies 
As a result of the immature global carbon market and the young international climate 
legislation framework, the transfer of climate-related technology is confronted by 
many barriers at the institutional level. The situation is getting worse in the less 
advanced environments of developing countries, which hope to acquire, assimilate 
and utilize up-to-date technologies from developed countries. Where necessary, 
developing country Parties have committed themselves to creating an enabling 
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environment by exploring and removing barriers.
22
 This allows them to take steps that 
will help prepare for potentially mandatory emission reductions in the future. 
However, a set of common constraints have been found in the aspects of climate 
negotiations, capacity building and regulatory framework. 
 
In the climate technology transfer negotiations, bargaining powers have mostly 
accrued to developed countries, whose technological and legal dominance is self-
evident. These countries have substantive speaking rights in the discussions on laying 
down technology transfer provisions. Although the UNFCCC has stipulated the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, strong equity concerns have 
been voiced in the negotiations on procedural and consequential issues. Currently, the 
dominant regulatory approach at the global level to tackling climate change seems to 
be the inappropriate one; to be properly inclusive and relatively effective, it needs to 
be designed to take account of the regulatory weakness of developing countries and 
not only the regulatory strengths of the developed world. For example, we have to 
understand the efforts at mitigation and adaptation to climate change as part of 
developing countries‟ wider development agenda. As the main technology recipients, 
developing countries are expected to take the lead in expanding equity into a broad 
technology transfer context beyond emission entitlements on which current post-
Kyoto negotiations centre.  
 
The continuing lack of capacity, at the level of both government and enterprises, is a 
well-recognized barrier to climate mitigation and adaptation through technology 
transfer. Governments are the principal actors responsible for enabling environments, 
while micro-level enterprises are the main cause of GHG problems and probably the 
major source of the final technology solution. This capacity barrier essentially results 
from technical, informational, financial and personnel shortages and deficiencies, 
whose incidence at enterprise level is highly correlated to that at government level. 
For example, a poor innovation system is hardly able to provide an environment in 
which enterprises can build solid knowledge bases needed to accommodate imported 
technologies.
23
 To overcome these barriers (and as the literature review has shown) 
various solutions have been proposed.
24
 These solutions are necessary, but not all of 
them are effective in a broad context where different stakeholders interact. For 
example, the measures to increase the absorptive capacity of developing countries 
arouse great concerns amongst international technology suppliers that technology 
transfer might trigger the emergence of new lower-cost competitors.  
 
Another basic challenge for host developing countries is to comprehensively improve 
their regulatory framework. An overall technology plan is at the heart of the 
regulatory framework. A common problem in developing countries is the shortage of 
a strategic, coherent and predictable plan for technology transfer in the new context of 
                                                 
22 Although a favourable environment for the international transfer of climate sound technology depends mainly on 
suppliers, it is difficult for technology assistance take place in the desired way in the absence of appropriate 
indigenous environments. FCCC/TP/2003/2, Enabling Environment for Technology Transfer, Technical Paper, 
UNITED, 4 June 2003, p. 4. 
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SERIES Working Paper, No. 147, 2011, pp. 12-13. 
24
 TT: Clear, “Climate Technology Centre and Network,” available at http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/CTCN.jsp. By 
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the Technology Mechanism (TM) to assist developing countries in reducing their technology information barriers.  
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climate change. Existing technology plans appear to be either short-term, isolated 
from mitigation policies or less effective as pure technology measures. Furthermore, 
specific environment/climate legislation tends to support technology transfer 
insufficiently and inefficiently. Until recently, the transfer of climate technology was 
largely left to market forces and economic legislation, even though the developing 
country world had (and still has) difficulties transferring technology by means of the 
more traditional mechanism. This is primarily because traditional mechanisms such as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology licensing are too sensitive to be 
structured; they are either heavily regulated or inadequately supervised. It is therefore 
important for the government in these countries to encourage green investments 
without leading to green protectionism. Additionally, technology transfer activities in 
response to climate change are poorly incentivized in developing countries. So far, 
these countries have possibly been less able to find ways to implement a more 




In sum, what remains common to all cases is the desirability of a supportive 
regulatory framework, and enabling environment more generally, together with the 
circulation of knowledge and capabilities among individuals and institutions in host 
countries. It is perhaps not surprising to find that not all barriers described above are 
legal in nature. In fact, some are based on practical problems, such as an information 
imbalance and inadequacy of capacity, and these could be resolved with broader 
government policies. The barriers are also outlined here, as they not only determine 
enterprises‟ choice of technology, but also have a profound effect on the 
implementation and enforcement of technology transfer provisions. On a related point, 
implementing and enforcing laws can have a counterproductive effect. It is nearly 
impossible to obtain conclusive evidence and therefore have an overall vision of such 
consequential barriers. A context-based response is therefore required for the great 
likelihood of effective technology transfer. As a developing country and recipient of 
climate sound technology, China serves as a good example. 
 
6.4 Has climate change-related technology transfer been regulated in China? 
What legal barriers exist specifically in Chinese legislation and practices? 
In the wake of global endeavors to address climate change using technology, the 
response of individual countries varies. How has China responded? 
 
（1） Background  
China, being under serious threat of climate hazards, has taken top-down actions to 
reduce the intensity of GHG in the atmosphere and has expended noticeable efforts in 
a relatively short time.
26
 Its technological needs to respond to climate change have 
expanded enormously as a result. To satisfy these needs, China has integrated 
mitigation and adaptation technologies into sci-tech, high-tech development plans. It 
has also set ambitious goals to reduce foreign reliance by dedicatedly fostering native 
innovation. Over the last decades, Chinese technology levels in key sectors like 
energy, raw materials and particularly renewable energies have risen. Yet, a 
significant gap exists between indigenous technological capacity and the 
technological demands related to climate improvement. China still lacks the core 
knowledge of important climate technologies (i.e., wind, solar and biomass), and the 
                                                 
25
 Incentives need to be introduced to attract the voluntary participation of industries and to complement 
command-and-control legislation. 
26
 Ch. 5.1.1.1 “Climate Change and China.” 
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lock-in effect of coal-intensive technologies will lead to high emissions for the next 
twenty years. This could well present significant transfer opportunities to foreign 




Today, the reality in China is that climate technologies continue to be transferred 
mainly on a business-as-usual basis. This is even more apparent in the case of 
mitigation technologies which are currently at pre-commercial or supported 
commercial stages of development and may therefore require some form of 
government support in order to facilitate their wider adoption. The rate of technology 
transfer through other channels like CDM projects, inter-governmental cooperation 
and official development assistance (ODA) is too slow. For example, the current level 
of technology transfer in CDM projects proves low, in terms of both how it takes 
place and the degree of integration between technology suppliers and project owners. 
To improve its record, China has expressed the urgent and immediate needs of 
technology transfer in climate diplomacy, while it has launched several technology 
needs assessments (TNAs) domestically to identify real technology needs and 
determine benefits that these technologies can bring to GHG emission reduction and 
adaptation to climate change. It is of great importance that these needs are recognized, 
understood and supported by the world community.  
 
（2） Chinese legislation on climate change-related technology transfer 
China‟s legal framework of climate change-related technology transfer is recent, 
starting only in the early 1990s after it signed the UNFCCC. Since then, this 
framework has developed with the evolution of international efforts and it is 
increasingly seen as being integral to the country‟s future legal system.
28
 At the 
moment, China does not have an UNFCCC of its own: a comprehensive Climate 
Change Act.
29
 Nor has it promulgated any law on general technology transfer 
activities. Rather, technology transfer formulations in response to climate change have 
been scattered over many specific laws which are essentially of two kinds: climate 
change-related legislation and economic legislation.  
 
Climate change-related legislation Economic legislation 
Constitution 
 
Environment Protection Law 
 






Technology Contract Law 
 
                                                 
27
 According to a study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), China will need to deploy 62 key 
technologies to fulfil its carbon intensity reduction pledge of 40 to 45% by 2020, but it lacks 43 of these, which 
means significant business opportunities for foreign enterprises that possess these technologies. In other words, 70% 
of the relevant technologies have to be imported. See “One Obstacle in China‟s Low-carbon Revolution: 70% of 
Key Technologies Have to be Imported,” 18 May 2010, available at 
http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/11623451.html. 
28
 China’s National Climate Change Program, Prepared under the Auspices of National Development and Reform 
Commission People‟s Republic of China, 2007, p. 11.  
29
 For a long time, administrative instructions have played a major role in setting realistic energy conservation 
targets and engaging in environmental activities. Along with increasingly mature legislative conditions, the 
promulgation of such an act has been put on the agenda of the 12th Five-Year Plan. It is distinctly possible that a 
new act would involve clean technology transfer. Yet, it is also highly likely that technology transfer will be 




Energy Conservation Law  
 
Renewable Energy Law 
 
Circular Economy Promotion Law 
 
 Cleaner Production Promotion Law 
Regulation on the Administration of 
Technology Introduction Contracts 
 
Implementation Regulations on the PRC 
Law on Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures  
 
 
Climate change-related legislation 
Climate change laws are seldom applied in complete isolation, as they overlap with 
other national laws relating to the environment, energy and therefore, in many cases 
require more than one legal instrument. In this overarching framework, the 
Constitution situates at the highest, guiding and coordinating all national and sub-
national actions to address climate change with technological solutions.  
 
When it comes to specific environmental issues, China‟s Environment Protection Law 
is the parent law. Its stipulations on environmental protection and pollution control 
are climate friendly. This is also the case with the Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Law, although CO2 has been considered distinct from atmospheric pollutants 
in China and are therefore excluded from the existing regime for the anti-air 
pollution.
30
 To some extent, this cancels the reduction of GHG emissions on a whole. 
Clean coal technologies are given priority in this law and increasingly tight 
technology standards provide room for up-scaling foreign advanced technologies. In 
the energy laws field, the Energy Conservation Law and the Renewable Energy Law, 
which primarily aim at rational energy utilization and air quality improvement, yield 
GHG reduction co-benefits. Particularly, the Energy Conservation Law contains a 
technology transfer provision which specifically mandates the authorities to make 
preferential tax and other policies for the purpose of encouraging the import of 
advanced energy conservation technologies. At the same time, however, the Chinese 
clean energy and technology market presents a paradox: the central government 
strategically encourages energy independence, local manufacture and innovation 
capacity. Typically, in the Renewable Energy Law, there are no words like “import” 
and “international cooperation”, as there are in the Energy Conservation Law. 
Furthermore, tackling climate change involves systematically developing a low-
carbon economy. The Circular Economy Promotion Law and the Cleaner Production 
Promotion Law foster local clean technologies, because of their potential impact on 
enterprises‟ environmental performance. Strategically, these laws focus on sector-
specific technologies that require the use of special methodologies. For example, the 
clean protection methodology itself has first to be transferred from abroad before it 
can be applied on a national scale.   
 
In a nutshell, technology transfer provisions in Chinese climate change legislation are 
sparse. Although nearly all related laws involve a strong technological component by 
setting forth general technology promotion clauses and international cooperation 
                                                 
30
 However, it is also important to be aware of the different environment for the implementation of primary 
legislation. See Lara Hansen, Christopher R. Pyke, “Climate Change and Federal Environmental Law,” 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2007, p. 26.  “Achieving the original goals of environment 
related regulations will require a careful assessment of long-standing assumptions, as well as decisive action to 
change regulatory practices in ways that accommodate, offset, and mitigate climate change.” 
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clauses, they show different degrees of correlation to technology transfer. Moreover, 
these provisions concerned are vague and in need of substantial elaboration.  
 
Economic legislation 
Like many developing countries, China has left climate technology transfer to market 
forces and economic legislation by and large. Due to the lack of uniform technology 
transfer law, current regulations on IP protection, competition, technology contracts, 
foreign trade and investment have a role to play.  
 
Before transferring technologies, the IPRs to technologies need to be explicitly 
determined by law in order for supply enterprises to be able to rely on their property 
rights. China has improved IPRs legislation in many aspects. Some improvements, 
like compulsory licensing and litigation against infringement, have a far-reaching 
impact on climate technology flows. Particularly, public health interest has been 
added as a new ground for compulsory licensing. Under the compulsory licensing, 
individual or enterprise seeking to use a patent can do so without seeking the patent 
holder‟s consent, and pays the patent holder a set fee for the license.
31
 However, it 
may be too early to conclude that Chinese IP laws have a particular focus on foreign 
participants and technology transfer. In fact, the balance between the promotion of 
foreign technology transfer and native technology innovation is delicate.
32
 To mitigate 
the side effects of a strict IP regime, China has promulgated the Antimonopoly Law, 
and its goals of promoting science, fair competition and public welfare are likely to 
improve the access of clean technologies to the market. Foreign technology holders 
should promote their lawful IP rights with care if they are to extend them in 
technology transfer deals.  
 
In foreign trade, technology for climate mitigation and adaptation is deemed to be 
freely transferable. Energy-saving measures, new materials and new energy vehicles 
have been added to the encouraged list for importation, and incorporated in the range 
of national subsidies. Detailed favourable measures like duty removal and value-
added tax concession have been put in place. To provide procedural guidance and 
ascertain whether technology import fits local development interests, China has 
introduced a contract registration system. Recently, online registration has been 
applied to any freely imported technologies, including climate sound technologies, 
provided that the contract was approved by the competent authority. A national 
review is to be conducted primarily for unreasonable restrictions in a contractual 
context.  
 
Foreign investment is another frequently used channel for China to introduce climate 
technologies. According to Chinese foreign investment policies, laws and regulations, 
foreign investors are allowed to contribute intangible technology when investing in 
China, provided the proportion of asset appraisal meets certain limitations. Very 
recently, China opened up FDI wider to clean energy industries, and foreign investors 
have been given preferential treatment, e.g., in relation to income tax and sales tax. 
China is trying to promote inter-company joint ventures to make full use of 
knowledge spillovers. This investment structure could promote trust among 
                                                 
31
 Ch. 3.1.1.2.2 “Assessing the Role of IPRs in Climate Change -related Technology Transfer.” 
32
 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD and UNCTAD), “Intellectual Property 
Rights: Implications for Development,” 2003, p. 85. It is to be expected that strong IPRs reduce the scope for 
informal technology transfer via imitation, which is an important form of learning and technical change. 
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stakeholders, which is a prerequisite for global climate cooperation. Meanwhile, FDI 
must meet certain key local policy objectives. Local content and technology transfer 
requirements have occasionally been imposed in clean energy and technology sectors 
such as gas turbines, new-energy vehicle production and wind turbine technology. 





In conclusion, within a more traditional mechanism, climate technology transfer 
encounters both risks and opportunities. Some amendments have recently been 
adopted in an attempt to follow the global trend and bring China more closely in line 
with international requirements like the TRIPS. Others efforts, however, proceed on 
the basis of different assumptions, for example, compulsory licensing formulated 
basically for exempting certain technologies from strong patentability. Interestingly, 
this is a point which corresponds to climate sound technology by its very nature, but 
presumably becomes a source of barriers in a real world scenario.   
 
（3） Barriers in the legal basis of climate change-related technology 
transfer 
Although legal obstacles to climate technology transfer in China reflect some of the 
common problems found in the developing world, they are specific in some 
significant respects. Currently, it is not only technology transfer provisions themselves 




Despite the limited number, technology transfer provisions are at the heart of the 
climate change framework associated with technology transfer. However, as in many 
other developing countries, these provisions have not achieved a breakthrough by 
clearly defining the key concept of technology transfer. The limitations of their scope 
are also apparent. Crucial issues such as climate adaptation, post-transfer activities 
and capacity-building remain outside the central climate framework. Typically, 
almost all technology transfer provisions lack explicitly determined legal 
consequences, resulting only in policy being dictated or yet another “best-effort” 
requirement. It becomes clear that China‟s technology transfer provisions have fallen 
short of the goal of the UNFCCC to enable an environment for effective technology 
transfer, as well as of the expectations of some key participants. 
 
As the technology transfer provisions have a superficial influence, there are naturally 
high hopes for climate governance in a broad context, though this has proved to be 
highly policy-centric and bureaucratic. Concrete mechanisms like the CDM and ODA, 
which as far as China is concerned are firmly linked to technology transfer 
commitments, operate inefficiently because of existing barriers. Some barriers 
originate from the design of mechanisms, such as the additionality needed for CDM 
approval, to which the transfer of technology marginally contributes. These barriers 
certainly depend on international developments. Other barriers are of an entirely local 
                                                 
33
 Local governments were considered to favour domestic players over foreign investors, which may violate the 
WTO principle of national treatment. After acceding to the WTO, China revised its major three FDI laws and 
called off some compulsory technology transfer requirements; only certain voluntary requirements remained. 
34
 In the broader context, climate governance, environmental protection, technological change and economic 
concerns combine to deal with climate change-related technology transfer.  
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nature. Several specific industry regulations on technology make it difficult for 




Environmental protection and pollution control are speeding up the phase-out of coal-
intensive technologies. In China‟s reality, several environment laws, particularly 
climate change-related laws, have been enacted rapidly in an attempt to accomplish 
departmental agendas or legislative deadlines for the adoption of certain laws. 
Inadequate legal research was carried out in advance, leading to a disjunction of 
provisions and practices. For example, the fast-track design of some technology 
standards fails to fully consider cost‐effective alternatives and ongoing incentives for 
improvement. As in technology transfer provisions, there are more or less similar 
statutory deficiencies in the broad environmental laws, e.g., the ambiguous, 
aspirational language that is adopted. Technology transfer is encouraged but rarely 
required, due to the lack of detailed goals and specific procedures. More in general, in 
China it is cheaper to break environmental laws than to abide by them, which 
provides a strong incentive for domestic and foreign enterprises not to comply with 




In practice, technology transfer takes place as a part of technology change. In general, 
“clean technology policy and law are developed without underlying theory in present 
China”.
37
Up to now, China still lacks well-designed Science &Technology (S&T) 
policies for the development and transfer of climate sound technology,
38
 and lacks the 
mechanism to achieve a balance. In common with many developing countries, 
China‟s S&T policies are poorly linked to mitigation policies. However, in China, the 
tension between national technology innovation and international technology transfer 
is exceptionally strong in the clean energy and technology sectors. In addition, China 
is traditionally weak with regard to technology innovation and entrepreneurial 
capacity. The ongoing S&T policies however give inadequate weight to these 
important traditions. Instead of comprehensive technology deployment strategies, they 
merely result in lists of technologies.  
 
In the current international economic order, host developing countries have been 
asked to provide a reasonably open, completely competitive market. It is however 
easier said than done. For many developing countries including China, it is 
challenging to soundly integrate the environmental agenda with economic objectives. 
Related key issues concern the accessibility and affordability of climate sound 
technologies, and the barriers which are emerging from IP protection, pro-competition, 
importation controls and FDI. On the one hand, because of the lack of long-term 
                                                 
35
 Technology Transfer in CDM Projects in China, EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, 2010, p. 11. In clean coal 
technology, for example, the relevant regulations require the use of coal bed methane (CBM) and coal mine 
methane (CMM) when the concentration rate is above 30%. Similar requirements also apply in several new 
regulations on the utilization of waste heat in the cement industry. “While these regulations will be beneficial for 
the environment and energy development in these specific sectors in China, [the] introduction of foreign 
technologies through CDM may be impeded since, by definition, these projects may no longer fulfil the 
requirements of additionality.”  
36
 Actually, along with China‟s endeavors to promote clean production and energy conservation, the costs 
associated with implementing new large-scale industrial technologies relative to achieving incremental 
improvements to existing technologies increase considerably. 
37
 See Bo Wang, “Can CDM Bring Technology Transfer to China- An Empirical Study of Technology Transfer in 
China‟s CDM Projects,” 38 Energy Policy 2010, p. 2575. 
38 
See Mu Rongping, “Development of Science and Technology Policy in China,” Institute of Policy & 
Management, Chinese Academy of Science, 2010, p. 9. 
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strategy for clean energy and technology industry, the barriers which occur in this 
respect appear to be particularly formidable in China. For example, the context for 
importing clean technologies is generally unstable. On the other hand, the primary 
aim of economic laws is to maximize the economic value of innovative technology. 
Fundamentally, laws which proceed from a clear business-as-usual assumption are not 
likely to play a role in the technological solution to climate change. Nowadays, there 
are systematic yet incomplete reforms in China. Great risks as well as great potential 
go hand in hand with the clean technology market in China. 
 
Finally, climate sound technologies and their transfer are relatively new to China and 
explicit new formulations are needed in order to create regulatory certainty. To a large 
extent, the Chinese legislation does not yield the desired results. Meanwhile, it could 
be said that in contemporary China, the implementation and enforcement of law 
cannot keep pace with its high rate of adoption. There are several reasons for this 
discrepancy, ranging from historical reasons rooted in legal traditions to practical 
reasons resulting from weak capacity. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese traditional 
practices in legal doctrine, the civil law system, transparency and institutional 
attitudes have an enormous impact on climate change related technology transfer. 
Confucianism for example has a profound influence on the role of law, the public 
perception of knowledge and the model for the settlement of disputes.
39
 Realistically, 
the transfer of technology is hampered by an inadequate capacity of both government 
and enterprises, and their potential technical, marketing, financial and institutional 
shortcomings. The capacity for implementation and enforcement is even weaker at the 
subnational level, i.e., by local governments and different sectors. Fortunately, in 
recent years, the relationship between capacity building and regulatory enforcement 
has begun to attract much-needed attention in the field of Chinese environmental law. 
 
This, the second decade of the 21
st
 century, may prove crucial in reducing global 
carbon emissions. Technology transfer tracks progress towards country-specific and 
collective climate goals. To facilitate this dynamic process and bring more climate 
friendly technologies to those developing countries that need them most, it is of vital 
importance to identify, evaluate and remove legal barriers. This is also a valuable 
pioneering opportunity on the path to climate justice as a hallmark of a highly 
developed political and legal civilization. 
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